कानून और आज की व्यवस्था (Video)

श्रीलंका का संकट और “जनता अरगलय”

“हम नहीं जानते और न ही जान सकते हैं कि संसारव्यापी आर्थिक और राजनीतिक संकट के परिणामस्वरूप सभी देशों में उड़ने वाली असंख्य चिंगारियों में से कौन सी चिंगारी आग को भड़काएगी, यानी जनता को उठा खड़ा कर देगी।” — लेनिन (1920)

श्रीलंका की हाल की घटनाएँ आशा और निराशा दोनों ही पैदा करती हैं — अगर एक तरफ पिछले कई महीनों से दिखती जन-क्रियाओं की दृढ़ता, निरंतरता और बहुआयामिता को देख कर आशा पैदा होती है, तो दूसरी तरफ इन घटनाओं के तात्कालिक नतीजे निराश करते हैं। यह बात सही है कि जिस फुर्ती से आंदोलन के नतीजतन राजसत्ता के चिह्नित मोहरे अप्रैल से जुलाई के अंतराल में एक एक कर लुढ़क रहे थे — मंत्रियों की कैबिनेट, केन्द्रीय बैंक के गवर्नर, प्रधानमंत्री, और अंत में राष्ट्रपति गोताबया का देश से भागना और बाहर से इस्तीफा देना — उतनी ही तेजी से नए मोहरे जुलाई के मध्य से सत्ता की सीढ़ियों पर चढ़ते गए। श्रीलंका में जहाँ तमाम राजनीतिक आभिजात्य संकर नस्ल के हैं — यानी उनके बीच आंतरिक और आपसी प्रजनन (केवल वैचारिक नहीं) की एक मजबूत परंपरा रही है, वहाँ महान इतालवी लेखक ज्यूसेप्पे तोमासी दी लांपेदूजा के उपन्यास “इल गात्तोपार्दो” (तेंदुआ) का व्यवस्थापरक कूटनीतिक निचोड़ — Cambiare tutto perché niente cambi (सब कुछ बदलो ताकि कुछ न बदले) पूरी तरह से लागू होता है। और कई दशकों से यही होता रहा है।

परंतु इस बार कुछ तो अलग हुआ — श्रीलंका में वैश्विक सत्ताओं को भी श्रीलंका के इस आभिजात्य वर्ग की क्षमता पर शक होने लगा। यही वजह थी कि अमरीकी राजदूत जुली चुँग भूतपूर्व-“क्रांतिकारी आतंकवादी” जनता विमुक्ति पेरामुन (जेवीपी) के नेतृत्व को भी एक विकल्प के रूप में पेश करने लगीं। इन पिटे हुए नेताओं से मिलकर चुँग ने कहा कि “मुझे पता है कि अतीत में बहुत सारी बयानबाजी हुई थी”, परंतु आज “मेरे लिए जेवीपी एक महत्वपूर्ण पार्टी है। उसकी मौजूदगी बढ़ रही है। आज की जनता पर उसकी पकड़ मजबूत है।” सचमुच सब कुछ बदलना पड़ता है ताकि कुछ न बदले। परंतु विक्रमसिंघे के राष्ट्रपति पद पर काबिज होने और भूतपूर्व त्रात्स्कीपंथी दिनेश गुणवर्देन के प्रधानमंत्री पद को संभालने से जेवीपी की बढ़ती महत्वाकांक्षा को एक हास्यास्पद अंत मिला, और फिलहाल सब कुछ बदलने की जरूरत नहीं पड़ी।

जो श्रीलंका की घटनाओं में निश्चित यथेष्ट “क्रांतिकारी” बदलाव देखना चाहते थे उनको अवश्य ही यह नतीजा उदासीन करता है। मगर तात्कालिक राजनीतिक बदलावों से आंदोलन की महत्ता तय नहीं होती। ऐसे बदलावों में क्रांति को ढूँढ़ने वाले यह भूलते हैं कि फ्रांसीसी क्रांति ने पूंजीवाद को पैदा नहीं किया, पूंजीवाद ने फ्रांसीसी क्रांति को जन्म दिया; या फिर, रूसी क्रांति बोलशेविकों के दिमाग की उपज नहीं थी, सोवियतों और अन्य सामाजिक सरोकारों में होते बदलावों ने रूसी क्रांति को जन्म दिया। नतीजों के आधार पर अगर जन उभारों और क्रांतियों के औचित्य को तय करेंगे तो निराशा हाथ लगनी ही है। यदि हम इन आंदोलनों को जन-क्रिया के संघटन और अवस्थाओं के रूप में न देखकर कर्मफलहेतु समझते रहेंगे हमें ये आंदोलन विफल क्या निरर्थक भी लगेंगे — और तब तो बीसवीं सदी की महान क्रांतियों और प्रतिक्रांतियों के सौ साल को हम एक जगह पर घूमने वाले चक्र की तरह देखेंगे और हम नहीं समझ पाएंगे कि किस प्रकार सर्वहारा जन की क्रियाओं और उनके सामूहिक आत्मनिर्णय ने पूंजीवाद के तमाम अवतारों को संकटग्रस्त रखा, उनको भी जो सर्वहारा क्रांतियों में जनित सत्ता के अलगाव के मूर्तरूप थे और जिन्हें समाजवाद का नाम दिया गया था।

श्रीलंका को लेकर तमाम व्याख्याओं में जन-संघर्ष (जनता अरगलय) को जीवन-स्तरों में गिरावट को लेकर श्रमिक वर्ग (खास तौर पर उसके मध्य-वित्तीय तबके — इन्हें ही मध्यम वर्ग आजकल कहते हैं) की प्रतिक्रिया के रूप में देखा गया है। इनकी दृष्टि में जनता क्रियाशील नहीं प्रतिक्रियाशील है। वर्चस्वकारी शक्तियों के बौद्धिक सिपाही इसमें कुछ विपक्षीय दलों और राष्ट्रविरोधी तत्वों का षड्यंत्र देखते हैं तो प्रगतिशील लोग आशातीत होते हैं परंतु वांछित नतीजा न देखकर आंदोलन के अंदर राजनीति और राजनीतिज्ञों की कमी का रोना रोते हैं। श्रीलंका के संदर्भ में तो कुछ लोग इसे चीन के खिलाफ अमरीका के नेतृत्व में साम्राज्यवादी खेमे की चालबाज़ी देखते हैं। इन सभी व्याख्याकारों के लिए जन-क्रिया की कोई स्वायत्तता नहीं है — व्यवस्था के व्याकरण में जनता औसत व्यक्तियों अथवा नागरिकों की भीड़ है जो केवल अपनी प्रतिक्रिया दे सकती है, कोई पहल नहीं कर सकती।

पूंजीवादी संकटों को महज आर्थिक प्रबंधन की कमजोरियों और गलत नीतियों के नतीजे के तौर पर देखना तो अवश्य ही गलत है, परंतु इन संकटों की वस्तुनिष्ठता को सामाजिक व्यवहार और संघर्षों के दायरे से परे समझना शायद उससे भी बड़ी गलती है। कम से कम मार्क्सवादियों का यह वैचारिक-कार्यक्रमात्मक दायित्व है कि वे जन-संघर्षों में इस तरह की द्वैतवादी अपरिष्कृतता की आलोचना करें ताकि ये संघर्ष व्यवस्था-बद्ध वर्चस्वकारी माँगवादी राजनीति के आगे अग्रसर हो अपने ही अंदर मौजूद सामूहिक तत्वों के आधार पर नए समाज के प्रारूप पेश कर सकें।

राजनीतिक अर्थशास्त्र की मार्क्सवादी आलोचना पूंजीवाद की संरचना, राजनीतिक अर्थशास्त्रीय अवधारणाओं और उपस्थित बाह्यरूपों के तह में सामाजिक संबंधों के प्रक्रियात्मक सत्य और उनके आंतरिक अंतर्विरोधों को उजागर करती है। उसके अनुसार राष्ट्रीय और अंतरराष्ट्रीय संकटों को वर्गीय संबंधों — पूंजी और श्रम के अंतर्द्वंद्व — द्वारा समझने की जरूरत है। ऐसा न करने से हम मेहनतकश जनता को महज आर्थिक और राजनीतिक नीतियों के भुक्तभोगी की तरह देखते रहेंगे और उनके नायकत्व के चरित्र से अनभिज्ञ हम भी उसके अलगाव के जरिया बन अधिनायकों और राजसत्ता के पूजक बने रहेंगे। यह बात सही है कि मानव-जन अपना इतिहास मनचाहे ढंग से नहीं बनाते और वे उसे अपनी मनचाही परिस्थितियों में भी नहीं बनाते, पर तब भी वे उसे स्वयं बनाते हैं।

श्रीलंका के जनता अरगलय का तात्कालिक संदर्भ एक प्रकार का आर्थिक संकट है जिसके कारण को बहुत आसानी से स्थानीय अव्यवस्थाओं पर मढ़ा जा सकता है। वैसे भी संकटों के सारे स्वरूपों को अर्थशास्त्री आमतौर पर तकनीकी चरों और अचरों के असंतुलन के रूप में पेश करते हैं। कुछ अर्थशास्त्रियों के अनुसार चूंकि ये संतुलन पूंजीवादी प्रक्रियाओं में स्वभावतः मौजूद होता है, असंतुलन बाह्य कारकों के हस्तक्षेप का नतीजा है। इन अर्थशास्त्रियों के अनुसार राजकीय व्यवस्था का मुख्य काम अपने और अन्य “बाह्य” कारकों के हस्तक्षेप को न्यूनतम करना है। अन्य अर्थशास्त्रियों के लिए पूंजीवादी प्रक्रियाएँ अपने आप में असंतुलित हैं इसलिए राज्य व्यवस्था का हस्तक्षेप जरूरी है। मामला दोनों के लिए प्रबंधन का है। दोनों ही पूंजीवादी प्रक्रियाओं को स्वतःस्फूर्त मानते हैं — बस अंतर उनके नैसर्गिक संतुलनता के सवाल पर है।

दोनों पक्षों के लिए सरकार और राजनीतिक शक्तियों की स्वायत्त सत्ता है जो मन चाहे ढंग से आर्थिक प्रबंधन कर सकती है। ये दृष्टिकोण पूंजी, आर्थिक प्रक्रियायों और यहाँ तक कि बाजार की भी जिंसीकृत समझ रखते हैं — इनको सामाजिक संबंधों के रूप में नहीं देखते। इसी कारण से वे समझ नहीं पाते कि किस प्रकार राजसत्ता, सरकार, राजनीति और आर्थिक-वैधानिक नीतियाँ इन संबंधों के गतिकी में जड़ित हैं — उनकी सापेक्ष स्वायत्तता की प्रतीति इस गतिकी के अन्तर्विरोधात्मक चरित्र का नतीजा है। इस अन्तर्विरोधात्मकता के जड़ में पूंजी-श्रम संबंध का द्वंद्ववाद है। यही अंतर्विरोध समयासमय संकट को जन्म देता है जो विभिन्न रूप ले सकता है, परंतु इतना तो साफ है कि पूंजी अथवा उसके तंत्र पूंजीवाद का संकट अंततः पूंजी-श्रम के संबंध का संकट है।

मार्क्सवाद ने पूंजीवादी संकट के विभिन्न अभिव्यक्तियों को पूंजीवादी संचय के गूढ़तम प्रक्रियाओं से जोड़ कर विभिन्न संकट सिद्धांतों की पेशकश की है। ज्यादातर मार्क्सवादी “अर्थशास्त्री” (पेशेवर और शौकिया दोनों) भी इन सिद्धांतों को महज पूंजी और पूँजीपतियों के विकास के सिद्धांत के रूप में देखते हैं जिसका वर्ग-संघर्ष से सीधा कोई वास्ता नहीं है। यदि उसमें प्रतिस्पर्धा की बात आती भी है तो उसे पूंजी की विभिन्न इकाइयों के बीच रिश्ते का पर्याय समझा जाता है। सामान्य तौर पर संकट को उत्पादन और संचरण की एकता में विच्छेद के रूप में देखा जाता है — बहस महज उत्पादन या संचरण के केन्द्रीयता को लेकर होती है। इस विच्छेद में निस्संदेह तथाकथित “उत्पादन शक्तियों” की निर्णायक भूमिका समझी जाती है, परंतु इन शक्तियों की गणना में जो सबसे महत्वपूर्ण तत्व है, यानी मानवीय श्रम, उसे ही निष्कासित कर इन्हें टेक्नोलॉजी का पर्याय मान लिया जाता है। इस तरह राजनीतिक अर्थशास्त्र की मार्क्सवादी आलोचना की विशिष्टता गायब हो जाती है और उसकी अवधारणाएं जड़ता का शिकार हो जाती हैं। निष्कर्षतः मार्क्सवादियों के बीच भी पूंजीवादी संकट के तमाम सिद्धांत निवेश चरित्र और यांत्रिक ब्रेकडाउन के सिद्धांत बन जाते हैं। (बेल 1977; बेल और क्लीवर 1982) इस प्रकार पूंजीवादी संकट के मार्क्सवादी सिद्धांतों के अन्तर्सम्बन्ध और अखंडता का संप्रत्ययात्मक (conceptual) आधार ओझल हो जाता है और ये सिद्धांत अलग-अलग, यहाँ तक कि विरोधास्पद प्रतीत होते हैं। इन सब के केंद्र में श्रम और वर्ग संघर्ष के सवाल जो इन तमाम सिद्धान्तों को बांधते थे, उनके ओझल हो जाने से पूंजीवादी संकट की विभिन्न अभिव्यक्तियाँ विकेन्द्रित होकर अपनी-अपनी कहानियाँ गढ़ती हैं।

इस तरह जो कारण है वह महज कार्य में तब्दील हो जाता है, वह कुंठित प्रतिक्रियात्मकता का द्योतक हो जाता है, और कई टुकड़ों में संगठित हो राजनीतिक प्रतिस्पर्धा का मोहरा बन कर रह जाता है। अर्थशास्त्रीय मार्क्सवादियों से तो यही उम्मीद की जाती है परंतु राजनीतिक मार्क्सवादी भी पूंजी की जिंसीकृत ही नहीं व्यक्तिकृत समझ रखते हैं और उसे सामाजिक संबंध और निर्वैयक्तिक सत्ता के रूप में नहीं देख पाते। तथाकथित मार्क्सवादी राजनीतिज्ञों के अनुसार पूंजी कोई वस्तु है जिस पर पूँजीपतियों का आधिपत्य है और अगर मजदूर उस पर कब्जा कर लें तो सब ठीक हो जाएगा।

जबकि मार्क्स के लिए पूंजी वह सामाजिक संबंध है जिसके तहत पूंजीपति पूंजीपति होते हैं, और मजदूर मजदूर होते हैं। पूंजीवादी संकट के विभिन्न स्वरूप इस संबंध के आंतरिक संकट की अभिव्यक्तियाँ हैं। वर्ग-संघर्ष केवल फैक्ट्री या फैक्ट्रियों के अंदर अथवा मजदूरों-पूंजीपतियों के बीच के सीधे टकराव से ही नहीं शुरू होता। वह तो आदिम संचय द्वारा श्रम को दोहरी आजादी मिलने से लेकर श्रम बाजार की धक्कम-धुक्की से होता हुआ वर्कशॉपों, फैक्ट्रियों, जमीनों, या कहें उत्पादन/श्रम संबंधों के तमाम स्वरूपों को समेटता हुआ, उपभोग की सीमाओं में घुस श्रम-शक्ति और बेशी आबादी के पुनरुत्पादन के सवाल से जूझता है। या कहें आज पूरा समाज ही सामाजिक फैक्ट्री के रूप में वर्ग संघर्ष का रणक्षेत्र है। इन तमाम सामाजिक-आर्थिक क्षेत्रों में वर्ग-संघर्ष मौजूद है, पूंजी की समस्याएँ इन सारे क्षेत्रों में श्रम को नियंत्रित करने की हैं, और इसी में असफलताएँ संकट के विभिन्न स्वरूपों को पैदा करती हैं।

III

अंतर्राष्ट्रीय कर्ज के संकट को लेकर अर्थशास्त्रीय अटकलें कर्ज की तह में छुपे सामाजिक-राजनीतिक तत्वों को सामने नहीं आने देतीं। 1982 के मेक्सिको संकट से लेकर आज तक कई प्रकार के कर्ज संकट हमारे सामने आए हैं। ये कर्ज मुख्यतः सरकारी और बहुपक्षीय अंतर्राष्ट्रीय वित्तीय संस्थानों द्वारा दिए जाते हैं, परंतु हाल के वर्षों में निजी संस्थानों का हिस्सा बढ़ता जा रहा है। ये कर्ज साधारणतः आधारिक संरचना और बाजार के विकास के नाम पर लिया जाता है, परंतु ये मासूम लगने वाले कारक सामाजिक-भौगोलिक दिक्काल का कायापलट कर स्थानीय सामाजिकता को पूरी तरह से झकझोर देते हैं। इनका काम उन सामाजिक संबंधों और क्रियाओं को इस प्रकार पुनर्संयोजित करना है ताकि नई स्थितियों के विकास में वे बाधक न हों और उनके अधीन रह वे उत्पादक बन सकें। मार्क्सवादी भाषा में यही आदिम संचय की प्रक्रिया है जो संसाधन को आबादी के नियंत्रण से और आबादी के श्रम को पुराने सामाजिक संबंधों से आजाद करती है, ताकि वे पूंजीवादी संचय और बाजार के विकास के आधार बन सकें।

इसके अलावे कर्ज की वे शर्तें हैं जिन्हे संरचनात्मक अनुकूलन कार्यक्रम अथवा संरचनात्मक सुधार कहते हैं और जिनके तहत स्थानीय अर्थव्यवस्था, संस्थाओं और सामाजिक संबंधों को वैश्विक पूंजी संचय की जरूरतों के अनुकूल विकसित करने की कोशिश होती है। निजीकरण, श्रम बाजार का युक्तिकरण, मौद्रिकरण का विस्तार, मितव्ययिता इत्यादि ऐसे औजार हैं जो स्थानीय श्रमिकों की आबादी को लाचार बना उन्हें इन जरूरतों के अनुसार अनुशासित करने की कोशिश करते हैं। पूंजी के स्थानीय प्रशासक उधार ली गई धनराशि का उपयोग मुख्यतः एक तरफ अगर स्थानीय औद्योगिकीकरण के साथ-साथ इसकी सभी परिचर लागतों को वित्तपोषित करने के लिए करते हैं जिसमें ठोस निवेश के लिए बुनियादी ढांचे पर खर्च शामिल है, तो दूसरी तरफ स्थानीय संघर्षों के जवाब में, विशेष रूप से, मजदूर वर्ग पर सैन्य/पुलिसिया नियंत्रण स्थापित करने के लिए करते हैं। (क्लीवर 1989; बेल और क्लीवर 1982)

यदि हम अंतर्राष्ट्रीय कर्ज के अर्थशास्त्रीय दलीलों और उसके शर्तों के औपचारिक व्याकरण को बिना इन व्यावहारिक पक्षों को ध्यान में रख पढ़ेंगे तो पूंजीवाद द्वारा फैलाए वैचारिक मायाजाल में फँस हम वर्ग-संघर्ष के बहुरूपिए पक्ष से अनभिज्ञ ही रहेंगे। सर्वहारा के खिलाफ पूंजी के विशिष्ट हमले को हम सर्वहाराकरण के खिलाफ सर्वहारा होती आबादी के संघर्ष के विभिन्न स्तरों को समझे बिना कभी नहीं ग्रहण कर सकते। कर्ज का संकट इसी वर्ग संघर्ष का नतीजा है — जिसे पूंजी के हित में जीतने के लिए सरकारों को और कर्ज लेना पड़ता है।

यह बहुस्तरीय वर्ग संघर्ष सामाजिकता के विभिन्न दायरे की विशिष्ट भाषा को लिए होते हैं, उन्हें एक स्वरूप में बांधना नामुमकिन ही नहीं प्रतिक्रियावादी भी है, क्योंकि वह मजदूर वर्ग की अपनी अभिव्यक्तियों का दमन है जो कि अंततः पूंजी को ही सुरक्षित करता है। कहीं पर यह संघर्ष अगर औद्योगिक संघर्षो के रूप में मिलते हैं तो कहीं राष्ट्रीयताओं और अस्मिताओं की भाषा में ये मौजूद रहते हैं। मार्क्स की “क्रांतिकारी सामान्यीकरण” की अवधारणा इन संघर्षो की स्व-अभिव्यक्तियों में पूंजी विरोधी क्रांतिकारी सूत्र को पहचानना है।

श्रीलंका की कर्ज की जरूरत को और आज के उसके कर्ज संकट को उसके पीछे काम कर रही सामाजिक प्रक्रियाओं और संघर्षों को पहचाने बगैर समझा नहीं जा सकता। इस पुस्तिका में हमारे साथियों ने इस संदर्भ को समझने के लिए जरूरी तथ्यों को बखूबी पेश किया है। इसलिए मैं बस दो तथ्यों को यहाँ गिनूंगा। पहला कि श्रीलंका की राजसत्ता लातिन-अमरिका में पिनोचेत की दमनकारी सरकार के बाद दूसरी थी जिसने वाशिंगटन कंसेंसस के नवोदारवादी मुहिम को जगह दी। दूसरा, आज से पहले श्रीलंका सोलह बार आईएमएफ के आर्थिक स्थायीकरण कार्यक्रमों को कार्यान्वित कर चुका है। उसके बाद भी वैश्विक और स्थानीय पूंजीवादी सत्ताएँ श्रीलंकाई जनता और संसाधनों को अपने गिरफ्त में नहीं कर पाई हैं। गृह युद्ध में जीत और सिंहली राष्ट्रवाद के सशक्तिकरण ने श्रीलंकाई राजसत्ता को जो वैधानिकता प्रदान की थी वह पूरी तरह से श्रीलंका की जनता ने मटियामेट कर दिया। वर्ग संघर्ष की भाषा वह कुंजी है जो हमें श्रीलंका में कर्ज की राजनीति, गृह युद्ध, अस्मिताओं/राष्ट्रीयताओं के खूनी संघर्ष और आज के आर्थिक, सामाजिक और राजनीतिक संकट को एक दूसरे से बांध के समझने में मदद करती है।

अंत में कुछ घरेलू बातें।

कुछेक संगठनों को छोड़कर हिंदुस्तानी वामपंथियों में श्रीलंका की घटनाओं को लेकर आम अलगाव बहुत ही निराशाजनक है, जबकि हिंदुस्तानी राजसत्ता और शासक वर्ग ने लगातार अपने हित को साधने में और विश्व-पूंजीवाद के क्षेत्रीय नायकत्व के नाते हस्तक्षेप करने में कोई कसर नही छोड़ा। हालांकि दक्षिण एशिया में नेपाल के लोकतंत्र आंदोलन के बाद श्रींलंका का जनता अरगलय पहला ऐसा जन उभार है जिसने शासन-व्यवस्था और क्षेत्रीय संतुलन को संकट में डाल दिया, मगर दोनों आंदोलनों में अंतर काफी साफ है। जहां एक तरफ नेपाली आंदोलन का लक्ष्य, उसका राजनीतिक स्वरूप और नेतृत्व साफ दिखता था, तो दूसरी तरफ श्रीलंका के जनता अरगलय में न कोई निश्चित लक्ष्य है, न कोई निश्चित राजनीतिक स्वरूप है और ना ही कोई निश्चित नेतृत्व है। निश्चित्तता प्रतिक्रियाओं के दायरे को भी निश्चित करती है — आंदोलन के विरोधियों और समर्थकों दोनों की प्रतिक्रियाओं को व्याकृत करती है। इसी कारण से भारत की विभिन्न राजनीतिक शक्तियाँ अपनी-अपनी राजनीति के अनुसार नेपाल की राजनीति के साथ जुड़ती रहीं है, उस पर टिप्पणी देती रहीं और असर भी डालती रही हैं। परंतु इस निश्चितता का आडम्बर उसके पीछे की अनिश्चित संभावनाओं की अपारता को नापने नहीं देता जबकि इसी अनिश्चितता में क्रांतिकारी परिवर्तन की गुंजाइश होती है। निश्चितता के दायरे में राजनीति केवल निश्चित संभावनाओं का इंतज़ार है, उसमें आशा की कोई गुंजाइश नहीं होती — जो होना है उसकी आशा नहीं की जाती, उसका इंतजार होता है।

श्रीलंका को लेकर हिंदुस्तानी वामपंथ की उदासीनता और निष्क्रियता के पीछे एक कारण तो अवश्य ही प्रत्यक्ष रूप से श्रीलंका के आंदोलन में “राजनीति की कमी” और अनिश्चितता थी। परंतु यह पर्याप्त या मुख्य कारण नहीं है। इसका सबसे प्रमुख कारण भारतीय वामपंथ का निम्न-पूंजीवादी राष्ट्रवादी विचलन है जो उसे भारतीय राजसत्ता और क्षेत्रीय पूंजीवादी प्रक्रियाओं में भारत की वर्चस्वकारी भूमिका की सटीक अंतर्राष्ट्रीयवादी आलोचना करने से रोकता है। जो धाराएँ आज भी भारत में “पूंजीवादी-जनवादी” कर्तव्यों को क्रांति द्वारा पूरा करने की बात करती हैं उनके लिए भारतीय पूंजीवाद और उसकी राजसत्ता का विश्व साम्राज्यवादी नेटवर्क के अंतर्गत एक वर्चस्वकारी शक्ति होने की बात कैसे स्वीकार होगी? वे छुटपुट धाराएँ भी जो भारत में समाजवादी क्रांति का सपना देखती हैं, वे भी पेड़ गिनने में लगी रहती हैं, जंगल की संश्लिष्ट समझ विकसित नहीं कर पातीं। (वे बहुत मायने में भारतीय राजनीतिक अर्थतंत्र की विश्लेषणात्मक स्तर पर सटीक और विस्तृत आलोचना पेश करती हैं, परंतु पूंजीवादी संरचना की संश्लिष्टता अथवा समग्रता को ग्रहण करने में चूक जाती हैं)। इसीलिए, भारतीय पूंजीवाद और राजसत्ता की (उप)साम्राज्यवादी रणनीतियाँ, पड़ोसी और अन्य देशों में भारत के दाँव-पेंच, जिनका निश्चित आर्थिक चरित्र है — ये सब इनके कूपमंडूक चिंतन प्रक्रिया से बाहर हो जाते हैं। और यही कूपमंडूकता हमें हमारे घर के दरवाजे पर हो रहे संघर्षो से सीख और प्रेरणा लेने से रोकती है।

पता नहीं लेनिन (1920) की निम्नलिखित बात का इस भूमिका में कही बातों से पाठकों को कोई सीधा रिश्ता दिखता है या नहीं, परंतु मेरी समझ में वामपंथी रूपवाद जिसको तोड़ने में हिन्दुस्तानी वामपंथियों को बहुत समय लग रहा है, और जो उन्हें नए संघर्षों को उन संघर्षों के अपने रूप में अपनाने से रोकता है, उसको यह उद्धरण चुनौती देता है:

“सबसे अधिक प्रगतिशील वर्ग की अच्छी से अच्छी पार्टियाँ और अधिक से अधिक वर्ग -सजग हिरावल जिस बात की कल्पना कर सकते हैं, इतिहास आम तौर पर, और क्रांतियों का इतिहास खास तौर पर, उससे कहीं अधिक सामग्री-समृद्ध,अधिक विविध, अधिक अनेकरूपीय, अधिक सजीव और प्रतिभा-सम्पन्न होता है। यह बात समझ में आनी चाहिए, क्योंकि अच्छे से अच्छे हिरावल भी केवल हजारों आदमियों की वर्ग-चेतना, निश्चय, उत्साह और कल्पना को ही व्यक्त कर सकते है, जब कि क्रांतियाँ वर्गों के तीव्रतम संघर्ष से प्रेरित करोड़ों आदमियों की वर्ग-चेतना, निश्चय, उत्साह और कल्पना से ओतप्रोत सभी मानव क्षमताओं के विशेष उभार और उठान की घड़ी में होती हैं। इससे दो महत्वपूर्ण अमली नतीजे निकलते हैं: पहला, यह कि क्रांतिकारी वर्ग को अपना काम पूरा करने के लिए, बिना किसी अपवाद के सामाजिक गतिविधि के सभी रूपों में, सभी पहलुओं में पारंगत होना चाहिए (इस विषय में जो कुछ वह राजसत्ता पर अधिकार करने के पहले पूरा नहीं कर पाता, उसे सत्ता पर अधिकार करने के बाद — कभी-कभी बड़े जोखिम उठाते हुए और बड़े खतरों के साथ — पूरा करना पड़ता है); दूसरा, यह कि क्रांतिकारी वर्ग को बहुत ही जल्दी के साथ और बड़े अप्रत्याशित ढंग से एक रूप को छोड़कर दूसरा रूप अपनाने के लिए सदा तैयार रहना चाहिए।”

और वैसे भी, बाबा वाक्यं प्रमाणम्!!!

संदर्भ सूची:

हैरी क्लीवर (1989), “Close the IMF, Abolish Debt and End Development: a Class Analysis of the International Debt Crisis,” Capital & Class (39), Winter 1989

पीटर बेल (1977), “Marxist Theory, Class Struggle and the Crisis of Capitalism” in Jesse Schwartz (ed.), The Subtle Anatomy of Capitalism. Santa Monica: Goodyear

पीटर बेल और हैरी क्लीवर (1982),” Marx’s Theory of Crisis as a Theory of Class Struggle,” Research in Political Economy (Vol. 5)

व्लादिमीर लेनिन (1920), वामपंथी कम्युनिज्म – एक बचकाना मर्ज

Capitalism, law and surplus population – in the context of the Mundka incident

Industrial accidents are a necessary condition of the capitalist economy, that is, their possibility is an integral part of capitalist life. Their occurrence can be avoided to some extent by legal-administrative reforms and vigilance. There are limits to these reforms, however. The Mundka incident, on the one hand, exemplifies corruption and non-compliance of the law (which attracts the most attention of the well-wishers), and on the other, it is primarily a manifestation of the organic brutality of capitalist industrial life. This brutality reflects the dispensability of individuated workers in an environment of continuous surplusing.

e0a4aee0a581e0a4a3e0a58de0a4a1e0a495e0a4be-google-docs Download

A Note on Premchand and the Proletarian Context

“अब तो शहरों में मजदूरों की मांग है, रुपया रोज खाने को मिलता है, रहने को पक्का घर अलग। अब हम जनिंदारों का धौंस क्यों सहें, क्यों भर पेट खाने को तरसें? — प्रेमाश्रम (Premashram)

While Premchand’s stories have numerous references to proletarian life, they generally portray a realist sad picture of a rickshaw-puller, of workers and the cesspool of urban life. However, a careful reading of Premashram shows how the presence of wage labour gave peasants of Awadh a context to act transcending the fatalism of rural life.

The greatness of a fiction writer depends on her awareness of those aspects of reality which are essential to produce its fictionalised model and, of course, on her ability to connect them sensitively to generate such a model, which is then incubated to develop a full-scale narrative. It is not any “scientific knowledge” of the reality, but its sensitive awareness, which helps her uncover and/or discover those irrational and rational socio-psychological aspects, which non-fiction cannot even imagine to reach.

It is important to remember that reality is not simply the real, i.e., what is, but what is not too, the unreal, the imaginary that stays with us as possibilities — again not just as actual possibilities, but also as remote and abstract possibilities, constituting the horizons of our imagination. Fictions work at the level of those horizons.

Premchand’s Premashram demonstrates his awareness of the rural reality of Awadh and of the constitutive conflicts. He is able to capture the passive revolution that was changing the rural setting, and emergent class consciousness and solidarity among the rural poor grounded in their everyday class experience and conflicts.

The novel is able to provide us an insight into the antinomies of Indian nationalism too — we have characters representing patriarchal humanism of the rentier class, incipient calculative rural bourgeois landlord interests, enlightened bourgeois utopians, diverse levels of indigenous bureaucratic class, proletarianising peasantry, all feeding into the constitution of this nationalism.

The global context of socialist movements, the Russian revolution and productive-technological evolution too become important elements in the novel as a constant background and through their discursive contributions. Many critics have of course mentioned this.

But an element of the contemporary reality which in my view is very crucial to grasp the novel and Premchand’s astuteness has generally been ignored or has not been identified. It is the fact of rural-urban migration and wage labour which in this novel at least exists not as a sign of distress, but as an opportunity and freedom for the rural poor. Migration and wage labour are escape routes that allow the rural poor enough confidence especially among the youth to engage in open conflict with rural oppressors.

It is not to say that Premchand considers wage labour to be an opportunity for a better life (in many of his stories he has shown the plight of migrants and wage labour). However, he is definitely aware, at least in Premashram, that the rural poor’s militancy is derived to a large extent from the proletarian context.

राजनीतिक विकल्प: चुनावी या आंदोलनकारी (Political Alternatives: Electoral or Movemental)

India Unlocked: World’s “Biggest Lockdown” and Workers’ Long March

“… never torment a creature for sport,
for it might be loaded.” – Ernst Bloch

At times, states compete to showcase merchandise and relative productive capacities. Other times, many of these states sell misery to gain access to economic packages, charities and loans. Today is the time when they compete to show off their capacity to impose the most efficient lockdown on their citizenry. Of course, the priority is to make this imposition consensual, because that would showcase the self-discipline of the national workforce. But if that doesn’t work, then the dosages of coercion are streamlined to measure the states’ disciplining capacity. The Narendra Modi government’s chest-thumping claim to run the “world’s biggest lockdown” was to showcase the realisation of the neoliberal ideal of a “strong state” in India — the carrots-and-sticks hidden behind the quinine-and-quarantine lockdown.

The Story of India’s Lockdown

With the absence of any coherent public health system, in the nationalist war against the “Chinese virus”, India has been relying on the dedicated medical workforce of much maligned public hospitals fending the virus without sufficient protection and supplies. Of course, popular pseudoscience is also there, factoring in a hot summer and the cumulative impact of other vaccines etc, along with the placebo effects of the homeopathic recipes.

Even with regard to the so-called practice of “social distancing” and its generalisation through the lockdown, much was left to the play of the complex and sinister traditional divisions — such as caste and communal divides among others — within the Indian society. One can speculate that this factor might have played a role in the slow expansion of the pandemic in India.

However, it goes to the credit of supposedly the most vulnerable in India who called the Indian state’s bluff, making its rhetoric of a successful and strong lockdown evaporate into thin air. The migrant’s faint cry to be allowed to go back home became a collective roar, and a long march in defiance of the strictures and coercive forces ensued.

We are witness to a process of how the vulnerabilities of the weakest become their strength; how their weak actions lead to a legitimation crisis of the state (and also at many times capitalist crisis in general). It is not very difficult to see how existential defiance of India’s migrants and the working class in general unravelled the neat choreography of the lockdown, making it meaningless. The exodus of internal migrants (India’s “biggest intangible assets” and “India’s real economic dynamo: a silent force“) and the anticipated volatility in the labour market have made capital jittery.

The Narendra Modi government, with President Trump’s encouragement, was already planning to catch companies flying away from China. The labour laws were being derailed to clear the way. But nobody heard the plates shifting — the lockdown just couldn’t lock the workers in! Their footlooseness, which was the biggest asset, has become a great liability now.

The Liberal Politics of Victimhood and Representation

The tremors were felt everywhere. The state was trying to control the damage desperately by providing buses, rations, and identifying potential stars in children, cycling hundreds of miles carrying their parents. On the other hand, the sensitive gentry could see the faces of orphans whose parents died in an accident while cycling 750 kilometres back home, or see blood splattered on the railway tracks.

In a recent article in The Indian Express, one of the most sensible political scientists in India, Suhas Palshikar, expressed the angst of the majority of the self-acclaimed politically conscious people on the side of left and liberals. He lamented “the incongruous image of the politicians and the political party” — they talk of the people but “betray an instinctive choice of ‘law and order’ and a techno-bureaucratic idea of governance”. It seems they are “on a holiday” and abstaining from politics. At the time when the central government is “caught in the trap of regulation and denial,” and “beset with uncontrollably delusional self-belief”, the opposition forces should have taken the initiative to “come up with a robust alternative route to governance” (of course, Kerala is already showing the way!).

According to Palshikar, there should be “a political response to the pandemic,” for which “resumption of democratic contestation is a must”, since “politics alone can be survival therapy for democracy.” He advises the Congress and its leadership to ask the party workers “to hit the roads, talk with suffering workers, walk with them”, only then they would “realise that taking a stand also means mixing with the people.”

Palshikar’s plea for the “resumption of democratic contestation” may seem inspiring at the time when there are so many people who are left uncared-for during the pandemic. It might motivate the opposition to see a political opportunity here, and the government too might see their pragmatic mistakes. But there are many assumptions on the basis of which such a plea is made. It seems Palshikar and, with him, most liberals and leftists in India assume that there is never a democratic agency of those who are surplused by the system, as there is no political agency beyond the legitimate state apparatuses — institutional and ideological.

With the WHO’s recognition of Covid-19 as a pandemic, the governments did what they are always good at when they are forced into action, i.e, to reach out for coercive measures. In the absence of vaccination and any understanding of the infecting germ, these measures take the form of imposing ancient “tribal traditions” of prevention (as J.D. Bernal used to call them) —social distancing, isolation and quarantine. But the liberal conscience, represented by Palshikar and others, demands an official opposition which will act as a corrective to this coercion.

The Real Opposition beyond Spectacular Politics

What happened instead is something, which, though, is not very uncanny in history, but, generally, goes unseen and unrecognised. It is accounted only in a retrospective reading of the people’s history. It happens beyond the spectacle of formal politics, which doesn’t have any category to capture this phenomenon in its positive grammar, except as a subaltern that never speaks.

The wails of pain, agony and anger of India’s internal migrants and workers in general have shattered the adamantine chains of the lockdown. The lockdown was never successful except in the ritualites of the already cocooned little bourgeois within everyone (meaning, everyone individually or as an aggregate of individuals). We found the appropriate nuclear environment of safety and discipline, and sang the “Middle Class Blues”:

“The streets are empty.
The deals are closed.
The sirens are silent.
All that will pass.” (Hans Magnus Enzensberger)

Among the working masses, the lockdown as a generalisation of “social distancing” was anyway meaningless, and its imposition amounted to an outrage. They felt what they are —surplus-ed and other-ed.

There are talks about the consolidation of the state and the rise of authoritarianism, but it is seldom recognised that this is a result of the exposed weakness of the state, its inability to regulate workers’ self activities and, especially, the panic and fear that they instill among other classes. Those who see these workers only as victims, which they are in the legitimate framework of political economy, are unable to see the organic resistance of the workers to the systemic regulation.

What argumentative liberals and online radicals couldn’t achieve was accomplished by the synergistic effects of the “weapons of the weak”. In fact, they are still waiting for the powers who imposed the lockdown to end it, so that, once again, they are able to lead these victims of the system back to the normal systemic cycle —some want them to fulfil their duties, and some, mainly those who are on the side of the left, would want them to struggle for their rights. What an irony!

There is nothing to celebrate here, but everything to understand — in order to imagine a new politics organically grounded in the everydayness of working class resistance.

The Game of Pursuit, Or the Chowkidar-Chor Narrative

अत्तुं वाञ्छति शांभवो गणपतेराखुं क्षुधार्तः फणी
तं च क्रौंचरिपो: शिखी गिरिसुतासिंहोऽपि नागाशनम्।
इत्थं यत्र परिग्रहस्य घटना शंभोरपि स्याद्गृहे
तत्रान्यस्य कथं न भावि जगतो यस्मात्स्वरूपं हि तत्॥

“The snake on the body of Siva, oppressed with hunger, wishes to eat Ganapati’s mouse; him (the snake) Kartikeya’s peacock wishes to devour; while Parvati’s lion (her vehicle) desires to make a meal of the elephant (mouthed Ganapati-mistaken for an elephant): when such is the constitution of Siva’s household even, how can such a state of things be not found in the rest of the world, since such is but the nature of the world?”

Thus Panchatantra takes the game of pursuit as “the nature of the world” and teaches the strategies and tactics to survive and win in the fields of commerce, state affairs and everyday life. If that was true of the ancient centuries of Indian history, what can we say of our own conjuncture. Our daily lives are proof of this, and so is our politics. But Panchatantra’s time had a solace that the plans or evil intentions did not often succeed, and hence the world continued to exist:

सर्पाणां च खलानां च परद्रव्यापहारिणाम् ।
अभिप्राया न सिध्यन्ति तेनेदं वर्तते जगत् ॥

But today there is no escape. We are all chowkidars (security guards), and, therefore, are chors (thieves) – of course, relatively.

Games People Play

The chowkidar-chor narrative is an opportunistic discursive instrument to impress upon the public to garner votes. But why does it have an appeal? Because, it is the folklore (katha) of our times, an articulation of our prevailing common sense, as Gramsci would put. It is so organic that it can be called infantile. Why not, even a child finds a voice in this dialectical narrative. Isn’t it the same game of chor-police that children play, where every child knows that the chor and the police are floating signifiers?

This narrative resonates with the psyche of our times. And thus, instead of simply condemning it we must take it as a symptom of the sickness that afflicts our social body or more correctly, a sign of its (un)healthiness. It is only by accessing the materiality of our social body through a critical understanding of such narratives, that we can access the healthy sections of our social body whose nourishment is our only hope. In other words, this narrative is a key to unlock “the healthy nucleus that exists in ‘common sense’”(Gramsci). Its analysis and critical retelling can trigger a much wanted alienation effect in this hyper-immediate responsive world by providing space-time to objectively understand ourselves – the nature of our world. Only thus can emerge the good sense, and the critical sense. It can be a parable for meditations and to develop mediations to grasp the material element of immediate consciousness and spontaneous philosophies of our times.

The lore reveals the stark nature of the neoliberal conjuncture – a near universal feeling of being hunted, and a universal aspiration of becoming a hunter. This game of pursuit-evasion is at the heart of the political and cultural milieu of our conjuncture. Everybody tries to put herself in a position of the pursuer but must evade other pursuers-evaders. “When such is the constitution of Siva’s household even, how can such a state of things be not found in the rest of the world, since such is but the nature of the world?” She can make sense of her existential crisis through such narratives, and learn to live with it. But then, even to transcend this crisis, its understanding is needed, for which what is the better beginning than these narratives themselves – the expressions of this crisis.

More than any institution and organization, it is this narrative that captures and productivises the anxieties of the (post)modern man. An institution lacks the plasticity that an empty narrative or metaphor like this has. The latter can homogenise all experiences by providing them a minimal, but universal form – it adjusts itself to any situation, while an institution must chisel the experiences to fit them.

The Neoliberal State

As a parable, the chowkidar-chor narrative further reveals in a condensed form two sequential and defining characteristics of the (post) modern state that has emerged throughout the globe – especially with the recent right-wing assertions. Firstly, it reveals the nature of the neoliberal state in its bare form – the state’s reduction to chowkidari. And, secondly, its gradual disembodiment and dispersal. Besides the chowkidar (an agent of the state) everybody is a potential chor. Thus, everybody seeks to become a chowkidar. Hence, the agency of the state expands. The state universalizes itself by dissolving itself into every individual. We are the state unto ourselves and others.

So, capital attains the dissolution of the state, while communists are still fighting over statist or anti-statist paths. However, this dissolution is attained by universalization of the state. You will never be able to pinpoint the presence of the state, but it is always present in every nook and corner of our being. It is present through our anxieties and alertness, and their institutionalisation. A globally extended and internally-intended lean (re)produced state is a post-fordist state based on self-and-peer surveillance.

Following Michael Taussig (The Magic of the State, 1997), we can perhaps assert that the state’s presence expands with its disembodiment. The spirit of the state, freed from any particular form, potentially can possess every form. That’s the Magic of the State in the age of Finance and Information. The state, as a node of capitalist accumulation and regulation, seeps into every societal relationship universally equalising them. They all find their universal articulation in the minimalist relationship of the hunter and the hunted, of the chowkidar and the chor.

III

Internal Relations

न विना पार्थिवो भृत्यैर्न भृत्याः पार्थिवं विना ।
तेषां च व्यवहारोऽयं परस्परनिबन्धनः ॥
अरैः सन्धार्यते नाभिर्नाभौ चाराः प्रतिष्ठिताः ।
स्वामिसेवकयोरेवं वृत्तिचक्रं प्रवर्तते ॥

According to our ancient wisdom, certain relationships are like that of a nave and spokes in a wheel. अरैः सन्धार्यते नाभिर्नाभौ चाराः प्रतिष्ठिताः. “The nave is supported by the spokes and the spokes are planted into the nave.” The nave and the spokes are mutually dependent. This dependence is not external, but तेषां च व्यवहारोऽयं परस्परनिबन्धनम्॥. They are in the relationship of mutual constitutivity. Panchatantra thus explains the nature of the master-slave dialectic. Similar is the relationship between a chowkidar (security guard) and a chor (thief), they constitute one another. Both identities are meaningful only in their relationship. So a chowkidar is himself only in relation to a chor, and a chor in relation to a chowkidar. Hence, the chowkidar must have a chor to pose himself as a chowkidar.

Even if the wheel of relationship turns, which frequently does, the only change will be that the chor will slide to the spokes and become a chowkidar, and the chowkidar will try to cling to the nave and become a chor. Moreover, as the wheel runs infinitely faster in the age of information and as the time-span for completing a cycle becomes smaller, who knows better than our head chowkidar, the chowkidar and the chor become identical.

Chinese Wisdom

The positive opposition in the cycle is caught up in its grammar and its continuity. It can never transcend the binary from within the narrative. The criticism must destroy the enclosures of the narrative freeing the flow of the negative from the chains of positive productivism. The circularity of power can be ruptured only by first recognising its foundation. The great Chinese sage, Lao Tsu provides a hint:

Thirty spokes will converge
In the hub of a wheel;
But the use of the cart
Will depend on the part
Of the hub that is void.

It is in the emptiness and void of the hub that the reason for the nave, spokes and the wheel is found.

With a wall all around
A clay bowl is molded;
But the use of the bowl
Will depend on the part
Of the bowl that is void.

It is only in that void that the rationale for the existence of a clay bowl resides.

Cut out windows and doors
In the house as you build;
But the use of the house
Will depend on the space
In the walls that is void.

It is the space enclosed by windows, doors and concrete walls that gives meaning to enclosures.

So advantage is had
From whatever is there;
But usefulness rises
From whatever is not.

It is this “whatever is not” that must be grasped to unravel the closed circularity of power, which seeks to absorb the negative therein, to positivise and productivise it, enclose it within the dualism of closed circularity.

[Note: Texts and Translations from Panchatantra have been taken from MR Kale (1912), Pancatantra of Visnusarman, Delhi: MLBD. (Reprint 2015) There are variations both in original texts and interpretations in various published versions of Panchatantra, but the narratival tenor and ideas are more-or-less same.]

On Rights Politics and Migrant Workers

These notes were prepared for a discussion in Delhi on a report on the condition of migrant workers in Delhi, Uttarakhand and Tamil Nadu (October 6 2017).

REFORMS & REVOLUTION

1. The two significant aspects of demand and right politics are – firstly, they are grounded in the immediate social needs that are framed within a structure. Secondly, they are attempts to establish a discourse with the state machinery – hence they are discursively circumscribed within the field of social relations. Thus, they are necessarily reform oriented, but they need not be reformist. The questions of rights, reforms and demands are unavoidable guerrilla struggles, which build the capacity of workers to organise larger movements. But do these struggles mean deferring the final movement that targets the very structural and superstructural setup that give language to those social needs? No, because they also test the vulnerabilities of the system and can become endeavours to burrow through it the final escape or emancipation. Every moment is a moment for both reform and revolution, and also reaction. When a movement is able to transcend its initial demands, to go on to attack the present social relations and to reorganise them then it becomes revolutionary. When the movement attempts to take the leap, but fails, then reaction happens. When the movement is not ready to take any leap beyond or reneges at the last moment, reform and/or reaction can happen, depending on the level of crisis in the system.

2. However, because the rights politics in itself is concerned with achievements of the rights and demands, at its own level will be geared towards negotiations and bargains, and impressing upon the state machinery, rather than changing the social relations themselves. Even the trade union politics is embedded in this kind of relationship. There is nothing in these forms that makes them question the structure of that relationship between workers and capitalists, or in the former case between workers and the state. The danger of reformism comes from this. But once again, as a conscious part of the larger movement against the structure of present social relations they play a crucial role of waging guerrilla struggles. But what does this signify? Then how do we define the working class politics? Also what will be the organisational question which balances between reform and revolution?

3. When we talk about workers’ politics, it is grounded in the dialectic of competition and collectivity. Marx captured this very aptly, when he said: “Wage-labour rests exclusively on competition between the labourers. The advance of industry, replaces the isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association.” The politics that is premised upon the segmentation of the workers vs the politics of ever-expanding combination and association, that is grounded in the everyday interaction among workers. The latter is not a mechanical aggregation or unity of isolated workers with similar grievances or demands, but a combination or network that is built in their daily conflict with state and capital. Only an expansion of this network has the capacity to refuse to be subsumed by capital and its network. In this, demands are definitely raised but are incidental. In this framework, demands and rights play the role of testing the system’s vulnerabilities and the organisational strength of the expanding combination.

ON MIGRATION

4. Migration is not just a fact, but also an act. It is not fully incidental that a word for migration in Hindi is पलायन (the more formal word is प्रवास). The former is very rich, often used as a stigma – one of its meaning being running away or an escapist act. In my view, it is this sense that renders the act of migration politically rich. Migration is not just a spatial fix, a response of the weak to the immediate contingencies of life. It is also a rebellious withdrawal, an escape, a long march against “the current state of affairs.” It is an act of refusal, non-acceptance of the lot. As an immediate spatial fix it demonstrates the weak agency of the migrant – a weakness in mastering the system. But it also has a utopian element that makes any human agency restless, that may come one time as an escape, another time as an emancipation, especially when individual weakness becomes a ground for collective subjectivity. Wasn’t this Ambedkar’s intention when he advised dalits to escape villages?

5. Legal Unionism is bound to consider migrant and mobile workers unreliable for their purpose – it simply cannot rely on them. On the other hand, social unionism which seeks to overcome the limits of traditional unionism is caught up in the discourse of non-conflictuality and negotiations with state (which in turn is problematically conceptualised). Hence for this school too it is always about accommodation – creating space for the migrants, not about problematising the whole space itself which is the etatised field of labour-capital relations. Therefore the vagrancy and mobility of proletarians are something to be shed off, not to be made a ground to imagine an overhauling of social relations and ideologies. Hence migrants as migrants are suspects, to be always put in the peripheries of organised politics. But different revolutions have shown how it was mostly settled workers’ organisations, afraid of losing their accumulated privileges, developed petty bourgeois tendencies and were unable to go beyond the legal fights when required, unless workers revolted and autonomously organised themselves.

6. Right from Karl Marx, Marxists have understood the relationship of workers mobility and their political consciousness. Lenin provides an insight into the poltical meaning of migration and demonstrates how to think about workers beyond their victimhood and our philanthropist vanguardism:

“There can be no doubt that dire poverty alone compels people to abandon their native land, and that the capitalists exploit the immigrant workers in the most shameless manner. But only reactionaries can shut their eyes to the progressive significance of this modern migration of nations. Emancipation from the yoke of capital is impossible without the further development of capitalism, and without the class struggle that is based on it. And it is into this struggle that capitalism is drawing the masses of the working people of the whole world, breaking down the musty, fusty habits of local life, breaking down national barriers and prejudices, uniting workers from all countries in huge factories and mines in America, Germany, and so forth.”

“Thus, Russia is punished everywhere and in everything for her backwardness. But compared with the rest of the population, it is the workers of Russia who are more than any others bursting out of this state of backwardness and barbarism, more than any others combating these “delightful” features of their native land, and more closely than any others uniting with the workers of all countries into a single international force for emancipation.

“The bourgeoisie incites the workers of one nation against those of another in the endeavour to keep them disunited. Class-conscious workers, realising that the breakdown of all the national barriers by capitalism is inevitable and progressive, are trying to help to enlighten and organise their fellow-workers from the backward countries.”

7. In recent years, Negri (and Hardt) repeats the same in the language of our times:

“Traditionally the various kinds of migrant workers, including permanent immigrants, seasonal laborers, and hobos, were excluded from the primary conception and political organization of the working class. Their cultural differences and mobility divided them from the stable, core figures of labor. In the contemporary economy, however, and with the labor relations of post-Fordism, mobility increasingly defines the labor market as a whole, and all categories of labor are tending toward the condition of mobility and cultural mixture common to the migrant. Not only are workers are forced to change jobs several times during a career, they are also required to move geographically for extended periods or even commute long distances on a daily basis. Migrants may often travel empty-handed in conditions of extreme poverty, but even then they are full of knowledges, languages, skills, and creative capacities: each migrant brings with him or her an entire world, Whereas the great European migrations of the past were generally directed toward some space “outside,” toward what were conceived as empty spaces, today many great migrations move instead toward fullness, toward the most wealthy and privileged areas of the globe…

“Part of the wealth of migrants is their desire for something more, their refusal to accept the way things are. Certainly most migrations are driven by the need to escape conditions of violence, starvation, or depravation, but together with that negative condition there is also the positive desire for wealth, peace and freedom. This combined act of refusal and expression of desire is enormously powerful…. Ironically, the great global centers of wealth that call on migrants to fill a lack in their economies get more than they bargained for, since the immigrants invest the entire society with their subversive desires. The experience of flights is something like a training of the desire for freedom.

“Migrations, furthermore, teach us about the geographical division and hierarchies of the global system of command. Migrants understand and illuminate the gradients of danger and security, poverty and wealth, the markets of higher and lower wages, and the situations of more and less free forms of life. And with this knowledge of the hierarchies they roll uphill as much as possible, seeking wealth and freedom, power and joy. Migrants recognize the geographical hierarchies of the system and yet treat the globe as one common space, serving as living testimony to the irreversible fact of globalization. Migrants demonstrate (and help construct) the general commonality of the multitude by crossing and thus partially undermining every geographical barrier.”

Demonetisation: Maturing Capitalism?

Radical Notes

“…it is not a question of the higher or lower degree of development of the social antagonisms that result from the natural laws of capitalist production. It is a question of these laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results. The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.” – Karl Marx (1)

“We do not think or plan in piecemeal, but in full-scale design. It is just that we are revealing our cards gradually…” – Narendra Modi (2)

The left-liberal intelligentsia in India is clearly in a quite precarious state, if it finds ex-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s criticism of demonetisation as the most competent response to the Modi Government’s move. The daily peddling by left social media activists of the criticisms that mainstream economists are making of demonetisation is a symptom of the Indian left’s lost confidence (if it ever had any). Even those who have come up with more erudite responses are lost in the grammar of the move — its immediate performance and effects — and have concluded that demonetisation is poor, bad and ignorant economics. Coming from a chaiwala, what else can it be!!!

In our view, Modinomics is a legitimate successor to Manmohanomics — it is a continuity entrenched in the dynamic needs of capitalist accumulation. Post 1990, India has seen governments of all colours, but the coherence of the Indian state has rarely faltered on the economic front. The rulers with all their electoral compulsions have succeeded in maintaining, if not accelerating, the neoliberal regime. However, this does not mean the political shade is merely external and cosmetic — politics in an electoral democracy is all about reshuffling social anxieties and interests in a manner that allows the state system to self-reproduce.(3)

Financial Expropriation and the Emergence of a Debtfare State

Demonetisation is a misnomer. It is not an attack on money by demonetising economies. Rather, it is a spectacular yet momentary unravelling and strengthening of the adamantine chain around so-called economic independence and growth in capitalism. In fact, it is a heightened expansion of money as financial and political-economic control. It is an effort to assess and consolidate the expanse of economic activities and transactions and thwart any possibility of parallel economic regimes. Delegitimising particular denominations of currency becomes a means to reclaim those activities, and reassert money as a universal measure of value, not as a means to autonomise particular levels of economy, by treating it as a mere facilitator of exchange or a means of hoarding. Money creates boundaries only to expand and cross them. Money measures the immeasurable, it equalises the most unequal. It institutes hidden connections between phenomena quite remote from one another — the vertical control however is revealed only at particular junctures of economic development through the action of state. In our opinion, demonetisation is an assertion of the universality of “universal equivalence”, i.e., money. This means consolidation of the linkages between layers of social relationships in the economy — strengthening of the neoliberal concentration and centralisation of capital.

There are two chief processes that define the neoliberal regime of capitalist accumulation, and demonetisation is remarkably connected with both of them. These processes are financialisation and informalisation, which in the present heat of the demonetisation debate, have been popularly dubbed as cashlessness and black/parallel economy respectively.

Financialisation has three main features. First, non-financial corporations increasingly financialise themselves, relying on retained profits and open financial markets for investments, rather than on banks. Even their wage bill “is frequently financed through the issuing of commercial paper in open markets.” Second, there is a restructuring of the banking operations by re-orienting them towards mediating “in open markets to earn fees, commissions and profits from trading”, on the one hand, and towards individuals/households “to obtain profits from lending but also from handling savings and financial assets”, on the other. With the active help of state through legislative measures and encouragement, the banks mobilise personal savings for peddling in stock markets.(4)

Lastly, and most importantly, in recent years “the personal revenue of workers and households across social classes” has been increasingly financialised. On the one hand, this specifically signifies that there has been a substantial increase in personal and household debts for various life needs – consumption, housing, health, education, etc. On the other hand, it shows there has been an expansion in the range of financial asset holdings — for medical and life insurance, pension and old-age benefits, various short- and long-term money market investments, etc. This relates obviously to a withdrawal of state-supported public provisions in the form of subsidies and direct benefits, and hence their privatisation. So, we find a tremendous increase in the involvement of banking and other financial institutions in mediating household consumption, while they have obtained a full freedom to channel “household savings to financial markets, thus extracting financial profits”.

Profiteering through financial transactions between banks and households has a predatory character. Profit here is not raised in the sphere of production, but through “the systematic extraction of financial profits out of the revenue of workers and other social layers”. This is what has been termed as “financial expropriation”. (5)

The current demonetisation move is nothing less than a full-scale financial expropriation in operation. The move has in one go forced small and big cash hoarders run to line up in the queue to reveal and officialise their savings. The government is not allowing these savers to exchange and repossess the whole amount of their savings in cash. This is not simply due to any unpreparedness or erratic behaviour on the part of the Indian state and Reserve Bank of India, as many have alleged. In fact, it is a remarkable move to institutionalise a financialised relationship between the banks and households. Of course, it is too early to judge if demonetisation has really succeeded in altering “nation’s conduct”. But its motive is pretty clear, as finance minister Arun Jaitley has time and again pronounced: “This one decision that has ensured that a lot of money has come into the banking system, a lot of informal savings have become formal now, and therefore, the tendency to invest these more formal savings in instruments that you keep an eye on is also increasing.” Demonetisation is a kind of encouragement to “ordinary citizens to channelise their savings into the market which indirectly would then contribute to the process of national development rather than be blocked only in dead assets”.(6)

Demonetisation is clearing the ground for a systematisation of “cannibalistic capitalism” in India by proliferating secondary forms of exploitation which are not directly linked to production but are financial mechanisms to expropriate. The Indian economy is massively based upon underemployed and under-waged surplus population that constitute the unorganised and informal labour relations. This makes it a very fertile ground for cannibalism that marked the US economy, which was based on the proliferation of various financial mechanisms of expropriation — nay, a financial inclusion of the hitherto excluded. In fact, we see in this move of demonetising specific denominations of the currency an emergence of the debtfare state.

Susan Soederberg defines a debtfare state as one that “legitimates, normalizes, depoliticizes and mediates the tensions emerging from cannibalistic capitalism”. It deregulates finance and provides legal machinery to protect and strengthen banks, thus facilitating an intensification and expansion of “forms of predatory practices.” The debtfare state enhances “the social power of money by legally and morally permitting credit card issuers (banks) to generate enormous amounts of income from uncapped interest rates and by continually extending plastic money to those who fall within Marx’s category of the surplus population: the partially employed (underemployed) or wholly unemployed”. The impact on the labour regime is also significant as “surplus workers” are subjected “to the disciplinary requirements of the market, such as compelling them to find and accept any form of work to continue to be “trustworthy” creditors”.(7)

Demonetisation in 2016 might mark a drastic emergence of a full-scale debtfare state by financially including the massive community of unbanked individuals and households through mobile, e-payment and plastic money. However, this has not happened suddenly. The insistence of the subsequent governments to profile Indian citizens through a unique identification system called AADHAAR and linking it with their everyday economic activities, despite the Indian judiciary pronouncing such moves illegitimate, was already an indication towards building a panopticon, which will make everybody useful and watched under the system. The banking and tax institutions had already started utilising this data. With demonetisation, now that the banks have acquired a full command over the finance of Indian households, a grand system of financial discipline and punishment can be effectively generated. With the proliferation of plastic and mobile/e-connections, our consumption and activities will be regulated, and we will pay for our own regulation.

This connects to the second aspect of neoliberalism, i.e. the process of informalisation, or the generalisation of informality destroying its sectoral and transitional character.

Informalisation and Consolidation

“With the junking of the old high-value currency, the parallel economy has become part of the formal system” – Arun Jaitley (8)

Everybody is talking about the impact of demonetisation on the informal sector, which is heavily dependent on cash transactions. But there is scarcely any analysis that shows how it is shaping the location of informality in the whole economy. Is it an end of informality — of the exploitation of cheap labour? Certainly not. It is an increase in the real subsumption of informality — it is a revelation that sectoral dualism sustained through segmented economies, if not fully illusory, is merely at the levels of appearance and form. The indirect exploitation of surplus population as cheap labour by capitalist firms by accepting the relative autonomy or sectoralisation of informality perhaps needs regimentation today to further expand capital accumulation. Through the so-called demonetization move, capital is arguably seeking to consolidate itself by vertically integrating the horizontalised relationship between formal and informal. It exposes the vulnerabilities of particular capitals seeking to hide their localised parallel levels accounted for in the official bookkeeping only as leakages in the system.

Managing money circulation is about networking and facilitating economic activities and transactions — production and circulation. The left-liberal intelligentsia, including many “Marxists”, are only talking about the impact of demonetisation as immediately experienced. At best, they are prognosticating a dampening of activities and demands, which will have adverse effects on growth. They are only remotely touching on the policy’s essential connection with the changing contours of the regime of accumulation. Leftists are right in noting the impact of demonetisation on the informal sector, but they have been unable to account for how it is shaping the regime in which informalisation is central.

It has been frequently noted, and quite rightly, that under neoliberalism the economy moves towards informalisation. The formal sector and employment are not growing, while informality is increasingly being embedded in the supply chains of the economy. That is why the informalisation of work processes is considered among the chief characteristics of the neoliberal economy.

As the informal sector has always thrived on surplus population exploited as cheap labour, “hiring-and-firing” is the norm there. What the pre-neoliberal phase had done was to secure an organised labour force that through its demand stability could sustain the domestic market. In many regions, however, a vast rural and urban informal sector was allowed to develop to reproduce surplus population. But the economic planning was avowedly geared towards formalisation. This vast surplus of labour and an increase in the organic composition of capital led to a crisis of the prolonged interregnum of planned capitalism, and a decline in the profitability rate. Technological transformations found the stable workforce in the so-called formal sector over-skilled and a hindrance to further accumulation. The formal sector was increasingly considered to be exclusionary unable to accommodate the growing surplus population allowing over-exploitative hidden economies to flourish. This led to an ascendancy of neoliberal market fundamentalism, which essentially attacked the formal-informal duality by legitimising informality. The aim was to take advantage of overpopulated living labour and utilise technological innovations that made skills redundant and required equi-skilled cogs in the wheel. Through initial structural adjustment programmes these surplus population-based informal sectors were linked with the formal corporate structures in the supply chain. In this scenario, instruments like the time-tested putting-out system, which capitalised and destroyed the old guild system, started becoming handy once again. It was through these instruments that cheap labour arrangements and regimes that existed locally were subsumed to avoid costlier and inflexible labour regimes that pre-neoliberal planning had generated.

However, despite the obvious hierarchical relationship between transnational corporate structures and local industrial set-ups that mobilised surplus labour, this relationship remained externalised becoming barriers to capitalist consolidation — concentration and centralisation of capital. Local laws that were promulgated to stabilise the labour force in the earlier regime became hurdles for capital mobility and accumulation in labour surplus economies. It was to avoid these hurdles that smaller and informal units were networked, but informalisation now has to be internalised and these units must be incorporated to survive intense competition. The parcellised production and distribution is not permanently beneficial. Also needed is “the concentration of already formed capitals, the destruction of their individual independence, the expropriation of capitalist by capitalist, the transformation of many small capitals into a few large ones”.(9)

Banking and finance that institutionalise the power of money facilitate the concentration and centralisation of capital today by regimenting individual capitals — big and small — and compel them to submit to the general needs of capitalist accumulation. The multiple layers of industrial forms — formal and informal — generate clogs in the real-time mobility of financialised capital. The informal set-up provides many smaller units with legal and trans-legal comparative advantages allowing them a kind of relative autonomy from legitimate competition. Being based on cash transactions they become autonomous from the institutionalised finance and public credit, while fully utilising the currency issued by these institutions. It was only through monetary and banking reforms that these economies could be contained within the structure.

We would do well to remember that one of the major battles capital has had to wage time and again is that of labour reforms. At the present juncture, especially in countries like India, numerous legal “number filters” have been imposed that grant smaller industrial units a freedom to disregard minimal labour standards, which bigger units have to at least legally maintain. Only by coordinating with these smaller units and utilising a labour contractual system the corporate sector could evade the imposition and draw the benefits. There has been a continuous demand to remove these filters, so that the benefits that the informal sector has — to openly exploit surplus population as cheap labour — could be generalised. Only through such generalisation can the processes of concentration and centralisation become effective.

Of course, the formal sector incorporated informal entities and relationships to evade the hazards of regulation. The way cheap labour-power was bought and exploited in the informal sector was an object of envy and is the benchmark for the formal sector entities to model the labour regime and demand for deregulation from the state. The state and the formal industrial regime have been long trying to achieve this. Despite being able to utilise informality to their advantage, the formal sector has been subject to humiliating bargaining tactics of smaller entities in the informal sector. The diverse local industrial regimes in which these entities function create difficulties for formal and bigger players in the value chains. Moreover, the ancillary interests are able to effectively compete with the corporate interests on the basis of their lower technical capabilities and cheap labour, thus leading to difficulties in the consolidation and centralisation of capital.

As labour reforms become more conflictual, with increasing defensive struggles of workers in the formal sector, monetary policies like demonetisation go a long way in regimenting “informal” and “small” capitalist interests. The wages of the unbanked population whom these entities have over exploited are all paid in cash. Demonetisation attempts to mobilise the advantages of these entities, which will now be totally subservient to formal processes. It is self-evident that any monetary tactic that affects cash flows would have an immediate effect on the cash-based informal economy. Amartya Sen is correct when he says, “At one stroke the move declares all Indians — indeed all holders of Indian currency — as possibly crooks, unless they can establish they are not.” (10) However, it is not totally wrong to say that a large section of this economy is always black as transactions and contracts there are not formally accounted for, and a substantial portion of income generated remains untaxed. But does this mean demonetisation will lead towards formality?

The notion of (in)formality is loaded with all kinds of connotations. And it is pretty confusing when we dichotomise formal and informal. In the production and distribution networks that define today’s economy we find this dichotomy resolved very efficiently. If legal systems tend to dampen flexible transactional and contractual relationships, informality (beyond the regulated formal relationships) seeps in to transcend rigidity. As a system, the formal-informal relationships constitute enormous value chains. However, if we discretise these relationships, it is not difficult to find clear examples of dichotomies in them, which actually define an intense competitive regime within the value chains — intra- and inter-sectoral competition. The entities in the informal zones of the value chain compete among themselves and also with entities in the formal zone.

Through demonetisation a process of verticalisation has been effectuated and the formal nodes would now act as concentration and centralisation of informal advantages. The state acting on behalf of capital in general is disciplining the devious and particularising nature of informality. Neoliberalism is a project to look after the general needs of capital in today’s conjuncture. Demonetisation is a decisive step in that direction.

Conclusion: Vulnerabilities

“…the magnitude of the global economic crisis at times is not felt in India because of strong (parallel) economy of black money.” – Akhilesh Yadav (11)

Post-2007-08, countries throughout the globe have been struggling to set their respective houses in order. That the so-called parallel cash-based economies in India cushioned the impact of the global crisis at the national level, acting as clogs that minimised the strains of the impact, is a strange truth. However, in order to sustain a higher growth these economies with their particularities will have to be incorporated into the formal system, and their comparative advantages annulled through their generalisation. What we see today is the neoliberal urge to mainstream and generalise informality and make it a ground for systematic capital accumulation, with concentration and centralisation as its vehicle. Hence, it is in this regard that the moves like demonetisation become effective instruments. But this would destroy the clogging effects of local and parallel economies. Hence, it would eventually minimise their ability to cushion against global vulnerabilities.

Notes and References

(1) Karl Marx, “Preface to the First German Edition,” Capital I, Collected Works, Volume 35, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p. 9.

(2) “Indira Gandhi lacked courage to demonetise, we are paying for it: Modi to his party MPs”, Indian Express (Dec 17, 2016).

(3) The political institutional ascendancy of rightwing jingoistic assertions is not any return to protectionism, rather it mobilises and productivises the general precarity to restrengthen neoliberalisation. By a reactionary generalisation of fear and terror that the mobility of capital and its crisis creates, it helps the system to reconsolidate its base against any radical statism and revolutionary anti-statism. The phenomena of Modi, Brexit, Le Pen and Trump will actually help in the final dismantling of the vestiges of older protectionist labour regimes in the name of making local economies and labour markets competitive, so that capital finds the locality docile for investment.

(4) Costas Lapavitsas (2013), “The financialization of capitalism: ‘Profiting without producing’”, City, Vol. 17 No. 6, pp 792–805.

(5) Ibid.

(6) “Demonetisation is changing nation’s conduct: Jaitley“, The Hindu (Dec 24, 2016).

(7) Susan Soederberg (2013)The US Debtfare State and the Credit Card Industry: Forging Spaces of Dispossession, Antipode Vol. 45 No. 2, pp 493–512.

(8) “Digital payments will help lower fiscal deficit: Arun Jaitley”, LiveMint (Dec 25, 2016).

(9) Karl Marx, op cit, p. 621.

(10) “Interview: Demonetisation move declares all Indians as possible crooks, unless they can establish otherwise, says Amartya Sen”, Indian Express (Nov 26 2016).

(11) “Black money helped Indian economy during global recession: Akhilesh Yadav”, Indian Express (Nov 15 2016).

What “Fataha” means in Anti-Capitalist Politics

[O]ur army is very different from others,
because its proposal is to cease being an army.– Subcomandante Marcos

1. SYRIZA’s initial electoral victory in Greece generated much hope among the European left and elsewhere too. The Europeans did not need to look zealously and jealously at the advancements in Latin America and elsewhere now. They suddenly found themselves advancing. But much of optimism, and also scepticism, looked at this political event as a phenomenon in itself which either had to be toasted for or condemned outrightly. They were either waiting for the SYRIZA experiment to be successful or defeated. Such sentiments have much to do with the way political formations are taken as voluntary forces judged in terms of their open or hidden programmes and agendas. They transcend and replace the movemental and other societal processes of which they are mere moments or symptoms. Political formations like SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain in this way are autonomised from the specific grounds of global class struggle.

2. Reactions to SYRIZA’s ‘success’ replayed the reactions to Latin American struggles and incidents of state empowerment in the last decade. Similar was the nature of remorse later. Such reactions I think rely too much on statism and less on its critique. They judge every success in the political field not as a beginning, but as a victory. Subsequently, the whole analyses that were being peddled were about what would SYRIZA do to sustain itself in state power, the task which we all know essentially is nothing but the state’s mode of reproducing itself through such agencies. It was good that SYRIZA’s every move was watched and debated, but to what purpose – just to wait for its success or defeat, not to generalise what its initial ‘success’ represented – the crisis of the old. You can’t wait for the barriers to become limits – this transformation requires not waiting, but hoping. As Ernst Bloch once said, “Against waiting, only hoping helps, which one must not only drink, but cook somewhat too.” (1)

3. Thankfully, in SYRIZA’s case there was a spoiler from the very beginning – it was SYRIZA’s alliance with ANEL, a rightist political formation which too stood against austerity, but for its own nationalist petty bourgeois reasons. The much-tested old wisdom is justified to consider such an alliance evil in its very constitution – it has a social corporatist nature, and any commitment around it must have a reactionary character seeking not to sharpen but obliterate the contradictions that might lead to the progressive transformation of the national and European political economy. Of course, at least, a critical mass of the polemicists were always online trying to dissuade people from considering electoral victories and state activism more than what they were. But even then the question remained – could SYRIZA have done better? So the object of analysis stayed – what SYRIZA did or didn’t do. And, hence, the conclusion: it was their opportunity, and they messed with it. But in reality, SYRIZA-like formations are definitely locally limited, yet globally linked. It is generally forgotten that their survival as radical forces depends on this balance. And this indicates at the responsibilities of both insiders and outsiders – who are equally located inside the structure of the global class struggle of which the Greek experience is an intrinsic part.

4. Similar was the euphoria, both positive and negative, when the Maoists in Nepal triggered a republican transformation, an overthrow of the royalty in the landlocked country, heavily dependent on Indian capital and its demands. A party-power struggle ensued in which even the revolutionaries were caught – every political party in Nepal has become a medium to pose different permutations and combinations of political groups to acquire or bargain power. The only stable political element that exists in Nepal is India trying to be the regional puppeteer using every political, social and cultural mechanism to fine-tune Nepalese politics to the advantage of the regional capitalist accumulation under its protection. Obviously, the presence of China is an irritant that Nepalese politicians utilise to claim some manoeuvrability. But what is interesting to see how all the blame for the failure of Nepalese communists/Maoists to mobilise republicanism under their leadership is put on them and their corruption. This blaming business is a reflection of the same voluntarist understanding of politics and state power that we see in the discourse over SYRIZA. It is not understood how within the dichotomised political/economic frame their failure was sealed from the very beginning. They definitely intensified the vocalisation of divided interests in the Nepalese society, which the royalty had suppressed in the name of unity. But limited to a national-state understanding of the Nepalese society they were evermore mired in the stagism of bourgeois-democracy. They on their own could not transform the political economy of the region of which Nepal was a mere part. Any local statist motivation in the Indian neighbourhood will not be very different from winning a few seats within the Indian Parliament. It is the benevolent nationalism of Indian communists that never allows the envisaging of a realistic transformation in the region. In fact, it scuttles any revolutionary potential in the local challenges like in Nepal or Kashmir. It is the big brotherly Indian radicals who are blind to any opening or opportunity in regional ripples.

5. The Nepalese movement was never simply to establish what they call “a modern state.” Reducing the many decades of the Nepalese movement to the unique and static question of state formation (which again is reduced to the royalty-or-republic frame) is the hegemonic mode of subsuming and dissipating the protracted struggle of the Nepalese toiling masses against the network of political economic power which India presides. Even republicanism must be understood as a concentrated, yet temporal reflection of the everyday struggle of the Nepalese people.

6. Fataha is an Arabic word meaning to open, to grant, to be victorious etc. It forms the root for Al Fattah, which is one of the names of Allah and means the Opener. What makes this term, fataha, interesting is the combined dialectical sense that its diverse meanings render. The way it celebrates, yet humiliates the victorious is quite fascinating – the victory or triumph is nothing more (and nothing less) than an opening. I think the heroic tragedies in history are mostly in forgetting this lesson. The so-called conscious social agencies often are oblivious of the dialectical truth of transience – they as missionaries, which definitely they are, think they have put the society to the desired pathway to the future, when it was just a mere possibility, one of the many possibilities. In fact, they have done nothing but opened Pandora’s box, bringing the society to the brink of possibilities (and uncertainties). What usually happens is that the phenomenality of the victory preoccupies everybody, it is reified.

7. The Paris Commune “inaugurated” the “glorious movement”, “the dawn of the great social revolution which will for ever free the human race from class rule.” It was the concrete beginning of coherent revolutionary politics of the working class that continues to train generations of world revolutionaries, despite recurrent reversals as revolutionary advancements are time and again consolidated in the form of nationalistic successes and gains. Even though locally the Paris Commune was crushed, “the presence of the threatening army of the proletariat of the whole world gathering in the rear of its heroic vanguard crushed by the combined forces of Thiers and William of Prussia” “attest the hollowness of their [the enemies’] successes.” (2, italics mine)

8. The October Revolution in its initial years was always taken as a mere “opening” for the European Revolution at least, if not the world revolution. Revolutionaries in Russia were aware of the need for the expansion of the revolution for the deepening of the revolution. And outside Russia, the revolutionary solidarity forces were intensifying their own struggles, which were understood as building upon the successful “opening.” It was when the world revolutionary movement subsided with alternative statist capitalism and techno-social corporatism competing with it that the “opening” became conscious of its distinction, its own being and endeavoured to survive as a government and a state. The Great Depression and the subsequent New Deal economics sealed the peaceful coexistence and competition between the two political-economic systems – the Cold War.

9. The Chinese Revolution too emerged as an opening for the revolutionary upsurges in various colonial and post-colonial peasant societies that questioned the teleology of market-oriented European capitalism. A planned nationalist transition with a controlled competitive regime, unimpeded by the imperialist politico-economic demands gripped the socialist imagination in these backward societies. We see large revolutionary movements and people’s wars rising in various parts of the world, especially on behalf of the pauperised peasantry and the precarised youth. These movements again saw the Chinese revolution just as an opening. But eventually the crisis of welfarism and statist capitalism, on the one hand, and the Cold War bipolarity, on the other, led to the reduction of various new de-decolonised states into self-hating rentier-bureaucracies, which bargained with the two poles and eventually became the ground for the neoliberal regime of economic restructuring. Ultimately, the Chinese state itself threw away the mantle of the Opener, and entered the fray to attract financialised capital huckstering upon the local institutions, resources and labouring population cheaply available.

10. On a much smaller scale, the Cuban Revolution too emerged as an opening for the Latin American revolutionaries and in Africa. Most of the time both Cuban and Chinese revolutions combined to inspire peasant revolts. Che Guevara epitomised this opening, lending himself to replicate the Cuban experience across continents – Congo and Bolivia, but to remarkable failures. What he lacked, unlike the Maoist conceptualisation of the protracted war, was the ability to keep politics in command. His guerrilla practices were extreme forms of voluntarism and subjectivism. On the other hand, the Maoist practice internationally suffered from both conceptual and practical overgeneralisation, which came from the legitimate practice of developing “base areas.” The territorial militarist symbolism and existentialism of localised peasant struggles overpowered the political sense of these movements. This led to the subservience of every expansion to secure base areas, which were increasingly surrounded and squeezed by the globalised networks of the capitalist circuit. Hence, the base areas remained central to revolutionary survivalism, while becoming marginal to the overall anti-capitalist movement of the working class. Guerrillas became identities in themselves, rather than “masses in arms”, as Kwame Nkrumah used to define a guerrilla. These movements could never become threats to capitalism, but always remained as actual scapegoats to impose global McCarthyism.

11. In fact, it was this marginalisation and deadlock that the movements like Zapatistas in Mexico apprehended in the 1980-90s, and were forced to envisage struggle and solidarity beyond instituted territorialities and state power. It was a recognition of the implausibility of the statist imaginary of post-capitalist transformation in the age of financialised transnational capital regimes. The critique of militarism and vanguardism presented by movements like the Zapatistas was the clarity that “you cannot reconstruct the world or society, or rebuild national states now in ruins, on the basis of a quarrel over who will impose their hegemony on society.” (3) The impetus to recognise and build a world of many worlds was not a simple rhetoric to revert to some united front tactics. It was a result of a deeper critique of relative “human conditions” and a self-critique of revolutionary practice, that was fixated upon the pre-determined goal of capturing state power. The critique of vanguardism that the Zapatistas presented was an affirmation of the vanguard as constantly (re)composed in the diverse levels of struggle – “We do not want to monopolize the vanguard or say that we are the light, the only alternative, or stingily claim the qualification of revolutionary for one or another current. We say, look at what happened. That is what we had to do.” (4) Of course, by relinquishing the aim of state power, they affirm themselves to be only a subset of the protracted global struggle. The Zapatistas provided an opening for the movemental critique of capitalism and capitalist state-formation, but the hypostatisation of the movement form that happened subsequently externalised this critique and reduced it to a dualism of state and civil society, that the process of state formation has always sought to pose. The powerful Zapatista experiment was eventually circumscribed within the NGOised civil society discourse – lobbyist rights, localist self-help politics and difference assertion which suited the neoliberal political economy based upon an infinite discretisation of human capacity and lean politics. The solidarity politics and economy that was envisaged in the Zapatista movement was abandoned in favour of identitarianist assertions, rights discourse and lifestyle autonomy. Leave aside its negation in practice, the state question itself was avoided.

12. If the post-Keynesian neoliberal counterrevolution professes to minimise the State by proclaiming it out of bounds from economy, it is simply vocalising the given divide between the economic and the political that characterises the capitalist system itself. What this divide means is the politics of depoliticisation of exchange relations – therefore, economy is always political economy, even if it is depoliticised. Whichever state form that has existed in the history of the modern state has come into being to facilitate the reproduction of exchange relations. The function of state in all its forms is to soak away the organic emergence of class struggle in these exchange relations, and limit it to the political superstructure. If Zapatistas exposed the crisis of valorisation on the margins of exchange relations and they could effectively practice “the idea of simply turning our back on the state,” their practice could not become more than an inspiration for those who found themselves enmeshed in exchange relations. John Holloway notes, “…there is no golden rule, no purity to be sought. Thus, for example, the Zapatistas in Chiapas make an important principle of not accepting any support from the state, whereas many urban pro-Zapatista groups in different parts of the world accept that they cannot survive without some form of state support (be it in the form of unemployment assistance or student grants or – in some cases – legal recognition of their right to occupy a social centre).” (5)

13. It was in the particulars conditions of urban and semi-urban locations at the very heart of exchange relations, that the risky in-the-state struggle became once again important. Especially in those countries where extractive industries are at the centre of economy and/or where the stark instrumentalisation of state institutions by glocal agencies of capital through purported neo-colonial mechanisms scuttled the local capacity to self-determine, the “opening” that Chavez’s Venezuela epitomised was significant. This revived the ground for people-oriented nationalist/statist efforts, but with a difference – there was a strong apprehension toward the statist primacy. Of course, the question of state power was posed by the barrios themselves, but with an evident sense that the state itself can never be transformed, but destroyed. The issue was to rein in state power to unleash a constant drive towards collective self-determination, rather than a pre-determined complete self-determination circumscribed within the instituted territoriality. The situation of dual power must be constantly posed, where popular autonomy is distrustful and vigilant towards the state, while class conflicts continually politicise exchange relations at every level and extend the reach of solidarity economy beyond territorial limits. Any slippage in this regard is an advantage to statism which eventually reduces dual power to the duality of the political and the economic – allowing capital to technicise the political recomposition of the working class to bring back exchange relations and capitalist accumulation on track.

14. The lessons of the Bolivarian revolution in South America are once again very elementary that until and unless these revolutions or events are taken as mere openings to deepen and expand the revolution, they will implode. Rosa Luxemburg reminded us a long time ago, “Either the revolution must advance at a rapid, stormy, resolute tempo, break down all barriers with an iron hand and place its goals ever farther ahead, or it is quite soon thrown backward behind its feeble point of departure and suppressed by counter-revolution. To stand still, to mark time on one spot, to be contented with the first goal it happens to reach, is never possible in revolution.” (6) In this age of the permanent crisis of capitalism and of generalised precarity, we will face numerous such reversals and can only hope to emerge every time a bit wiser.

References:

(1) Ernst Bloch [1969 (2006)] Traces, Stanford University Press, Stanford, p. 1-2.

(2) Karl Marx [2011 (1872)] “Resolutions of the Meeting held to celebrate the anniversary of the Paris Commune,” in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, People’s Publishing House, New Delhi, p. 287.

(3) Marcos quoted in Alex Khasnabish (2010) Zapatistas: Rebellion from the Grassroots to the Global, Zed Books, London, p. 83.

(4) Marcos quoted in Alex Khasnabish (2010), p. 64.

(5) John Holloway (2005) Change the world without taking power: New Edition, Pluto Press, London, p. 235.

(6) Rosa Luxemburg (1918) The Russian Revolution. Available at marxists.org