रूस-यूक्रेन युद्ध: फायदा किसका?


मोर्चा, अप्रैल 2022

ड्राफ्ट

यूक्रेन पर रूस की चढ़ाई को लेकर कोई भी सारगर्भित टिप्पणी बिना भूमंडलीय पूंजी की प्रक्रियाओं और प्रवृत्तियों को नजर में रखे नहीं की जा सकती। इस तरह की घटनाएं नेताओं के बयानों, उनके तात्कालिक चालों और हमारी स्वाभाविक प्रतिक्रियाओं के आधार पर नहीं समझी जा सकतीं। देशों की, विशेषकर उनकी जो इस युद्ध में निर्णायक भूमिका अदा कर रहे हैं, राजनीतिक-आर्थिक प्रकृति को समझना अत्यंत आवश्यक है, परंतु उसके बाद भी हमें इस बात को नजरंदाज नहीं करना चाहिए कि सम्पूर्ण अपने भागों के योग से बड़ा होता है। एक तरफ, पूंजी की संपूर्णता, और दूसरी तरफ, उसका विभिन्न और विरोधाभासी आर्थिक, सामाजिक और राज्य सत्ताओं के रूप में प्रसार और उनके बीच द्वंद्व — इन दोनों के बीच के संबंध को हमेशा ध्यान में रखना आवश्यक है। इसी द्वन्द्वात्मकता को हम मार्क्स-एंगेल्स द्वारा अंतर्राष्ट्रीय संबंधों और घटनाओं पर लिखे लेखों में तथा लेनिन की साम्राज्यवाद पर लिखी पुस्तिका में देख सकते हैं। हमारी समझ है कि यूक्रेन-रूस युद्ध की व्याख्या के लिए इसी द्वन्द्वात्मक पद्धति को हमें अपना हथियार बनाना होगा।

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अमरीका के नेतृत्व में नाटो की विस्तारकारी और एकछत्रवादी चालबाज़ी, नए शीत युद्ध का आरंभ, रूस की आक्रामकता, पुतिन की साम्राज्यिक बृहत रूसी अंधराष्ट्रवादी बयानबाजी, यूक्रेन में फासीवादी समूहों का वर्चस्वकारी उभार — ये सब हो रही घटनाओं के विभिन्न विवरण हैं, परन्तु सत्य की पहचान केवल उसके इन सतही पहलुओं की व्याख्या द्वारा नहीं हो सकती। भविष्य की संभावनाओं की पहचान और उनके परिपेक्ष में सर्वहारा वर्गीय दृष्टिकोण और गतिविधियों के लक्षणों की पहचान जिनके अनुसार क्रांतिकारी समूहों को अपनी भूमिका को तय करना होता है, सतही उपस्थितियों के चित्रण से नहीं हो सकती।

ऐसे चित्रण के आधार पर केवल प्रतिक्रियात्मक नारेबाजी ही हो सकती है और यही देखने को आज मिल रहा है। भारतीय वामपंथ में रूस-यूक्रेन युद्ध को लेकर कई तरह की समझ है। कई इस युद्ध को यूक्रेनी आत्मनिर्णय के नजरिए से देखते हैं, और रूस के आक्रमण में उन्हें पुरानी दकियानूसी रूसी साम्राज्यिक नास्टैल्जिया का प्रकटीकरण दिखता है। राष्ट्रपति पुतिन के बयानों में इसके लिए भरपूर सामग्री तैयार मिलती है। दूसरी ओर वे हैं जिन्हें इस युद्ध को उकसाने में अमरीकी षड्यंत्र दिखता है। उन्हें इस युद्ध में और इससे पहले भी यूक्रेन के समाज में फासीवादी तत्वों को भड़काकर रूस को उसके ही क्षेत्र में हाशिए पर डालने के अमरीकी नेतृत्व और नाटो के प्रयास दिखाई देते हैं। इसके लिए भी अमरीकी, उसके सहयोगी देशों के नेतृत्व और यूक्रेनी नेतृत्व के बयानों में और गतिविधियों में व्यापक सामग्री तैयार मिलती है। तो कौन सही है? शायद इसी तरह के माहौल में प्रथम विश्व युद्ध के दौरान यूरोप के क्रांतिकारियों ने क्रांतिकारी पराजयवाद के अस्थायी रणनीति को अपनाया। परंतु यह भी तब तक केवल अटकल ही है और महज़ नारा है, जब तक हम इस युद्ध के पीछे विद्यमान राजनीतिक आर्थिक प्रक्रियाओं और प्रवृत्तियों की व्याख्या नहीं कर लेते। “वास्तविक स्थिति की जांच किए बिना, वर्ग शक्तियों का आदर्शवादी मूल्यांकन और काम में आदर्शवादी मार्गदर्शन ही हो सकता है, जिसका नतीजा या तो अवसरवाद या तख्तापलटवाद होगा”। (माओ)

राष्ट्रीय आत्मनिर्णय कोई निरपेक्ष सिद्धांत नहीं है। लेनिन की तर्ज पर हम जरूर बोल सकते हैं कि रूसी जनता के लिए यूक्रेनी राष्ट्रीय आत्मनिर्णय का सवाल महत्वपूर्ण है, क्योंकि यह रूसी राजसत्ता की महत्वाकांक्षाओं को चुनौती देता है। परन्तु यूक्रेनी आत्मनिर्णय को सकारात्मक रूप में पेश करने वालों को यूक्रेनी कुलीन वर्गों द्वारा दक्षिणपंथी अंधराष्ट्रवादी लामबंदी को ध्यान में रखना होगा, जो यूक्रेन की अन्य उप-राष्ट्रीयताओं की आकांक्षाओं को दबाने का जरिया है। ऐसा तो नहीं कि यूक्रेनी राष्ट्रवाद महज़ वैश्विक नवउदारवादी नव-रूढ़िवाद का हथियार है?

आगे, जो रूसी राजसत्ता के नव-साम्राज्यिक राजनीतिक अर्थशास्त्र को नजरअंदाज़ करते हैं, वे ज्यादा बड़ी गलती करते हैं। शायद वे अभी भी अपने अवचेतन में पुराने फादरलैंड की रंगीनियत को संजोए हुए हैं। वे भूल जाते हैं कि विद्यमान रूसी राजसत्ता विश्व नवउदार पूंजीवादी दौर में पैदा हुई है, जिस दौर में राजसत्ता ने विश्व भर में दमनकारी चरित्र अख्तियार कर लिया है, कल्याणकारी मुखौटे को उतार फेंका है। रूसी राजसत्ता का प्रतिक्रियावादी चरित्र वहां के पूंजीवादी वर्ग के चरित्र पर निर्भर है। रूस और अन्य पूर्वी यूरोप के देशो में (जिसमें यूक्रेन भी शामिल है) पूँजीवादीकरण की प्रक्रिया मुख्यतः भूतपूर्व राजकीय समाजवादी व्यवस्था के तहत विकसित संसाधनों पर कुलीन वर्ग को काबिज कर विश्व पूंजी के साथ उन संसाधनों का दोहन कर मुनाफे में रॉयल्टी अथवा लगान के रूप में हिस्सेदारी करना रही है। इन देशों के बीच सहयोग और प्रतिस्पर्धा का रिश्ता भी इसी पूंजीवादी चरित्र द्वारा निर्धारित है।

वर्तमान युद्ध की व्याख्या के लिए सबसे प्रमुख तथ्य जिसे हमे ध्यान रखना चाहिए वह यही है कि रूस से यूरोप सप्लाई होती ऊर्जा का बड़ा हिस्सा यूक्रेन होकर गुजरता है, और इस व्यवस्था से यूक्रेन को अच्छा खासा फायदा भी है परंतु यूक्रेन के ट्रांजिट फ़ी के कारण ऊर्जा की यूरोप सप्लाई पर लागत बढ़ जाता है। इसी कारण से बाल्टिक सागर से ऊर्जा सीधे यूरोप पहुंचाने के लिए नॉर्द स्ट्रीम पाइपलाइनों का निर्माण चल रहा है जो इस लागत को काफी कम कर देगा, परंतु ट्रांसिट फी पाते यूक्रेन समेत कई केन्द्रीय और पूर्वी यूरोपीय देश इसका विरोध कर रहे हैं। (संयुक्त राज्य अमरीका इन पाइपलाइनों के बनने को शुरुआत से ही रोकने की कोशिश कर रहा है, क्योंकि उसका मानना है कि इससे यूरोप पर रूसी प्रभाव अत्यधिक बढ़ जाएगा। चल रहे युद्ध के कारण पहली बार नॉर्द स्ट्रीम का निर्माण रुक गया है।) इस संदर्भ में यह तथ्य भी गौर करने योग्य है कि पिछले साल 2021 में रूस ने यूक्रेन से गुजरती ऊर्जा की मात्रा में अत्यधिक कटौती कर दी जिसकी वजह से यूक्रेन की राष्ट्रीय आय पर अच्छा खासा असर पड़ा है।

यूक्रेन नाटो और युरोपियन यूनियन में शामिल होने की धमकियों का लगातार इस्तेमाल इस सप्लाई चेन और ट्रांजिट फी की राजनीति में रूस के साथ मोल-भाव करने में करता रहा है। रूस भी लगातार यूक्रेन के अंदर अपने हितों के अनुकूल शासन व्यवस्था बनाने की कोशिश में लगा रहा है। 2014 में क्रिमिया पर कब्जा करने का भी कारण यही था। यूक्रेन के रूसी उप-राष्ट्रीयताओं के अपने वास्तविक संघर्षों को रूस अपने साम्राजयिक इरादों की पूर्ति में चारे की तरह इस्तेमाल करता रहा है। रूस-विरोधी यूक्रेनी शासक वर्ग को संयुक्त राज्य अमरीका और नाटो से भरपूर सहयोग मिलता रहा है।

पर इन सब तथ्यों और आपसी राजनीति के पीछे कुछ पूंजी की भूमंडलीय संरचनात्मक और ऐतिहासिक पहलू भी काम कर रहे हैं, जिनकी संक्षेप में चर्चा आवश्यक है।

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पिछली शताब्दी के अंत में सोवियत संघ और उसके आश्रित शासनों के विघटन ने अंतर्राष्ट्रीय संबंधों की दिशा को एक नए मोड़ पर लाकर खड़ा कर दिया। इसने वैश्विक राजनीति की पुरानी व्यवस्था को पूरी तरह से ढहा दिया। यह व्यवस्था द्वितीय विश्व युद्ध के दौरान फासीवादी एक्सिस शासनों की हार के बाद उभरी थी। इस व्यवस्था को शीत युद्ध प्रोटोकॉल और मानदंडों द्वारा नियंत्रित किया जाता था। इस व्यवस्था के तहत विभिन्न देशों में उनके विशिष्ट और विविध प्रकार के श्रम और अन्य संसाधनों के आधार पर पूंजीवादी संबंधों को विकसित और दृढ़ करने के विभिन्न विकासीय मॉडल तैयार हुए। इसने आयुध और रक्षा उद्योगों के विशाल और व्यवस्थित विकास में भी मदद की, और वैश्विक ध्रुवीकरण के तहत तमाम देशों को गोलबंद किया। वह सैन्य कींसियवाद का युग था, जब यह समझ थी कि “सरकारी खर्च के उच्च स्तर की नीति — भले ही कभी-कभी घाटे के माध्यम से वित्तपोषित हो — अर्थव्यवस्था को बढ़ावा दे सकती है”। सैन्य खर्च का उद्देश्य भी “बेरोजगारी की दर को कम करने, मजदूरी बढ़ाने और श्रमिकों की आर्थिक सुरक्षा में योगदान देना था” (जेम्स सी. साइफर) ताकि प्रभावी मांग में बढ़ोत्तरी हो सके, आर्थिक गतिविधियों में तेजी आए और पूंजीवाद-विरोधी सामाजिक वर्गीय जन-उभार की संभावना को खत्म किया जा सके।

पूंजीवाद के तथाकथित स्वर्ण युग के 1970 में पतन के साथ, सोने-डॉलर के रिश्ते के अंत और सूचना प्रौद्योगिकी के विकास के कारण, जिसने श्रम प्रणालियों के सतत असततीकरण (infinite discretisation) को और उत्पादन प्रक्रियाओं के भूमंडलीय एकीकरण को संभव बना दिया, पूंजीवाद के वित्तीयकरण की प्रक्रिया शुरू हुई जिसने आर्थिक के घेरे से राजनीतिक प्रभाव को लगातार नदारद किया, और राष्ट्रीय सत्ताओं को महज पुलिस फोर्स बन सामाजिक असंतोष को प्रबंधित और उत्पादित करने का काम सौप दिया। इस बदलाव ने धीरे-धीरे शीत युद्ध युगीन स्थायित्व को नष्ट कर दिया और राष्ट्रीय विकास के प्रतिमानों को लगातार ध्वस्त कर वैश्विक वित्तीय बाजार और एकीकरण के दायरे में लाकर खड़ा कर दिया। अब पूंजी के संकटग्रस्त प्रवृत्तियों से कोई भी अर्थतंत्र अपने आप को अछूता नहीं रख पाएगा।

शीत युद्ध के अंत को जिसे बर्लिन दीवार के ढहने और पूर्वी यूरोप के देशों के विघटन से चिह्नित किया जाता है, अमरीकी नेतृत्व की जीत के रूप में देखा गया। लेकिन यह एकछत्रवादी उत्साह तुरंत ही फीका पड़ गया क्योंकि अमरीकी नेतृत्व वाले गठबंधन यानी नाटो ने अपना तात्कालिक औचित्य खो दिया। मास्त्रिख्त संधि (Maastricht Treaty) और अन्य नए क्षेत्रीय गठबंधनों के जन्म के साथ, अमरीका और डॉलर की वर्चस्वता सर्वमान्य नही रह गई। कुछ सुरक्षा विचारकों ने इस मौके को एकध्रुवीयता की असंभावना और बहुध्रुवीय दुनिया के उदय के आग़ाज़ के रूप में देखा, जिसे वे एक तरह से अंतर्राष्ट्रीय लोकतंत्र का पर्याय मानते थे।

दूसरी ओर, अमरीकी-परस्त सुरक्षा विचारक पुराने गठबंधन के औचित्य को साबित करने के लिए कई तरह की अटकलों का इस्तेमाल करते रहे। सोवियत संघ के विघटन के बाद कई तरह के स्थानीय और आर्थिक-हितार्थी गठबंधनों का जन्म होता दिखाई देता है, जिसमें ग्लोबल साउथ अथवा तीसरी दुनिया के वे अवसरवादी और तानाशाही देश भी शामिल हो रहे थे जो अमरीकी खेमे में रहा करते थे। ये स्थानीकरण वित्त पूंजी के भूमंडलीकरण के लिए तात्कालिक चुनौती प्रतीत होते हैं। इसी चुनौती ने शीत युद्ध के बाद भी अमरीकी नेतृत्व में भूमंडलीय पुलिसशाही को आरंभिक दिनों में जिंदा रखा — कई यूरोपीय देशों को इस युद्ध में अनमने ढंग से ही सही मगर इस गठजोड़ को जिंदा रखना पड़ा। इसी परिपेक्ष में पिछली सदी के अंत के साथ, इस वैश्विक पुलिसिंग की रणनीतियों को मजबूत करने के लिए “आतंकवाद के खिलाफ वैश्विक युद्ध” के रूप में तात्कालिक कामचलाऊ सैन्य विचारधारा उभरी। यह विचारधारा अत्यधिक शक्तिशाली थी क्योंकि यह किसी भी हस्तक्षेप को सही ठहरा सकती थी। यह नवउदारवादी युग के लिए काफी उपयुक्त भी थी क्योंकि यह मरीचिकानुमी, गतिशील और सर्वव्यापी वित्तीय पूंजी के फैलाव का साधन बन सकती थी। जहां-जहां राजनीतिक को आर्थिक के तहत अधीनार्थ करने की आवश्यकता है यानी जहां-जहां स्थानीय संसाधनों और अर्थतंत्रो को पूंजी के खुले दोहन में राजनीतिक और सामाजिक अड़चनें पैदा हो रही हैं वहां आतंकवाद-विरोधी मुहिम चलाई जा सकती है। इस अंतहीन युद्ध के परिवेश ने न केवल सैन्य और सैन्य प्रौद्योगिकियों पर जारी सार्वजनिक खर्च के लिए, बल्कि विशेष रूप से सुरक्षा और निगरानी के ढांचे के सामान्यीकरण और निजीकरण के लिए भी औचित्य प्रदान किया, क्योंकि वित्त की तरह आतंकवाद कोई सीमा नहीं जानता — इसलिए आतंकवाद के खिलाफ युद्ध जितना विदेशी भूमि पर होता है, उतना ही (शायद अधिक ही) घरेलू सीमाओं के भीतर छेड़ा जाता है।

3

इस संदर्भ में, शायद प्रासंगिक है मार्क्सवादी इतिहासकार और चिंतक एलेन मेक्सिन्स वुड की “अधिशेष साम्राज्यवाद” की थीसिस — जो नव-उदारवादी दौर में साम्राज्यवादी प्रक्रियाओं को सैन्य उद्योग में अतिसंचय की अभिव्यक्ति के रूप में देखती है। मेक्सिन्स वुड तर्क देती हैं,

“यह पहला साम्राज्यवाद है जिसमें सैन्य शक्ति न तो क्षेत्र को जीतने के लिए और न ही प्रतिद्वंद्वियों को हराने के लिए निर्मित हुई है। यह ऐसा साम्राज्यवाद है जो न तो क्षेत्रीय विस्तार चाहता है और न ही व्यापार मार्गों पर भौतिक प्रभुत्व। फिर भी इसने इस विशाल और अनुपातहीन सैन्य क्षमता का विकास किया है जिसकी अभूतपूर्व वैश्विक पहुंच है। शायद इतने बड़े सैन्य बल की आवश्यकता इसी वजह से है क्योंकि नए साम्राज्यवाद का कोई स्पष्ट और सीमित उद्देश्य नहीं है। वैश्विक अर्थव्यवस्था और इसे संचालित करने वाले विभिन्न राज्यों पर असीम वर्चस्व के लिए अंतहीन, उद्देश्य अथवा समय के मामले में, सैन्य कार्रवाई की आवश्यकता होती है।”

आतंकवाद के खिलाफ वैश्विक युद्ध निश्चित रूप से वैश्विक पुलिस व्यवस्था के विस्तार में शानदार रूप से उत्पादक है, लेकिन उसकी सबसे बड़ी कमजोरी है दुश्मन को वास्तव में पहचानने और नियंत्रित करने में असमर्थता। यह सहयोगियों से ज्यादा नाराजगी और दुश्मन पैदा करता है, और वे कहीं से भी उभर सकते हैं। मेक्सिन्स वुड आगे कहती हैं,

“हमें बताया गया है कि सीमाओं के बिना युद्ध सीमा-विहीन विश्व की अनुक्रिया है, एक ऐसी दुनिया की जिसमें राष्ट्र-राज्य अब प्रमुख खिलाड़ी नहीं हैं और गैर-राज्य विरोधी, या ‘आतंकवादी’ एक बड़ा खतरा बन गए हैं। इस तर्क में विशिष्ट संतुलन आकर्षक है, लेकिन यह जांच में खरा नहीं उतरता। आतंकवाद का खतरा, बल-प्रयोग के किसी भी अन्य खतरे से अधिक, भारी सैन्य विरोध का प्रतिरोधक है — राज्यविहीनता के बावजूद नहीं बल्कि उसके कारण; और, वैसे भी, ‘आतंकवाद के खिलाफ युद्ध’ से आतंकवादी हमलों के रुकने से ज्यादा, उनको बढ़ावा मिलने की संभावना है। गैर-राजकीय दुश्मनों का खतरा सैन्य बल के अनुपातहीन जमावड़े, जिनका कोई अभिज्ञेय लक्ष्य नहीं है, की सफाई नहीं हो सकते। इसके विपरीत, ‘अधिशेष साम्राज्यवाद’, चाहे वह कितना भी विकृत और अंततः आत्म-पराजयशील क्यों न हो, तर्कसम्मत है, परंतु केवल वैश्विक राज्य प्रणाली और उसकी विरोधाभासी गतिकी की प्रतिक्रिया के रूप में।”

इसलिए, यह अंतहीन वैश्विक युद्ध कभी भी अंतरराष्ट्रीय संबंधों के नियमन का कुशल साधन नहीं हो सका। इसके अलावा, घरेलू राजनीति पर इस वैश्विक युद्ध का प्रभाव अत्यंत विघटनकारी और अस्थिर होता है, जैसा कि अमरीकी राजनीति पर खाड़ी और अफगानिस्तान युद्धों के प्रभाव ने स्पष्ट रूप से प्रदर्शित किया है। वर्तमान सदी के दूसरे दशक के दौरान अमरीका में विभिन्न सरकारें इन युद्धों से बाहर निकलने का उचित समय और रास्ता खोजने की कोशिश करती रहीं। हाल ही में अमरीका ने शर्मनाक ढंग से अफगानिस्तान से अपने आप को बाहर खींचा — अफगानिस्तान युद्ध तालिबान शासन को अपदस्थ करके शुरू हुआ और इसे पुनर्स्थापित करके समाप्त हुआ।

आतंकवाद के बहाने ने सामान्य निगरानी (surveillance) उद्योग के अंतर्गत सैन्य और आयुध उद्योग के विस्तार और एकीकरण में मदद की, जिसने सार्वजनिक/निजी विभाजन और शांति/युद्धकालीन जरूरतों के विभाजन को व्यर्थ करार दिया। इसने अस्थायी रूप से वैश्विक सैन्य-औद्योगिक परिसर पर अमरीकी आधिपत्य को जीवित रखा, लेकिन वर्तमान शताब्दी के पहले दशक में नाटो की गतिविधियों को सही ठहराने के लिए इस्तेमाल किए गए ज़बरदस्त झूठ और छल ने एकछत्र अमरीकी नेतृत्व के प्रति सर्वसम्मति को खतरे में डाल दिया। आतंकवाद के खिलाफ युद्ध कभी भी वैश्विक राजनीतिक शक्तियों के आपसी गठजोड़ के लिए सुसंगत साधन प्रदान नहीं कर सका। शीत युद्ध की द्विध्रुवीयता के स्थायित्व और संतुलन की जगह लेने के लिए आज तक कोई नया समीकरण नहीं पैदा हो सका है।

4

एक तरफ, पूंजीवाद के नव-उदारवादी चरण ने तमाम राजसत्ताओं को महज पुलिस-प्रशासन में तब्दील कर दिया है, परंतु उस कार्य को भी निभाने के लिए उनके बीच प्रतिस्पर्धा को अत्यधिक तेज कर दिया है। दूसरी ओर, अमरीका को यदि ग्लोबल पुलिसशाही के शीर्ष पर रहना है, तो उसे अपने ऐतिहासिक वर्चस्व को बचाना होगा, जिसके लिए आतंकवाद जैसा चेहराविहीन दुश्मन नहीं सोवियत संघ जैसे खतरे को सामने रखना होगा। मुख्यधारा के सुरक्षा विचारक और अमरीकी नेतृत्व अंतरराष्ट्रीय संबंधों के प्रबंधन में इस संकट के बारे में जानते हैं और पिछले एक दशक से द्विध्रुवीयता के मिथक को फिर से बनाने में व्यस्त हैं — इस बार सोवियत संघ का जगह चीन को मिल रहा है। प्रारंभ में, यह केवल हॉलीवुड था जिसने इस कार्य को गंभीरता से लिया, लेकिन ट्रम्प शासन और भारत के मोदी जैसे उसके स्थायी सहयोगियों ने इसको मुख्य एजेंडा बना दिया। बाइडेन शासन डोनाल्ड ट्रम्प द्वारा छोड़ी गई विरासत को बखूबी व्यवस्थित कर आगे ले जा रहा है। हालांकि, हाल तक चीनी नेतृत्व लगातार इस मिथक में पड़ने से बचता रहा है। चीन दूसरों के खेलने के लिए गैजेट्स और गिज़्मोस के आपूर्तिकर्ता के रूप में अपने आप को रखे रहना चाहता है, लेकिन रूस-यूक्रेन युद्ध के साथ अमरीकी रणनीतिकारों और उनके ग्राहकों को अपना सपना साकार होता दिख रहा है।

शीत युद्ध की द्विध्रुवीयता के पुनर्निर्माण के लिए उनके मिथक-निर्माण को साकार करने में मदद करने के लिए उन्हें दो कारकों की आवश्यकता है— पहला, निश्चित रूप से, उन्हें उम्मीद है कि चीन रूस के साथ गठबंधन करेगा, और दूसरा है, जो अमरीका की पिछले तीन दशकों से प्रमुख चिंता रही है, यूरोपीय संघ के जर्मन नेतृत्व की तटस्थता का प्रश्न। यूक्रेन-रूस युद्ध ने इतना तो किया है कि विश्व के तमाम देशों को सैन्यीकरण के प्रति घरेलू सहमति बनाने में लालायित देशों के लिए काम आसान कर दिया है और तटस्थ देशों को मजबूर कर दिया है। भारत की मोदी सरकार की गिनती लालायितों में होगी। दूसरी ओर, यूक्रेन-रूस द्वंद्व का नतीजा यह है कि अनिच्छुक जर्मनी ने अपनी सैन्य अक्षमता का आभास करते हुए 2022 के बजट में दस हज़ार करोड़ यूरो सैन्य खर्च के लिए तय कर लिया। मैक्सिन्स वुड की बात माने तो यह अमरीका के अधिशेष साम्राज्यवाद के लिए उत्तम अवसर है। इस दौर में उसकी सैन्य क्षमता के खरीददार अनेक होंगे।

परन्तु पुरानी द्विध्रुवीयता का आधार सैन्य कींसियवाद था जो कि घरेलू अर्थतंत्र के सुनियोजित संतुलित विकास पर केंद्रित था। उसके विपरीत नई द्विध्रुवीयता का संदर्भ वित्तीय पूंजी और बाजार की स्वच्छंद और अनियत प्रकृति है जिसके आगे सारी दूरगामी संरचनात्मक स्थानीय नीतिगत योजनाएं विफल हैं और जिसने विश्व को भूमंडलीय ग्रामीण व्यवस्था में तब्दील कर दिया है जहां कभी अकेले कभी साथ मिल कर एक दूसरे की नोच-खसोट में सभी लगे हुए हैं — यही ज़ोंबी युग है जहां खून पीने की होड़ को प्रतिस्पर्धा का नाम दिया गया है। वैसे भी पूंजीवाद में “जो कुछ भी ठोस है वह हवा में उड़ जाता है” (मार्क्स) परंतु शुरुआती चरणों मे स्थान और समय में अंतराल का अर्थ था, जो कि नव-उदारवादी चरण में असीम क्षणभंगुर और संयोगात्मक होता चला जा रहा है — कैंसर मौजूद है परंतु वह तात्कालिक रूप में किस जगह और कब उभरेगा यह तय नहीं है। जॉन मैकमूर्टी ने पूंजीवाद के विद्यमान चरण को “पूंजीवाद का कैंसर चरण” नाम दिया है।

5

जबतक रणक्षेत्र मध्य-एशिया, अफगानिस्तान या ग्लोबल साउथ के कोई और देश में स्थित थे तब तक इन युद्धों के पीछे मूल रूप से काम कर रही वर्चस्वकारी राजसत्ताओं की संरचनात्मक कमजोरियाँ और उत्कंठाएँ साफ नहीं दिखती थीं। यूक्रेन-रूस युद्ध ने इन सब पर से पर्दा हटा दिया। वित्तीयकृत पूंजी ने किस रूप में पूंजीवादी राजसत्ताओं और उनके बीच के संबंधों की सर्वमान्यता और स्वरूपों को अनिश्चित कर दिया है, यह आज साफ है।

आने वाले वर्षों में घटनाएं क्या मोड़ लेंगी यह बताना शायद मुश्किल है। लेकिन इतना तो साफ है कि चीन और रूस पुराने सोवियत संघ नहीं है। चीन विश्व पूंजीवाद का सबसे बड़ा विनिर्माण केंद्र ही नहीं है, वित्तीय पूंजी का भी केंद्र बनता जा रहा है, और साथ ही पूंजी के वैश्विक फैलाव का वह अहम जरिया भी है। आगे, संयुक्त राज्य अमरीका की स्थिति 1950-80 में जैसी थी वैसी नहीं है — वह न तो विश्व पूंजीवादी उत्पादन का केंद्र है, न ही डॉलर की वर्चस्वता निर्विरोध सर्वस्वीकृत है। परंतु संयुक्त राज्य अमरीका तमाम अर्थतन्त्रों के लिए, विशेषकर चीन के लिए सबसे महत्त्वपूर्ण बाजार है। इसी कारण अमरीका के अर्थतंत्र के पोषण में सभी पूंजीवादी राष्ट्र अपना हित देखते हैं।

इसके अलावे, यूक्रेन-रूस युद्ध के नतीजे के तौर पर कई लोग नव-शीत युद्ध की परिकल्पना करते हुए हथियारों के होड़ की फिर से शुरुआत की संभावना को देखते हैं। क्या यह कभी रुका था? अगर हम इस युद्ध में अमरीका और रूस के बीच प्रतिस्पर्धा को देख रहे हैं तो यह हमें समझना चाहिए कि वैश्विक सैन्य-औद्योगिक परिसर के फैलाव में मुख्य प्रतिस्पर्धक होने के कारण रूस और अमरीका दोनों सहयोगी भी हैं। संयुक्त रूप से, अमरीका और रूस का हथियारों के वैश्विक निर्यात में 57% हिस्सा है। इस मामले में यह युद्ध दोनों ही देशों के हित में है।

इस युद्ध के मामले में भारत और अन्य देशों की तटस्थता को देखकर कुछ विद्वानों को गुटनिरपेक्ष आंदोलन की याद आने लगी है और उसके पुनरागमन की संभावना भी दिखने लगी है। इस मोह का इस्तेमाल कर मोदी सरकार और विश्व की अन्य अवसरवादी सरकारें सैन्य खर्चों की बढ़ोत्तरी के प्रति घरेलू सर्वसम्मति तैयार कर रहीं है। शायद वे इसमें आर्थिक मंदी से उबरने का जरिया देख रहीं हैं। रोजा लुक्सेमबुर्ग ने कभी कहा था — “जो चीज सेना की आपूर्ति को, उदाहरण के लिए, सांस्कृतिक उद्देश्यों (स्कूलों, सड़कों, आदि) पर राज्य के व्यय की तुलना में, अधिक लाभदायक बनाती है, वह है सेना का निरंतर तकनीकी नवाचार और इसके खर्चों में लगातार वृद्धि।”

मोदी सरकार शुरुआत से ही भारत में सैन्य-औद्योगिक परिसर के विकास पर जोर दे रही है। रक्षा क्षेत्र में आत्मनिर्भरता के नाम पर उदारीकरण और निजीकरण की प्रक्रिया स्थापित हो चुकी है। रक्षा औद्योगिक कॉरिडोरों का निर्माण किया जा रहा है। विदेशी निवेश को खुला निमंत्रण दिया जा चुका है, और कंपनियों का आगमन शुरू हो चुका है। यही कंपनियां है जो पहले देश के खिलाफ दूसरे देश को, और दूसरे के खिलाफ पहले देश को हथियार सप्लाई करती हैं। इस संदर्भ में हम लेनिन की बात को उद्धृत कर इस लेख को यहीं पर विराम देंगे —

“हथियारों को एक राष्ट्रीय मामला, देशभक्ति का मामला समझा जाता है; यह माना जाता है कि हर कोई उनके बारे में अधिकतम गोपनीयता बनाए रखेगा। लेकिन जहाज निर्माण कारखाने, तोपें, डाइनेमाइट और लघु शस्त्र बनाने के कारखाने अंतरराष्ट्रीय उद्यम हैं, जिनमें विभिन्न देशों के पूंजीपति विभिन्न देशों की जनता को धोखा देने और मुड़ने के लिए और इटली के खिलाफ ब्रिटेन के लिए और ब्रिटेन के खिलाफ इटली के लिए समानरूप से जहाज और तोपें बनाने के लिए मिलकर काम करते हैं।”

राजनीतिक विकल्प: चुनावी या आंदोलनकारी (Political Alternatives: Electoral or Movemental)


फासीवाद का कम्युनिटी ट्रांसमिशन


सर्वहाराकरण की तेज होती प्रक्रिया के कारण उभरतीं दमित उत्कंठाओं को फासीवाद इस रूप में अभिव्यक्ति देकर संघटित करता है कि वे उन सामाजिक-आर्थिक और संपत्ति संबंधों के लिए खतरा न बन पाएँ जो उस प्रक्रिया और उसकी उत्कंठाओं को जन्म देते हैं । फासीवाद उन उत्कंठाओं को उनके तात्कालिक प्रतिक्रियात्मक स्तर और रूप में ही व्यक्त करने का साधन प्रदान करता है, ताकि राजनीतिकता और आर्थिकता के पार्थक्य से जो राजसत्ता पैदा होती है उसक़े पुनरुत्पादन में आम रोष के कारण रोध पैदा न हो सके। नवउदारवादी अर्थतन्त्रीय अवस्था – पूंजी के वित्तीयकरण, उत्पादन के सूचनाकरण और श्रम के अनौपचारीकरण – ने फासीवाद के इस गुण को अलग स्तर पर पहुँचा दिया है, उसको तीव्रता और व्यापकता दे दी है। अब फासीकरण (fascisation) के साधन के लिए खुली राजनीतिक तानाशाही केवल एक आपातकालिक विकल्प है। फासीवाद आज सामाजिक प्रक्रिया का रूप धारण कर पूंजीवाद की वर्तमान अवस्था की दैनिक सामाजिकता और प्रतिनिधत्ववादी औपचारिक जनतंत्र की आंतरिकता में समाहित हो गई है। और इस प्रक्रिया के चलन और संचालन के लिए अब फासीवादियों की ज़रूरत नहीं है। कोरोना के वक्त की भाषा में बोलें तो फासीवाद का आज कम्युनिटी ट्रांसमिशन हो गया है।

Capitalism and Social Justice: The Floyd Protests in the US


In 1968, when Europe was witnessing student revolts, Italian Marxist filmmaker, novelist and poet Pier Paolo Pasolini wrote a poem addressing students, where he unabashedly told them,

When yesterday at Valle Giulia you fought 
with policemen, 
I sympathized with the policemen! 

He went on to explain that these boys in the police came from poor families and were dehumanised by the system — 

…Worst of all, naturally, 
is the psychological state to which they are reduced 
(for roughly sixty dollars a month); 
with a smile no longer, 
with friends in the world no longer, 
separated, 
excluded (in an exclusion which is without equal); 
humiliated by the loss of the qualities of men
for those of policemen (being hated generates hatred). 

Pasolini tauntingly challenged the students,

We obviously agree against the police as institution. 
But get mad at the Legal System and you will see! [1]

The Defunding of Police: What does it signify?

In the context of the ongoing movement against police violence in the US, the proposal for defunding and disbanding the police force has gained a wide currency. It has enthused many towards a more libertarian future. Its influence has also reached the learned sections of the left and liberal circles in India. As in 1968 and some years after it, today once again we see a confluence between those who stress on the virtues of a lean state and those demanding social justice, trying to give meanings or definite agenda to the movement —binding it to concrete demands. As David Harvey has shown, the intellectual force and initial consensus for neoliberalism were derived from such confluence.[2] However, neither in the case of the 1968 upsurge nor today can one reduce a whole movement to these vocal agencies who are there to negotiate with the system — in the case of the Floyd protests, to bring in police reforms and the Democrats to commit for them, while blaming Trump for everything. 

It is interesting to see the complementarity of Trump and his right-wing bandwagon, on the one hand, and the left-liberals, on the other. The former sees the conspiracy of anarchists, communists and anti-capitalism everywhere, destroying American values and institutions; therefore, they stress on violent incidents that have happened during the upsurge. The liberals and left see in the protests the assertion of American values rescuing  institutions from their takeover by conservative and even fascist elements. They downplay violence and sometimes even blame rightwingers for infiltration. Hence, in both discourses American values and basic institutions remain sacrosanct.

Even the apparently radical suggestion to defund and even disband the police is perhaps not very drastic. With the growing numbers of private security agencies and the localised community-level management of their engagement, the state run formal police force is increasingly becoming obsolete. Two prominent journalists-cum-business experts, while writing in Business Insider, applauded police-free Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone (CHAZ) and found Trump’s accusation that such zones are  anarchistic to be unwarranted and “a wrong response”. They go on to say,

“Whether you believe in the Black Lives Matter cause or not, you should want this test to continue. If the Floyd protests have shown us anything, it’s that America needs new models for law enforcement, regulation, and community organising. CHAZ is one tiny demonstration. We can think of tons of experiments worth trying: no-armed-police zones, no-police-car zones, an-officer-on-every-corner zones… Let’s try ‘em all. May there be 1,000 more CHAZzes!”[3, emphasis mine] 

Disbanding the police force is a wonderful idea, but what does it mean to implement this idea in an unequal system? Isn’t policing an intrinsic need of such a system? Is this system itself being questioned, or is it just an anger against a particular “alienated” form of policing? Empowering people without destroying the internal hierarchy in a community will only allow those on top to accumulate more power. Disbanding police in this scenario will force the community to internalise policing, and the powerful will play the judge. Power always clings to the powerful, who in turn are only personifications of power. That is why you see no significant outrage at such “radical” proposals in the US, except from the supporters of Trump, and Fox News. But what we see most of the time, if not always, depends on the perspective that we take, which in turn is dependent on our location relative to various socio-cultural (superstructural) asperities that break open whenever there is a heightening of structural stress energy in capitalist class relations.  Hence, the relevant question would be whether the Floyd Protests are merely about different demands that are being posed, or whether something more is happening in the American society that we need to understand.

Capitalism is ever ready to recompose itself according to the crisis that a social movement poses. Reducing a movement to its immediate demands is one of the main ways that contribute to this recomposition. The demands are crucial to organise the movement, but reducing the latter to the literality of the former is not just ludicrous, but a serious reduction that reifies demands and is a  result of commodity fetishism — of reducing social relations to thingness, which helps in capitalist reproduction not just in ideology, but also materially. It is through this reduction that the legitimation of a capitalist state, as the chief arbitrator of the system, is derived. But a movement is definitely more than its demands, it is about social relations. What is happening in the US is not simply a reaction to an incident, rather it is the eventalisation of that incident exposing the ab-normalcy of those relations.       

The Political Economy of Policing and the Floyd Protests

It seems corporate America has found “a public relations windfall” in the Floyd protests. Many delivery-based firms, like Amazon, Instacart, GrubHub among others, who have been crucial agencies of commodity circulation during the ongoing pandemic, were engulfed in labour conflicts. They found a respite in the protests, as “corporate anti-racism is the perfect egress from these labor conflicts. Black lives matter to the front office, as long as they don’t demand a living wage, personal protective equipment and quality health care.”[4] However, these spectacular protests could not be reduced to militant black liberal demands of Black Lives Matter, foremostly because the problems of policing themselves could not be understood simply from the perspective of race. 

Racial disparity is an important description of inequalities that characterise the American society. The statistical significance of this phenomenon can hardly be overstated in describing police violence and incarceration in the US.  However, it is not self-explanatory, it is linked to the deeper political economic processes. 

“What the pattern in those states with high rates of police killings suggests is what might have been the focal point of critical discussion of police violence all along, that it is the product of an approach to policing that emerges from an imperative to contain and suppress the pockets of economically marginal and sub-employed working class populations produced by revanchist capitalism.“[5, emphasis mine]

In the Marxist framework, “the uncertainty and irregularity of employment, the constant return and long duration of gluts of labour are all symptoms of a relative surplus population.”[6] The growing number of marginalised sub-employed segments of the working class are what constitute today the relative surplus population and its various types: Floating, Latent, Stagnant and “the sphere of pauperism…the hospital of the active labour-army and the dead weight of the industrial reserve army.”[7] This ever growing population must be harnessed for capitalist accumulation, to obtain cheap labour and to cheapen existing labour. Yet it is a dangerous disruptive force when not engaged productively in an immediate manner. The increase in police violence is perhaps evidence of an increased self-activity of this population.  A proper regime of incarceration and policing is needed to contain, suppress and productivise its energy. 

In fact, Ruth Gilmore in her book, Golden Gulag, shows “how resolutions of surplus land, capital, labor, and state capacity congealed into prisons.” The “phenomenal growth of California’s state prison system since 1982” can be understood as a part of the resolution to the crisis of the golden age of American capitalism, which was characterised by overaccumulation wanting radical measures like “developing new relationships and new or renovated institutions out of what already exists.” [8] Since the late 1990s, Gilmore along with Angela Davis and others has been involved in the organising efforts against what they call, the Prison-Industrial Complex.[9] 

With regard to the Floyd Protests too, it has been observed that among the masses that have emerged on the streets, there are those who have suffered because of the pandemic and being sheltered-in-place “without adequate sustained federal relief.” Therefore, these protests are also a consequence of “mass layoffs, food pantries hard pressed to keep up with unprecedented need, and broad anxiety among many Americans about their bleak employment prospects in the near future.” This can be grasped only if the widespread looting is not rejected, but explained. 

Unlike the ghetto rebellions of yesteryears, the composition of the looters today is multiracial and intergenerational, targeting downtowns and central shopping districts. These are “the most dispossessed of all races and ethnicities who are the most likely to be routinely surveilled, harassed, arrested, convicted, incarcerated and condemned as failures, the collateral damage of the American dream.”[10] The law-preserving and law-constituting forces can understand only the language of demands, and the surplus-ed do not demand, but act.

Beyond Neoliberal Social Justice 

The hegemonic tendency in the American anti-racist movement today “accepts the premise of neoliberal social justice”. It has emerged as “the left wing of neoliberalism  [whose] sole metric of social justice is opposition to disparity in the distribution of goods and bads in the society, an ideal that naturalizes the outcomes of capitalist market forces so long as they are equitable along racial (and other identitarian) lines.”[11] This provides a crucial clue to understand not just the limits of the movements for representation, recognition and redistribution, but also the compatibility of social justice with neoliberalism. This can help in making sense of why in some countries, like India, policies and laws towards ensuring social justice frequently accompanied the aggressive implementation of neoliberal economic reforms. 

The history of capitalism shows that it includes through differentiation and segmentation, constituting the unevenness of its social geography, which is a crucial factor in the dynamics of capitalist accumulation. It is this differential inclusion that structures the extension and intensification of division of labour, facilitating the circulation of commodities and capital and ensuring the transfer of value. This aspect of capitalist development manifests itself in real identitarian inequalities, insecurities, anxieties and politics at diverse levels of social structures. Social differentiation, obviously, in effect preempts or defers the emergence of class-against-capital that threatens not just law and order, but the very system that they conserve. Simplistically put, identities are all about horizontal divisions and vertical (re)integration. This engenders a perspective that does not allow various segments to think beyond redistributive economics and the politics of representation and recognition. So all social conflicts become just problems of management, engineering, and of statistics. Hence, tweaking specific variables is what needs to be done. Blaming individuals  or even specific institutions for what is an endemic problem of the system is the best way to salvage the system. This is how today, as Pasolini would put, people everywhere (differentially, but definitely) “belong to a ‘totality’ (the ‘semantic fields’ on which they express themselves through both linguistic and nonlinguistic communication).” This is how “bourgeois entropy” is reached, when “the bourgeoisie is becoming the human condition. Those who are born into this entropy cannot in any way, metaphysically, be outside of it. It’s over.”[12] But, is it so?  

Can we deny the experience of racism and, for that matter, of any enclosed segment of class? Aren’t such experiences crucial to the politics of class? While it is true that racism cannot be understood in its own terms, and all problems faced by black proletarians cannot be reduced to racism, can we deny that class always appears through such specific geo-cultural forms of social relations? The sedimental reality of all these forms is, of course, the dynamics of class relations and struggle, but these dynamics can only be captured in the experience of these forms. The struggle against segmentation is not to wish it away. Any unity based on such ideological wishing away of inter-segmental conflicts will be external and an imposition. 

An identity assertion becomes revolutionary when it is a ground for negating the very logic of differentiation and segmentation that sustains capitalist accumulation through competition and hierarchy. Then, the assertion is not for identitarian accommodation, but against the logic of identification—to envisage a non-identity against and beyond all identities. The positive assertion of identities, on the other hand, is for accommodation within power and accumulation of power —this is what social justice means within the logic of capital. However, any assertion of oppressed identities always contains the possibility of the release of an anti-identitarian subject, the class of proletarians, that goes against racism, casteism and other segmentations to destroy the stability of the very system of classification and gradation of labourers that sustains capitalism. It is this subject that can be traced in the incidents of looting and arson in the Floyd protests. Since they serve no means, they are ignored by those who don’t decry them.

Note: My special thanks to Arvind, Lalan, Nilotpal, Paresh, Prakash, Pritha and Satyabrat for innumerable discussions on the article. 

References

[1] Il PCI ai Giovani (The PCI to the Young), in Pier Paolo Pasolini. 1972 [2005]. Heretical Empiricism. Tr. Ben Lawton & Louise K. Barnett, New Academia Publishing, pp 150-158.

[2] David Harvey. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press. (Chapter 2, ‘The Construction of Consent’).

[3] David Plotz & Henry Blodget. 2020. ‘We need more experiments like Seattle’s police-free’, Business Insider (June 13, 2020). Accessed on June 15, 2020.

[4] Cedric Johnson. 2020. ‘The Triumph of Black Lives Matter and Neoliberal Redemption’, nonsite.org (Posted June 9, 2020). Accessed on June 15, 2020.

[5] Adolph Reed, Jr. 2016. ‘How Racial Disparity Does Not Help Make Sense of Patterns of Police Violence’, nonsite.org (Reposted June 9, 2020). Accessed on June 15, 2020. 

[6] Karl Marx. 1976. Capital. Volume 1, (Trans. Ben Fowkes). London: Pelican Books, p. 866.

[7] Ibid, p. 797.

[8] Ruth Wilson Gilmore. 2007. Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis and Opposition in Globalizing California. University of California Press, p. 28.

[9] Critical Resistance Publications Collective, ed. 2000. Critical Resistance to the Prison-Industrial Complex. Special Issue of Social Justice 27(3). 

[10]Johnson, op. cit.

[11] Reed, op. cit.

[12] Pasolini, op. cit., p. 156. 

Nobel to Abhijit Banerjee: who celebrates and why


The Nobel prize to Abhijit Banerjee seems to have given a fresh lease of life to the embattled identities of JNUites and Bengali intellectuals, even for many leftists who are caught up in dystopic existentialism, and hence are unable to see beyond immediacies. The general secretary of the biggest communist party in India said:

He again twits:

Another erudite general secretary of a radical communist party twitted:

However, Banerjee himself is busy dissociating himself from any political tag quite vocally and finds himself to be a mere surgeon who will cut into anything that comes on his table (or a mere plumber who will make this table!)- it is not about right and left. In fact, he has been working with all sorts of governments. Just because he was a JNUite or he criticised the Modi government’s particular policies, he is being celebrated by the anti-Modi forces, whether rightist, leftist or centrist. Of course, the Modi ministers themselves are becoming jittery at the wake of the deepening economic crisis, and are losing sanity by disowning people like Manmohan Singh, Banerjee & co (a point made by none other than Parakala Prabhakar, India’s Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s husband). And leftists too caught up in the cycle of reaction along with official rightists have lost all tactfulness.

Politically, the awarding of the Nobel prize in economics this year is a recognition by bourgeois (finance capital) internationalism and its agencies that rightist neoliberal etatist minimalism that has emerged globally, if left to itself, will not be able to contain and sublimate the growing discontentment in societies towards serving the bourgeois interests. As a result, the states might collapse or will start going beyond policing usurping the domain of the economic. The global corporate social responsibility (CSR) institutions must take over the task through the networks of NGOs throughout the globe and palliate the soaring social injuries, while productivising them for the benefit of capitalist expansion.

Abhijit Banerjee and his colleagues have been at the forefront of creating a model of treating poverty as a disease. They have been involved with states and corporate institutions in this regard for a very long time. And, we know, a disease is not just itself, it is a great industrial opportunity too (the booming hospital and pharmaceutical industries are clear examples). The Nobel laureates of this year have shown through randomized controlled trials how to dynamically customise strategies to recognise symptoms and provide palliatives or incentives to integrate the poor in the mainstream network of commodity market and finance. This capitalist inclusiveness is what Negri called differential inclusion. It is undoubtedly an effective tactic to encourage capitalist accumulation from below within a post-fordist neoliberal frame that allows heterogeneity in entrepreneurial forms (by including pakodawallahs, chaiwallahs etc), while networking them through finance.

Whether we recognise it or not, demonetisation and GST in India have at least created the digitised infrastructure to put such an effort in place. As Marxists we know, this will never be able to save capitalism from crisis, but it may have the impact of deferring the collapse.

So, comrades, is this a cause enough to celebrate?

Demonetisation: Maturing Capitalism?


Radical Notes

“…it is not a question of the higher or lower degree of development of the social antagonisms that result from the natural laws of capitalist production. It is a question of these laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results. The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future.” – Karl Marx (1)

“We do not think or plan in piecemeal, but in full-scale design. It is just that we are revealing our cards gradually…” – Narendra Modi (2)

The left-liberal intelligentsia in India is clearly in a quite precarious state, if it finds ex-Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s criticism of demonetisation as the most competent response to the Modi Government’s move. The daily peddling by left social media activists of the criticisms that mainstream economists are making of demonetisation is a symptom of the Indian left’s lost confidence (if it ever had any). Even those who have come up with more erudite responses are lost in the grammar of the move — its immediate performance and effects — and have concluded that demonetisation is poor, bad and ignorant economics. Coming from a chaiwala, what else can it be!!!

In our view, Modinomics is a legitimate successor to Manmohanomics — it is a continuity entrenched in the dynamic needs of capitalist accumulation. Post 1990, India has seen governments of all colours, but the coherence of the Indian state has rarely faltered on the economic front. The rulers with all their electoral compulsions have succeeded in maintaining, if not accelerating, the neoliberal regime. However, this does not mean the political shade is merely external and cosmetic — politics in an electoral democracy is all about reshuffling social anxieties and interests in a manner that allows the state system to self-reproduce.(3)

Financial Expropriation and the Emergence of a Debtfare State

Demonetisation is a misnomer. It is not an attack on money by demonetising economies. Rather, it is a spectacular yet momentary unravelling and strengthening of the adamantine chain around so-called economic independence and growth in capitalism. In fact, it is a heightened expansion of money as financial and political-economic control. It is an effort to assess and consolidate the expanse of economic activities and transactions and thwart any possibility of parallel economic regimes. Delegitimising particular denominations of currency becomes a means to reclaim those activities, and reassert money as a universal measure of value, not as a means to autonomise particular levels of economy, by treating it as a mere facilitator of exchange or a means of hoarding. Money creates boundaries only to expand and cross them. Money measures the immeasurable, it equalises the most unequal. It institutes hidden connections between phenomena quite remote from one another — the vertical control however is revealed only at particular junctures of economic development through the action of state. In our opinion, demonetisation is an assertion of the universality of “universal equivalence”, i.e., money. This means consolidation of the linkages between layers of social relationships in the economy — strengthening of the neoliberal concentration and centralisation of capital.

There are two chief processes that define the neoliberal regime of capitalist accumulation, and demonetisation is remarkably connected with both of them. These processes are financialisation and informalisation, which in the present heat of the demonetisation debate, have been popularly dubbed as cashlessness and black/parallel economy respectively.

Financialisation has three main features. First, non-financial corporations increasingly financialise themselves, relying on retained profits and open financial markets for investments, rather than on banks. Even their wage bill “is frequently financed through the issuing of commercial paper in open markets.” Second, there is a restructuring of the banking operations by re-orienting them towards mediating “in open markets to earn fees, commissions and profits from trading”, on the one hand, and towards individuals/households “to obtain profits from lending but also from handling savings and financial assets”, on the other. With the active help of state through legislative measures and encouragement, the banks mobilise personal savings for peddling in stock markets.(4)

Lastly, and most importantly, in recent years “the personal revenue of workers and households across social classes” has been increasingly financialised. On the one hand, this specifically signifies that there has been a substantial increase in personal and household debts for various life needs – consumption, housing, health, education, etc. On the other hand, it shows there has been an expansion in the range of financial asset holdings — for medical and life insurance, pension and old-age benefits, various short- and long-term money market investments, etc. This relates obviously to a withdrawal of state-supported public provisions in the form of subsidies and direct benefits, and hence their privatisation. So, we find a tremendous increase in the involvement of banking and other financial institutions in mediating household consumption, while they have obtained a full freedom to channel “household savings to financial markets, thus extracting financial profits”.

Profiteering through financial transactions between banks and households has a predatory character. Profit here is not raised in the sphere of production, but through “the systematic extraction of financial profits out of the revenue of workers and other social layers”. This is what has been termed as “financial expropriation”. (5)

The current demonetisation move is nothing less than a full-scale financial expropriation in operation. The move has in one go forced small and big cash hoarders run to line up in the queue to reveal and officialise their savings. The government is not allowing these savers to exchange and repossess the whole amount of their savings in cash. This is not simply due to any unpreparedness or erratic behaviour on the part of the Indian state and Reserve Bank of India, as many have alleged. In fact, it is a remarkable move to institutionalise a financialised relationship between the banks and households. Of course, it is too early to judge if demonetisation has really succeeded in altering “nation’s conduct”. But its motive is pretty clear, as finance minister Arun Jaitley has time and again pronounced: “This one decision that has ensured that a lot of money has come into the banking system, a lot of informal savings have become formal now, and therefore, the tendency to invest these more formal savings in instruments that you keep an eye on is also increasing.” Demonetisation is a kind of encouragement to “ordinary citizens to channelise their savings into the market which indirectly would then contribute to the process of national development rather than be blocked only in dead assets”.(6)

Demonetisation is clearing the ground for a systematisation of “cannibalistic capitalism” in India by proliferating secondary forms of exploitation which are not directly linked to production but are financial mechanisms to expropriate. The Indian economy is massively based upon underemployed and under-waged surplus population that constitute the unorganised and informal labour relations. This makes it a very fertile ground for cannibalism that marked the US economy, which was based on the proliferation of various financial mechanisms of expropriation — nay, a financial inclusion of the hitherto excluded. In fact, we see in this move of demonetising specific denominations of the currency an emergence of the debtfare state.

Susan Soederberg defines a debtfare state as one that “legitimates, normalizes, depoliticizes and mediates the tensions emerging from cannibalistic capitalism”. It deregulates finance and provides legal machinery to protect and strengthen banks, thus facilitating an intensification and expansion of “forms of predatory practices.” The debtfare state enhances “the social power of money by legally and morally permitting credit card issuers (banks) to generate enormous amounts of income from uncapped interest rates and by continually extending plastic money to those who fall within Marx’s category of the surplus population: the partially employed (underemployed) or wholly unemployed”. The impact on the labour regime is also significant as “surplus workers” are subjected “to the disciplinary requirements of the market, such as compelling them to find and accept any form of work to continue to be “trustworthy” creditors”.(7)

Demonetisation in 2016 might mark a drastic emergence of a full-scale debtfare state by financially including the massive community of unbanked individuals and households through mobile, e-payment and plastic money. However, this has not happened suddenly. The insistence of the subsequent governments to profile Indian citizens through a unique identification system called AADHAAR and linking it with their everyday economic activities, despite the Indian judiciary pronouncing such moves illegitimate, was already an indication towards building a panopticon, which will make everybody useful and watched under the system. The banking and tax institutions had already started utilising this data. With demonetisation, now that the banks have acquired a full command over the finance of Indian households, a grand system of financial discipline and punishment can be effectively generated. With the proliferation of plastic and mobile/e-connections, our consumption and activities will be regulated, and we will pay for our own regulation.

This connects to the second aspect of neoliberalism, i.e. the process of informalisation, or the generalisation of informality destroying its sectoral and transitional character.

Informalisation and Consolidation

“With the junking of the old high-value currency, the parallel economy has become part of the formal system” – Arun Jaitley (8)

Everybody is talking about the impact of demonetisation on the informal sector, which is heavily dependent on cash transactions. But there is scarcely any analysis that shows how it is shaping the location of informality in the whole economy. Is it an end of informality — of the exploitation of cheap labour? Certainly not. It is an increase in the real subsumption of informality — it is a revelation that sectoral dualism sustained through segmented economies, if not fully illusory, is merely at the levels of appearance and form. The indirect exploitation of surplus population as cheap labour by capitalist firms by accepting the relative autonomy or sectoralisation of informality perhaps needs regimentation today to further expand capital accumulation. Through the so-called demonetization move, capital is arguably seeking to consolidate itself by vertically integrating the horizontalised relationship between formal and informal. It exposes the vulnerabilities of particular capitals seeking to hide their localised parallel levels accounted for in the official bookkeeping only as leakages in the system.

Managing money circulation is about networking and facilitating economic activities and transactions — production and circulation. The left-liberal intelligentsia, including many “Marxists”, are only talking about the impact of demonetisation as immediately experienced. At best, they are prognosticating a dampening of activities and demands, which will have adverse effects on growth. They are only remotely touching on the policy’s essential connection with the changing contours of the regime of accumulation. Leftists are right in noting the impact of demonetisation on the informal sector, but they have been unable to account for how it is shaping the regime in which informalisation is central.

It has been frequently noted, and quite rightly, that under neoliberalism the economy moves towards informalisation. The formal sector and employment are not growing, while informality is increasingly being embedded in the supply chains of the economy. That is why the informalisation of work processes is considered among the chief characteristics of the neoliberal economy.

As the informal sector has always thrived on surplus population exploited as cheap labour, “hiring-and-firing” is the norm there. What the pre-neoliberal phase had done was to secure an organised labour force that through its demand stability could sustain the domestic market. In many regions, however, a vast rural and urban informal sector was allowed to develop to reproduce surplus population. But the economic planning was avowedly geared towards formalisation. This vast surplus of labour and an increase in the organic composition of capital led to a crisis of the prolonged interregnum of planned capitalism, and a decline in the profitability rate. Technological transformations found the stable workforce in the so-called formal sector over-skilled and a hindrance to further accumulation. The formal sector was increasingly considered to be exclusionary unable to accommodate the growing surplus population allowing over-exploitative hidden economies to flourish. This led to an ascendancy of neoliberal market fundamentalism, which essentially attacked the formal-informal duality by legitimising informality. The aim was to take advantage of overpopulated living labour and utilise technological innovations that made skills redundant and required equi-skilled cogs in the wheel. Through initial structural adjustment programmes these surplus population-based informal sectors were linked with the formal corporate structures in the supply chain. In this scenario, instruments like the time-tested putting-out system, which capitalised and destroyed the old guild system, started becoming handy once again. It was through these instruments that cheap labour arrangements and regimes that existed locally were subsumed to avoid costlier and inflexible labour regimes that pre-neoliberal planning had generated.

However, despite the obvious hierarchical relationship between transnational corporate structures and local industrial set-ups that mobilised surplus labour, this relationship remained externalised becoming barriers to capitalist consolidation — concentration and centralisation of capital. Local laws that were promulgated to stabilise the labour force in the earlier regime became hurdles for capital mobility and accumulation in labour surplus economies. It was to avoid these hurdles that smaller and informal units were networked, but informalisation now has to be internalised and these units must be incorporated to survive intense competition. The parcellised production and distribution is not permanently beneficial. Also needed is “the concentration of already formed capitals, the destruction of their individual independence, the expropriation of capitalist by capitalist, the transformation of many small capitals into a few large ones”.(9)

Banking and finance that institutionalise the power of money facilitate the concentration and centralisation of capital today by regimenting individual capitals — big and small — and compel them to submit to the general needs of capitalist accumulation. The multiple layers of industrial forms — formal and informal — generate clogs in the real-time mobility of financialised capital. The informal set-up provides many smaller units with legal and trans-legal comparative advantages allowing them a kind of relative autonomy from legitimate competition. Being based on cash transactions they become autonomous from the institutionalised finance and public credit, while fully utilising the currency issued by these institutions. It was only through monetary and banking reforms that these economies could be contained within the structure.

We would do well to remember that one of the major battles capital has had to wage time and again is that of labour reforms. At the present juncture, especially in countries like India, numerous legal “number filters” have been imposed that grant smaller industrial units a freedom to disregard minimal labour standards, which bigger units have to at least legally maintain. Only by coordinating with these smaller units and utilising a labour contractual system the corporate sector could evade the imposition and draw the benefits. There has been a continuous demand to remove these filters, so that the benefits that the informal sector has — to openly exploit surplus population as cheap labour — could be generalised. Only through such generalisation can the processes of concentration and centralisation become effective.

Of course, the formal sector incorporated informal entities and relationships to evade the hazards of regulation. The way cheap labour-power was bought and exploited in the informal sector was an object of envy and is the benchmark for the formal sector entities to model the labour regime and demand for deregulation from the state. The state and the formal industrial regime have been long trying to achieve this. Despite being able to utilise informality to their advantage, the formal sector has been subject to humiliating bargaining tactics of smaller entities in the informal sector. The diverse local industrial regimes in which these entities function create difficulties for formal and bigger players in the value chains. Moreover, the ancillary interests are able to effectively compete with the corporate interests on the basis of their lower technical capabilities and cheap labour, thus leading to difficulties in the consolidation and centralisation of capital.

As labour reforms become more conflictual, with increasing defensive struggles of workers in the formal sector, monetary policies like demonetisation go a long way in regimenting “informal” and “small” capitalist interests. The wages of the unbanked population whom these entities have over exploited are all paid in cash. Demonetisation attempts to mobilise the advantages of these entities, which will now be totally subservient to formal processes. It is self-evident that any monetary tactic that affects cash flows would have an immediate effect on the cash-based informal economy. Amartya Sen is correct when he says, “At one stroke the move declares all Indians — indeed all holders of Indian currency — as possibly crooks, unless they can establish they are not.” (10) However, it is not totally wrong to say that a large section of this economy is always black as transactions and contracts there are not formally accounted for, and a substantial portion of income generated remains untaxed. But does this mean demonetisation will lead towards formality?

The notion of (in)formality is loaded with all kinds of connotations. And it is pretty confusing when we dichotomise formal and informal. In the production and distribution networks that define today’s economy we find this dichotomy resolved very efficiently. If legal systems tend to dampen flexible transactional and contractual relationships, informality (beyond the regulated formal relationships) seeps in to transcend rigidity. As a system, the formal-informal relationships constitute enormous value chains. However, if we discretise these relationships, it is not difficult to find clear examples of dichotomies in them, which actually define an intense competitive regime within the value chains — intra- and inter-sectoral competition. The entities in the informal zones of the value chain compete among themselves and also with entities in the formal zone.

Through demonetisation a process of verticalisation has been effectuated and the formal nodes would now act as concentration and centralisation of informal advantages. The state acting on behalf of capital in general is disciplining the devious and particularising nature of informality. Neoliberalism is a project to look after the general needs of capital in today’s conjuncture. Demonetisation is a decisive step in that direction.

Conclusion: Vulnerabilities

“…the magnitude of the global economic crisis at times is not felt in India because of strong (parallel) economy of black money.” – Akhilesh Yadav (11)

Post-2007-08, countries throughout the globe have been struggling to set their respective houses in order. That the so-called parallel cash-based economies in India cushioned the impact of the global crisis at the national level, acting as clogs that minimised the strains of the impact, is a strange truth. However, in order to sustain a higher growth these economies with their particularities will have to be incorporated into the formal system, and their comparative advantages annulled through their generalisation. What we see today is the neoliberal urge to mainstream and generalise informality and make it a ground for systematic capital accumulation, with concentration and centralisation as its vehicle. Hence, it is in this regard that the moves like demonetisation become effective instruments. But this would destroy the clogging effects of local and parallel economies. Hence, it would eventually minimise their ability to cushion against global vulnerabilities.

Notes and References

(1) Karl Marx, “Preface to the First German Edition,” Capital I, Collected Works, Volume 35, Progress Publishers, Moscow, p. 9.

(2) “Indira Gandhi lacked courage to demonetise, we are paying for it: Modi to his party MPs”, Indian Express (Dec 17, 2016).

(3) The political institutional ascendancy of rightwing jingoistic assertions is not any return to protectionism, rather it mobilises and productivises the general precarity to restrengthen neoliberalisation. By a reactionary generalisation of fear and terror that the mobility of capital and its crisis creates, it helps the system to reconsolidate its base against any radical statism and revolutionary anti-statism. The phenomena of Modi, Brexit, Le Pen and Trump will actually help in the final dismantling of the vestiges of older protectionist labour regimes in the name of making local economies and labour markets competitive, so that capital finds the locality docile for investment.

(4) Costas Lapavitsas (2013), “The financialization of capitalism: ‘Profiting without producing’”, City, Vol. 17 No. 6, pp 792–805.

(5) Ibid.

(6) “Demonetisation is changing nation’s conduct: Jaitley“, The Hindu (Dec 24, 2016).

(7) Susan Soederberg (2013)The US Debtfare State and the Credit Card Industry: Forging Spaces of Dispossession, Antipode Vol. 45 No. 2, pp 493–512.

(8) “Digital payments will help lower fiscal deficit: Arun Jaitley”, LiveMint (Dec 25, 2016).

(9) Karl Marx, op cit, p. 621.

(10) “Interview: Demonetisation move declares all Indians as possible crooks, unless they can establish otherwise, says Amartya Sen”, Indian Express (Nov 26 2016).

(11) “Black money helped Indian economy during global recession: Akhilesh Yadav”, Indian Express (Nov 15 2016).

Kashmir beyond the Child Psychology of Partha Chatterjee


The argument that Partha Chatterjee peddles in his latest article in Telegraph on the ongoing Kashmir uprising is quite mainstream. It is of course presented in a subalternist language and with a lot of sympathy. But in its assertion of the autonomy of the subaltern masses, the subalternist sympathy becomes generally like that of those parents who find every action of their children to be revelatory about their uniqueness. And if other children seem to show some unique characteristics, these parents always find them resembling their own children.

Being a Bengali historian, Chatterjee reserves this feeling of empathy only for Bengali subalterns. Obviously this allows him to connect with other parents, sympathise and advise them. This is what Chatterjee is doing in this article – imploring other parents (Indian and Kashmiri) to recognise the crossroads in their children’s lives and help them pass them successfully, without sliding to “worst outcomes.”

Chatterjee finds Kashmiris resembling Bengali mourners at the funeral of Kanailal Datta in 1908, who shot at a renegade in the courtroom, and was hanged by the Britishers. He quotes an official report of the time,

“An extraordinary scene was witnessed at Kalighat at the time of the cremation of Kanai… Crowds thronged the road, people pushing past one another to touch the bier… Many women, to all appearances of a highly respectable class, followed the funeral procession wailing, while men and boys thronged around shouting ‘ Jai Kanai’!””

According to Chatterjee, the Kashmiri act of mourning and rioting for an ‘Islamist terrorist’ similarly “perplexed” the officials and others. A proud father is always ready to dispel people’s perplexities towards other kids, by flaunting his own wisdom of parenthood remembering the childhood of his children.

Thus, continues the wiseman’s argument, where patronising eventually takes a more mainstream turn. Subalterns always perplex non-subalterns. Hence, they need specialised experts to interpret their actions and language. Left to themselves, the innocence of subalterns makes them vulnerable to all kinds of manipulations. Actually, they always look for “figures of love and reverence” and “pure selflessness.” Hence, the Kashmiris themselves are innocent and victims of “bad” manipulations by the two neighbouring states and “routine politicians.” What is happening is now an outrage against these manipulations constituting “the crossroads.”

So, Chatterjee asserts, “Kashmiri nationalism stands at the same crossroads where Indian nationalism stood a hundred years ago.” Pure subalterns wanting to be tended with love, care and self-sacrifice are looking for the figures that epitomise them. If “democratic nationalism” is not “given a genuine chance”, there will be a slide –

“Given the bankruptcy of the politics that has tried so far to accommodate Kashmir’s national aspirations within the Indian federal system, there is a tendency now for the young to adopt an Islamist idiom to vent their demands. If this trend gets stronger, the best result might be a new popular movement, Islamist in temper but with deep roots in local communities…The worst outcome would be the burgeoning of jihadi groups that no one will be able to control.”

Hence, as subalterns are bound to be instrumentalised or domesticated, why not channelise their energy for some good cause, which protects them and mobilises them in the interest of progress and democratic nationalism, thus saving them from an uncontrollable jihadi sectarianism?

But that leaves the story twisted – not just in Kashmir, but also that of the early twentieth century Bengal. Chatterjee does not tell us what happened to Indian/Bengali nationalism “beyond the crossroads”, at least not in this piece. In fact, he does not clear the ambience at “the crossroads” too. He talks about outcomes without talking about the processes. And outcomes are explicitly seen as sliding to worse, if they are not short circuited by “democratic nationalism”. “The bankruptcy of the politics” leads “to a tendency …to adopt an Islamist idiom”, which if not saved through “democratic nationalism” would result into “the worst outcome.”

Actually, the Bengali bhadralok has never been able to cope with the partition of his Bengali nation. The year 1971 soothed him but the scar that 1947 gave runs very deep. Historians like Chatterjee do understand it, but dil hai ki maanta nahin. How could the Islamic enticement to integrate with Pakistan ever be stronger than the Bengali brotherhood?

Hence, azadi is fine as it can be variedly interpreted, and one clever interpretation is that of the Indian left, which Chatterjee articulates so well:

“Azaadi is not the name for a blueprint of Kashmir’s future political state. Rather it is a rejection of India’s armed occupation and the declaration of the right of the Kashmiri people to decide its own future.”

It is all due to the intransigence of India and Pakistan that no breakthrough is happening. They see Kashmir as a site for their competition. Chatterjee goes ahead and talks about progressive constitutional options as tried in Canada to resolve the Quebec question. All these must be tried or things will slide to “the worst outcome.”

“To stop that slide, democratic nationalism in Kashmir must be given a genuine chance.”

It is the same Bengali hangover that seems to play its role here – pitting “democratic nationalism” of Sheikh Abdullah against Islamism/Pakistan. Chatterjee seems to judge everything according to tangible historical outcomes and options, rather than in terms of the processes that might lead to multiple outcomes and options. Azaadi is of course “not the name of a blueprint”, but a movement that houses many contesting blueprints.

Why not? It could also be about the redefinition of South Asia – a movement against thinking in terms of established states and institutions. It could be a signal to subsumed nationalities in the region to revolt against internal segmentation of politico-economic agencies, against differential surplusing and inclusion/exclusion of populations. It could be a struggle against the evolving framework of regional political economy that hierarchises peoples, while including some and reserving/surplusing many, to keep the structure under control and “human resources” competitive.

But most importantly, why are we not considering the stone throwing and infinitely resilient, yet defiant Kashmiri youth a sign of the times – the evolution of a popular subjectivity of the precariat leading a real movement that abolishes the present state of things? Why is Chatterjee bringing an example from the Bengali history that seemingly demonstrates innocence and malleability of the masses? Crossroads are about the opening of new horizons too. And definitely, the people’s history of early twentieth century Bengal is extremely rich in this regard. It is unbelievable that Partha Chatterjee is unaware of the complexity of those times. But perhaps the subalternist notion of subalternity doesn’t allow him to render any overt political agency to subalterns except as fodder for the two sides in the Manichaeism of mainstream institutional politics.

There, were far more interesting things happening than a funeral march, which was just a symptom, a temporal spectacle. Beyond spectacularity, while Bengali bhadralok radicals were mired in the voluntarist and masochistic interpretation of Bhagavad Gita, a new Islam was rising in Bengal that gave radical meaning to the everyday struggle of people providing a ground to the evolution of popular subjectivity. In this regard, let me extensively quote from a recent article on MN Roy written by a very astute historian of communism in Bengal, Suchetna Chattopadhyaya, published in the first volume of Communist Histories (Left Word, 2016, pp 45-46), edited by Vijay Prashad:

“The ‘new’ Islam of the early 1910s, in its populist political form, took shape in the backdrop of the ‘new’ plan to sharply alter the physiognomy of the city, the Balkan Wars as a ‘prelude’ to the First World War, and the emergence of a new set of preacher- leaders known for their radical rejection of loyalist positions. One of the aims of pan-Islamist campaigners was to protect Islamic shrines and monuments in the Ottoman Empire, under jeopardy in the climate of Balkan Wars. These efforts by a segment of the intelligentsia resonated, stirring empathetic response among the masses. The immediate material context of this identification was the aggressive and invasive implementation of colonial construction plans that had disturbed conurbations from Kanpur to Calcutta. Though public protests in Calcutta revolved around the issue of mosque demolitions by the authorities, the submerged feelings at a popular level reflected social anxieties and anger over looming evictions. The anti-demolition meetings, including those directed against the Port Trust authorities in Khidirpur, saw large participation of cooks, waiters and small traders. The protestors experienced and envisaged uprooted neighbourhoods, destroyed settlements and forcible expulsions from their dwellings. In the backdrop of such a large-scale offensive from the top, pan-Islam, and popular protests interacted and forged political combinations. With the coming of a major conflict, and British declaration of war against Turkey, the pan-Islamist support for the Ottoman Caliphate came to be echoed in mosques and bazaars, in prayers and conversations and in the texture of everyday life.”

Whatever the limits of historical languages and institutions inherited by the people be, the organic political process (not necessarily around formal state apparatuses) grounded in popular everydayness renews the subjectivity of the multitude, always exploring and exploding the limits that temporally bind it. Subalternisation should be seen as procrustean endeavours of the State apparatuses to depoliticise the everydayness and alienate this subjectivity. However, pure subalternity is never achieved, the multitude accepts new bondages only to master and destroy them. Hence, assuming any innocence on the part of the “subalterns” in Bengal and Kashmir in the process of the “slide” that Chatterjee talks about is not only factually wrong, but politically meaningless and even dangerous. Such assumption autonomises political practices and ideologies from the real political ground and reduces them to mere objects of the elitist and statist operation of naming and shaming.

What “Fataha” means in Anti-Capitalist Politics


[O]ur army is very different from others,
because its proposal is to cease being an army.
– Subcomandante Marcos

1. SYRIZA’s initial electoral victory in Greece generated much hope among the European left and elsewhere too. The Europeans did not need to look zealously and jealously at the advancements in Latin America and elsewhere now. They suddenly found themselves advancing. But much of optimism, and also scepticism, looked at this political event as a phenomenon in itself which either had to be toasted for or condemned outrightly. They were either waiting for the SYRIZA experiment to be successful or defeated. Such sentiments have much to do with the way political formations are taken as voluntary forces judged in terms of their open or hidden programmes and agendas. They transcend and replace the movemental and other societal processes of which they are mere moments or symptoms. Political formations like SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain in this way are autonomised from the specific grounds of global class struggle.

2. Reactions to SYRIZA’s ‘success’ replayed the reactions to Latin American struggles and incidents of state empowerment in the last decade. Similar was the nature of remorse later. Such reactions I think rely too much on statism and less on its critique. They judge every success in the political field not as a beginning, but as a victory. Subsequently, the whole analyses that were being peddled were about what would SYRIZA do to sustain itself in state power, the task which we all know essentially is nothing but the state’s mode of reproducing itself through such agencies. It was good that SYRIZA’s every move was watched and debated, but to what purpose – just to wait for its success or defeat, not to generalise what its initial ‘success’ represented – the crisis of the old. You can’t wait for the barriers to become limits – this transformation requires not waiting, but hoping. As Ernst Bloch once said, “Against waiting, only hoping helps, which one must not only drink, but cook somewhat too.” (1)

3. Thankfully, in SYRIZA’s case there was a spoiler from the very beginning – it was SYRIZA’s alliance with ANEL, a rightist political formation which too stood against austerity, but for its own nationalist petty bourgeois reasons. The much-tested old wisdom is justified to consider such an alliance evil in its very constitution – it has a social corporatist nature, and any commitment around it must have a reactionary character seeking not to sharpen but obliterate the contradictions that might lead to the progressive transformation of the national and European political economy. Of course, at least, a critical mass of the polemicists were always online trying to dissuade people from considering electoral victories and state activism more than what they were. But even then the question remained – could SYRIZA have done better? So the object of analysis stayed – what SYRIZA did or didn’t do. And, hence, the conclusion: it was their opportunity, and they messed with it. But in reality, SYRIZA-like formations are definitely locally limited, yet globally linked. It is generally forgotten that their survival as radical forces depends on this balance. And this indicates at the responsibilities of both insiders and outsiders – who are equally located inside the structure of the global class struggle of which the Greek experience is an intrinsic part.

4. Similar was the euphoria, both positive and negative, when the Maoists in Nepal triggered a republican transformation, an overthrow of the royalty in the landlocked country, heavily dependent on Indian capital and its demands. A party-power struggle ensued in which even the revolutionaries were caught – every political party in Nepal has become a medium to pose different permutations and combinations of political groups to acquire or bargain power. The only stable political element that exists in Nepal is India trying to be the regional puppeteer using every political, social and cultural mechanism to fine-tune Nepalese politics to the advantage of the regional capitalist accumulation under its protection. Obviously, the presence of China is an irritant that Nepalese politicians utilise to claim some manoeuvrability. But what is interesting to see how all the blame for the failure of Nepalese communists/Maoists to mobilise republicanism under their leadership is put on them and their corruption. This blaming business is a reflection of the same voluntarist understanding of politics and state power that we see in the discourse over SYRIZA. It is not understood how within the dichotomised political/economic frame their failure was sealed from the very beginning. They definitely intensified the vocalisation of divided interests in the Nepalese society, which the royalty had suppressed in the name of unity. But limited to a national-state understanding of the Nepalese society they were evermore mired in the stagism of bourgeois-democracy. They on their own could not transform the political economy of the region of which Nepal was a mere part. Any local statist motivation in the Indian neighbourhood will not be very different from winning a few seats within the Indian Parliament. It is the benevolent nationalism of Indian communists that never allows the envisaging of a realistic transformation in the region. In fact, it scuttles any revolutionary potential in the local challenges like in Nepal or Kashmir. It is the big brotherly Indian radicals who are blind to any opening or opportunity in regional ripples.

5. The Nepalese movement was never simply to establish what they call “a modern state.” Reducing the many decades of the Nepalese movement to the unique and static question of state formation (which again is reduced to the royalty-or-republic frame) is the hegemonic mode of subsuming and dissipating the protracted struggle of the Nepalese toiling masses against the network of political economic power which India presides. Even republicanism must be understood as a concentrated, yet temporal reflection of the everyday struggle of the Nepalese people.

6. Fataha is an Arabic word meaning to open, to grant, to be victorious etc. It forms the root for Al Fattah, which is one of the names of Allah and means the Opener. What makes this term, fataha, interesting is the combined dialectical sense that its diverse meanings render. The way it celebrates, yet humiliates the victorious is quite fascinating – the victory or triumph is nothing more (and nothing less) than an opening. I think the heroic tragedies in history are mostly in forgetting this lesson. The so-called conscious social agencies often are oblivious of the dialectical truth of transience – they as missionaries, which definitely they are, think they have put the society to the desired pathway to the future, when it was just a mere possibility, one of the many possibilities. In fact, they have done nothing but opened Pandora’s box, bringing the society to the brink of possibilities (and uncertainties). What usually happens is that the phenomenality of the victory preoccupies everybody, it is reified.

7. The Paris Commune “inaugurated” the “glorious movement”, “the dawn of the great social revolution which will for ever free the human race from class rule.” It was the concrete beginning of coherent revolutionary politics of the working class that continues to train generations of world revolutionaries, despite recurrent reversals as revolutionary advancements are time and again consolidated in the form of nationalistic successes and gains. Even though locally the Paris Commune was crushed, “the presence of the threatening army of the proletariat of the whole world gathering in the rear of its heroic vanguard crushed by the combined forces of Thiers and William of Prussia” “attest the hollowness of their [the enemies’] successes.” (2, italics mine)

8. The October Revolution in its initial years was always taken as a mere “opening” for the European Revolution at least, if not the world revolution. Revolutionaries in Russia were aware of the need for the expansion of the revolution for the deepening of the revolution. And outside Russia, the revolutionary solidarity forces were intensifying their own struggles, which were understood as building upon the successful “opening.” It was when the world revolutionary movement subsided with alternative statist capitalism and techno-social corporatism competing with it that the “opening” became conscious of its distinction, its own being and endeavoured to survive as a government and a state. The Great Depression and the subsequent New Deal economics sealed the peaceful coexistence and competition between the two political-economic systems – the Cold War.

9. The Chinese Revolution too emerged as an opening for the revolutionary upsurges in various colonial and post-colonial peasant societies that questioned the teleology of market-oriented European capitalism. A planned nationalist transition with a controlled competitive regime, unimpeded by the imperialist politico-economic demands gripped the socialist imagination in these backward societies. We see large revolutionary movements and people’s wars rising in various parts of the world, especially on behalf of the pauperised peasantry and the precarised youth. These movements again saw the Chinese revolution just as an opening. But eventually the crisis of welfarism and statist capitalism, on the one hand, and the Cold War bipolarity, on the other, led to the reduction of various new de-decolonised states into self-hating rentier-bureaucracies, which bargained with the two poles and eventually became the ground for the neoliberal regime of economic restructuring. Ultimately, the Chinese state itself threw away the mantle of the Opener, and entered the fray to attract financialised capital huckstering upon the local institutions, resources and labouring population cheaply available.

10. On a much smaller scale, the Cuban Revolution too emerged as an opening for the Latin American revolutionaries and in Africa. Most of the time both Cuban and Chinese revolutions combined to inspire peasant revolts. Che Guevara epitomised this opening, lending himself to replicate the Cuban experience across continents – Congo and Bolivia, but to remarkable failures. What he lacked, unlike the Maoist conceptualisation of the protracted war, was the ability to keep politics in command. His guerrilla practices were extreme forms of voluntarism and subjectivism. On the other hand, the Maoist practice internationally suffered from both conceptual and practical overgeneralisation, which came from the legitimate practice of developing “base areas.” The territorial militarist symbolism and existentialism of localised peasant struggles overpowered the political sense of these movements. This led to the subservience of every expansion to secure base areas, which were increasingly surrounded and squeezed by the globalised networks of the capitalist circuit. Hence, the base areas remained central to revolutionary survivalism, while becoming marginal to the overall anti-capitalist movement of the working class. Guerrillas became identities in themselves, rather than “masses in arms”, as Kwame Nkrumah used to define a guerrilla. These movements could never become threats to capitalism, but always remained as actual scapegoats to impose global McCarthyism.

11. In fact, it was this marginalisation and deadlock that the movements like Zapatistas in Mexico apprehended in the 1980-90s, and were forced to envisage struggle and solidarity beyond instituted territorialities and state power. It was a recognition of the implausibility of the statist imaginary of post-capitalist transformation in the age of financialised transnational capital regimes. The critique of militarism and vanguardism presented by movements like the Zapatistas was the clarity that “you cannot reconstruct the world or society, or rebuild national states now in ruins, on the basis of a quarrel over who will impose their hegemony on society.” (3) The impetus to recognise and build a world of many worlds was not a simple rhetoric to revert to some united front tactics. It was a result of a deeper critique of relative “human conditions” and a self-critique of revolutionary practice, that was fixated upon the pre-determined goal of capturing state power. The critique of vanguardism that the Zapatistas presented was an affirmation of the vanguard as constantly (re)composed in the diverse levels of struggle – “We do not want to monopolize the vanguard or say that we are the light, the only alternative, or stingily claim the qualification of revolutionary for one or another current. We say, look at what happened. That is what we had to do.” (4) Of course, by relinquishing the aim of state power, they affirm themselves to be only a subset of the protracted global struggle. The Zapatistas provided an opening for the movemental critique of capitalism and capitalist state-formation, but the hypostatisation of the movement form that happened subsequently externalised this critique and reduced it to a dualism of state and civil society, that the process of state formation has always sought to pose. The powerful Zapatista experiment was eventually circumscribed within the NGOised civil society discourse – lobbyist rights, localist self-help politics and difference assertion which suited the neoliberal political economy based upon an infinite discretisation of human capacity and lean politics. The solidarity politics and economy that was envisaged in the Zapatista movement was abandoned in favour of identitarianist assertions, rights discourse and lifestyle autonomy. Leave aside its negation in practice, the state question itself was avoided.

12. If the post-Keynesian neoliberal counterrevolution professes to minimise the State by proclaiming it out of bounds from economy, it is simply vocalising the given divide between the economic and the political that characterises the capitalist system itself. What this divide means is the politics of depoliticisation of exchange relations – therefore, economy is always political economy, even if it is depoliticised. Whichever state form that has existed in the history of the modern state has come into being to facilitate the reproduction of exchange relations. The function of state in all its forms is to soak away the organic emergence of class struggle in these exchange relations, and limit it to the political superstructure. If Zapatistas exposed the crisis of valorisation on the margins of exchange relations and they could effectively practice “the idea of simply turning our back on the state,” their practice could not become more than an inspiration for those who found themselves enmeshed in exchange relations. John Holloway notes, “…there is no golden rule, no purity to be sought. Thus, for example, the Zapatistas in Chiapas make an important principle of not accepting any support from the state, whereas many urban pro-Zapatista groups in different parts of the world accept that they cannot survive without some form of state support (be it in the form of unemployment assistance or student grants or – in some cases – legal recognition of their right to occupy a social centre).” (5)

13. It was in the particulars conditions of urban and semi-urban locations at the very heart of exchange relations, that the risky in-the-state struggle became once again important. Especially in those countries where extractive industries are at the centre of economy and/or where the stark instrumentalisation of state institutions by glocal agencies of capital through purported neo-colonial mechanisms scuttled the local capacity to self-determine, the “opening” that Chavez’s Venezuela epitomised was significant. This revived the ground for people-oriented nationalist/statist efforts, but with a difference – there was a strong apprehension toward the statist primacy. Of course, the question of state power was posed by the barrios themselves, but with an evident sense that the state itself can never be transformed, but destroyed. The issue was to rein in state power to unleash a constant drive towards collective self-determination, rather than a pre-determined complete self-determination circumscribed within the instituted territoriality. The situation of dual power must be constantly posed, where popular autonomy is distrustful and vigilant towards the state, while class conflicts continually politicise exchange relations at every level and extend the reach of solidarity economy beyond territorial limits. Any slippage in this regard is an advantage to statism which eventually reduces dual power to the duality of the political and the economic – allowing capital to technicise the political recomposition of the working class to bring back exchange relations and capitalist accumulation on track.

14. The lessons of the Bolivarian revolution in South America are once again very elementary that until and unless these revolutions or events are taken as mere openings to deepen and expand the revolution, they will implode. Rosa Luxemburg reminded us a long time ago, “Either the revolution must advance at a rapid, stormy, resolute tempo, break down all barriers with an iron hand and place its goals ever farther ahead, or it is quite soon thrown backward behind its feeble point of departure and suppressed by counter-revolution. To stand still, to mark time on one spot, to be contented with the first goal it happens to reach, is never possible in revolution.” (6) In this age of the permanent crisis of capitalism and of generalised precarity, we will face numerous such reversals and can only hope to emerge every time a bit wiser.

References:

(1) Ernst Bloch [1969 (2006)] Traces, Stanford University Press, Stanford, p. 1-2.

(2) Karl Marx [2011 (1872)] “Resolutions of the Meeting held to celebrate the anniversary of the Paris Commune,” in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, People’s Publishing House, New Delhi, p. 287.

(3) Marcos quoted in Alex Khasnabish (2010) Zapatistas: Rebellion from the Grassroots to the Global, Zed Books, London, p. 83.

(4) Marcos quoted in Alex Khasnabish (2010), p. 64.

(5) John Holloway (2005) Change the world without taking power: New Edition, Pluto Press, London, p. 235.

(6) Rosa Luxemburg (1918) The Russian Revolution. Available at marxists.org

The Standpoint of the Unemployed


Our task in this note is to locate the unemployed in the social structure of capitalism and its dynamics. We cannot undertake this without simultaneously identifying them as forming a social subject that contributes in the critique of capitalist political economy. It essentially means relating the subject position with what it does. In a more sophisticated language, it means deciphering in this particular case the locus of the unemployed in the dialectic of the technical and political composition and recomposition of the working class. It is our contention that the standpoint of the unemployed as a social subject provides to the critique of political economy and labour politics access to the darkest and invisible corners of capital relations. This standpoint emerges from the unemployed’s apparent marginality in the capitalist system, their peculiar positioning within capital relations – their compulsion to sell their labour power, but inability to do so. (Dinerstein 2001)

The Marxist treatment of unemployment goes much deeper than the economics of unemployment which treats it at the level of appearance as cyclical and a problem of market clearance. Marx relates it to the logic of capitalist accumulation and treats it as “a condition of existence of the capitalist mode of production.” Here we rely on Marx’s analysis of “the reserve army of unemployed paupers” and relative surplus population. Through our deliberation upon the informal economy, we seek to demonstrate that the informalisation of work processes in the era of globally dispersed Fordism has brought the unemployed to the centre of labour politics.

1

Much of what is called the informal economy is constituted by processes and institutions built upon labour or activities that are termed self-employment, and whatever workers do to survive in the absence of what they consider decent jobs according to their skills. That is why these activities were considered transitory jobs or no jobs at all. And they still exist so in the minds of workers at least. Materially, too, the transitoriness is evident, which was never the character of the jobs themselves, but of labour that undertakes them, whose footlooseness these jobs re-enforced and productively channeled. Workers undertake these activities to reproduce themselves so that they are able to continue hunting for “jobs”. It is this tentativeness, casualness and ephemerality of informal labour that when disciplined becomes a positive economic virtue called flexibility.

Labour flexibility is among the most significant features of the informal economy that sanitises informality of its hideousness. By all standards flexibility sounds better than rigidity, which now comes to encapsulate the chief characteristics of formal employment and welfarism. Isn’t it interesting, insecurity is called flexibility, while security is dubbed rigidity? Flexibility is adventurous and forward looking, while rigidity is, of course, boring and conservative.

Labour is flexible here in all its possible senses – no standard wage, no insurance, no stability, use and throw policy etc. As clear from above, this feature is actually the nurturing and harnessing of alienation and homelessness or nomadism that workers experience in these economic engagements.

What dispersed Fordism or post-Fordism has accomplished is to mainstreamise or formalise this informality. Interestingly, this formalisation does not do away with the specificities that characterise this informality, rather the informal gets embedded in the formal network of production and distribution. This embedding incidentalises the labour intensive nature of the informal sector which was considered necessary in the pre-neoliberal phase of capitalism. The processuality that informality acquires destroys its dualistic separation from the formal. In fact, it loses its phenomenal nature. Thus, informalisation grips even the most skilled work and technologically advanced sectors of the whole economic system. The network economy that this process builds is not between the formal and the informal, which are losing any meaning as separate phenomenal entities, but between diverse levels of labour intensive and capital-intensive work processes, where insecurity dubbed labour flexibility or informalisation is the general tendency of the economy. Only this could allow requisite technological rationalisation of the production process to garner competitive advantages from available resources. As Marx had identified a hundred fifty years ago, the principle behind this rationalisation is quite simple, i.e., “the difference between the value of the machine and the value of the labour power replaced by it.” Harvey (2006:124) explains this,

“At times when the industrial reserve army becomes massive, capital will have abundant incentives to go back to labour-intensive techniques (hence the contemporary revival of the sweatshop even in advanced capitalist countries). The stimulus for more complex forms of technological and organisational change is certainly blunted at times of chronic labour surplus.”

However, what we see today is networking and complex layering of work processes involving multiple levels of technological and organisational forms in every economic activity. An extreme, but significant example, comes from the electronic industry. This industry today has attained a very high level of automation. However, almost every significant and sophisticated electronic device needs tantalum capacitor to control current flow inside miniature circuit boards. This metallic tantalum is made from the ore called columbite-tantalite or coltan, which is mined in African countries, especially Congo, through extremely primitive mechanisms. So we find a simultaneity of different degrees of labour/capital intensity forming a chain of exploitation that makes globalisation sensible, which is actually nothing more than the globalisation of the whole circuit of capital. This is not the simultaneity of non-simultaneous which defined the unevenness in the history of modern capitalism, and which could be mapped as vestiges or temporal and social lags. Non-simultaneous have been reduced to cosmetic shades. Now, “everything has reached the same hour on the great clock of development or rationalization.” The diverse work processes are homogenised as the realisation of capitalist expediency that is dependent on “the difference between the value of the machine and the value of the labour power replace by it.” And this difference is regulated on the basis of the extent and composition of the industrial reserve army or surplus population.

2

Capitalism is a system of intensification and expansion. The intensity and expansion increase what Marx calls surplus population. This surplus forms a reserve army from which workers are drawn whenever needed. The intensity of accumulation leads to what Marx calls floating reserve. The technological changes that produce this intensity make skills and the skilled redundant. Similarly, the expansion of commodity relations erodes the autonomy of modes and regimes of production redefining them within the logic of capital relations. It is not that this internal redefinition is anywhere accomplished without resistance. In fact, this resistance itself is instrumentalised to assign its ground a place value within the system. Even the refusal is taken care of, if not as criminal, then as exotic or erotic. Whatever be its face value, howsoever it is holy, capitalist valorisation profanes it by placing it in systemic relations. Primitive or original accumulation (re)produces the essential conditions for capitalist accumulation to take place. And among these the most important is the abundant supply of living labour to be subsumed.

“But if a surplus labouring population is a necessary product of accumulation or of the development of wealth on a capitalist basis, this surplus population becomes, conversely, the lever of capitalistic accumulation, nay, a condition of existence of the capitalist mode of production. It forms a disposable industrial reserve army, that belongs to capital quite as absolutely as if the latter had bred it at its own cost. Independently of the limits of the actual increase of population, it creates, for the changing needs of the self-expansion of capital, a mass of human material always ready for exploitation.” (M&E, Vol 35 [Capital 1]:626)

The relative surplus population includes every unemployed and half-employed. Though it can have many “periodically recurring forms” generated during the ups and downs of a business cycle, there are some permanent forms, which Marx identifies as floating, latent and stagnant. The floating surplus consists of those workers who are pushed and pulled in the normal operation of the supply and demand in the labour market. They float with the regular movement of capital, they emigrate where capital emigrates.

The latent surplus population is what feeds the flows between agriculture and non-agricultural sectors, between the countryside and towns. It is this surplus that supplies for the peripheral industrial employment and infrastructure building. With the progressive capitalisation of agriculture, the whole countryside is slowly transformed into a labour reserve. The latent character of this population is derived from the fact that it is hidden under the “half-employment” or self-employment in rural (agrarian and forest) activities. On the other hand, the “surplus” nature of this population is ensured by keeping their “one foot already [and always] in the swamp of pauperism”, by allowing depressed remunerations in these employments, whether as agricultural wages or as returns in exchange of services and produces. “The extent of [latent surplus population] becomes evident only when its channels of outlet open to exceptional width.” (M&E, Vol 35 [Capital 1]: 636-37)

Then comes the stagnant surplus which consists of all those are engaged in “extremely irregular employment,” toiling in the ‘domestic industry’ and under “the system of middlemen and sweaters.” “Its conditions of life sink below the average normal level of the working class; this makes it at once the broad basis of special branches of capitalist exploitation. It is characterised by maximum of working time, and minimum of wages.”(M&E, Vol 35 [Capital 1]: 637) It is worth quoting Marx’s words at length to define these forms of organising production. Marx describes the ‘domestic industry’,

“as one of the most dreadful forms of production existing, a form which is only brought to an end by the introduction of machinery, and in comparison with which the formal subsumption of labour under capital appears as a redemption. The immense surplus POPULATION created by large-scale industry in agriculture and the factory system is exploited here in a way which saves the “capitalist” a part of the production costs of capital, and allows him to speculate directly upon the misery of the workers. It is so in JOBBING WORK, the system under which some of the tailors, cobblers, NEEDLEWOMEN, etc., are employed in London. The surplus value created here depends not only on overwork and the appropriation of surplus labour, but also directly on deductions from wages, which are forced down far below their normal average level.

“The system of MIDDLEMEN and SWEATERS follows on from this one. The actual “capitalist” distributes among the MIDDLEMEN a certain quantity of raw material which is to be worked on, and they in their turn distribute these materials among those unfortunates, living in cellars, who have sunk down below the average level of the normal workers who are combined together in TRADE UNIONS, etc., etc. Thus the profit of these MIDDLEMEN, among whom there are often in turn further MIDDLEMEN, consists exclusively of the difference between the normal wage they let themselves be paid, and the wage they pay out, which is less than normal. Once a sufficient number of workers of the latter kind is organised through this system, they are often directly employed by capitalist No. I on the same conditions as those under which the MIDDLEMEN employed them.” (M&E, Vol. 34 [Marx’s Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63]:120)

These forms are what we today define as the system of sub-contracting or outwork and dispersed factory system. It will not be an exaggeration to claim that post-Fordist informalisation actually mainstreamises this, while neoliberalism justifies it as market expedient. In fact, even at the level of public policy design, the issue of its “abolition” is transcended, and what are actually sought are politics that can “foster the informal sector to mainstream, without loosing its inherent advantages.” (GDRC, http://www.gdrc.org/informal/about-informal.html)

Besides these three categories of surplus population, Marx identifies a section dwelling in the sphere of pauperism, which he defines as “the hospital of the active labour army and the dead weight of the industrial reserve army.” Exclusive of the dangerous class of actual lumpen-proletarians, this category includes, firstly, those who are pushed into employment only at the time of prosperity; secondly, “orphans and pauper children,… candidates for the industrial reserve army”; and, thirdly, “the demoralised, ragged, and those unable to work, chiefly people who succumb to their incapacity for adaptation, due to the division of labour; people who have passed the normal age of the labourer; the victims of industry, whose number increases with the increase of dangerous machinery, of mines, chemical works, &c, the mutilated, the sickly, the widows, &c.” (M&E, Vol. 35 [Capital 1]:637-38)

The resemblance of the experience of the informal economy in late capitalist economies like India with Marx’s analysis and description of the relative surplus population and unemployment is not accidental. It only evidences the cruciality of Marx’s analysis of the logical structure of capitalism and its rounding up of socio-historical resources for its realisation to comprehend the developmental specificities of these economies and their integration in the capitalist globality. However, we must assert that the difficulties that Marx confronted, due to many aspects of the logic of capitalist accumulation still unrealised during his time, led him to indulge in descriptivism leading to ambiguities in his expressions. Essentially, it led to a blurring of the division and relationship between the logic and history of capitalism. A sociologistic and evolutionary reading of Marx’s critique of political economy led to its normalisation as Marxian economics and another policy framework. In politics, it sustained reformism and class collaborationism.

Many later readers have not been able to grasp the conceptual centrality of primitive accumulation and the industrial reserve army in the logic of capital. A historicist reading of Marx’s Capital leads to the dilution of the richness of these concepts and reduces these categories to specific teloses of capitalism – to describe the development and/or underdevelopment of national and regional economies. The teleological understanding of capitalist development served well in the formative periods of the labour movement when the erosion of pre-capitalist relations seemed to have a redemptive value, allowing workers to focus on the requirements of the class struggle and organise themselves into a class. It exposed the reactionary socialisms of “Narodism” and Proudhonism that rampantly infested anti-capitalism – one wanting to bypass capitalism and the other “beneath the cloak of freedom and anti-governmentalism or anti-authoritarian individualism …are in actuality preaching vulgar bourgeois economics”, wanting to have capitalism without capitalists. This helped in battling the hegemony of those workers “who as workers in luxury trades are, without realising it, themselves deeply implicated in the garbage of the past.” (M&E, Vol.42 [Marx to Ludwig Kugelmann In Hanover, 9 October 1866] :326) It freed the labour movement from the dominance of the petty-bourgeois economism and directed it toward the political struggle against capital for reform and revolution.

But the teleological fallacy in later periods led to the reproduction of the same ideologies that it successfully combatted initially. The epithets of “vestiges”, “backwardness” etc bestowed upon various forms of social relations eventually became hurdles in grasping how these forms were instrumentalised in grounding and specifying capital relations in concrete locations. Although as the teleology had to fail and capitalism did not seem to proletarianise the labouring masses and sweep away the non-capitalist relations, with the teleology the primacy of class struggle too had to be abandoned. The working class became another identity and hence, the discourses of intersectionality and relativism. What has left of the teleology as capitalist development fails to adhere to the timeline is mere state fetishism and welfarism.

It is our contention here that the analysis of surplus population and reserve army that Marx’s make in his writings is crucial to understand the technical composition of the working class, providing an insight into the constitution and processes of different regimes of accumulation. Hence, its cruciality for understanding the possibilities and processes in the political recomposition of the working class. Marx already hints at this when he says:

“The demand for labour is not identical with increase of capital, nor supply of labour with increase of the working class. It is not a case of two independent forces working on one another. Les dés sont pipés [The dice are loaded]. Capital works on both sides at the same time. If its accumulation, on the one hand, increases the demand for labour, it increases on the other the supply of labourers by the “setting free” of them whilst at the same time the pressure of the unemployed compels those that are employed to furnish more labour, and therefore makes the supply of labour, to a certain extent, independent of the supply of labourers. The action of the law of supply and demand of labour on this basis completes the despotism of capital. As soon, therefore, as the labourers learn the secret, how it comes to pass that in the same measure as they work more, as they produce more wealth for others, and as the productive power of their labour increases, so in the same measure even their function as a means of the self-expansion of capital becomes more and more precarious for them, as soon as they discover that the degree of intensity of the competition among themselves depends wholly on the pressure of the relative surplus population; as soon as, by Trades’ Unions, &c, they try to organise a regular co-operation between employed and unemployed in order to destroy or to weaken the ruinous effects of this natural law of capitalistic production on their class, so soon capital and its sycophant, political economy, cry out at the infringement of the “eternal” and so to say “sacred” law of supply and demand. Every combination of employed and unemployed disturbs the “harmonious” action of this law. But, on the other hand, as soon as (in the colonies, e.g.) adverse circumstances prevent the creation of an industrial reserve army and, with it, the absolute dependence of the working class upon the capitalist class, capital, along with its commonplace Sancho Panza, rebels against the “sacred” law of supply and demand, and tries to check its inconvenient action by forcible means and State interference.” (M&E, Vol 35 [Capital 1]:634, emphasis ours)

3

Despite its alleged “backwardness”, informality has not just survived but has infiltrated the formal spaces, and is still spreading its tentacles. The institutionalised labour movement started by taking it as a transient phenomenon, attesting to its understanding of unevenness as “the simultaneity of non-simultaneous” and as a problem of insufficient development or underdevelopment, which capitalism would overcome in due course by its expansion or by the agency of the state, which was externalised and considered autonomous from capital relations (and many a times as a mere neutral instrument or agency which behaved according to who wielded it).

Informal workers being of transient identity, therefore, never became a concentration of trade unions, because their job profiles did not comply with the legalist definition of “workmen” whom trade unions organised. It is not that this was just a result of their choice, but was mainly due to their legal-structural accommodation which shaped their understanding and activities. Of course, these trade unions have always supported the struggles for the demand of “employment”, but organising on this issue never became a concern for them as these struggles were outside the purview of industrial relations. They could organise sporadic demonstrations to petition the state demanding employment or some social scheme to support the unemployed, but organising the unemployed and half-employed in their daily struggles for survival and as workers could never become one of their concentrations.

However, this drastically changed with the crises of Keynesianism in the 1960s, when the distance between informal and formal economies was eroded. They were not only networked together, informalisation became internal to factory work processes. The employment of casual and contract workers challenged the old school organising of industrial unions that based itself on stable, even if not permanent, workforce. The obvious and initial reaction of course was to assert privileges as qualifications that came with particular job profiles, experience and struggles. A part of this “new” unstable workforce was viewed as apprentices, still in a transitional stage, who would perhaps gain these qualifications with experience and become part of the regular workforce. Others would remain disqualified. These underprivileged would revert back to the reserve, as they didn’t have the core skills required for particular industries. In India, this industrial structure was codified through various legislations that established various kinds of filters segmenting the jobs and workers. But the telos was still there as the defining legal, political and economic ideology which saw everything moving towards the goal, the centre.

It was the Contract Labour Act of 1970 that recognised the crisis of this teleological structure in India. The division between jobs of the perennial nature and the incidental nature, between regular and temporary workforce were not just codified in this Act, but more importantly it sought to curb the centripetal teleology of welfarism by relativising the centre itself as another zone of difference, perhaps a privileged one, but not a goal. It might be surprising why the Act was celebrated among trade unionists, given what it demolished, but the competitive anxieties of the stable workforce that were increasing got some definite respite in the Act.

In 1960, the Supreme Court in The Standard Vacuum Oil Refinery Company v their Workmen (1960 AIR 948) sought to discourage and even abolish contractualisation especially in the public sector. This triggered a spate of cases brought before industrial tribunals to regularise workers. The Indian state was understandably rattled, as the verdict seemingly strengthened the existing labour institutions and curbed any capital-friendly flexibility in the labour market. The state was very much aware of the emergence of the new regime of accumulation based on labour informalisation and flexibilisation that started in the 1960s. This new regime sought to take advantage of the growing labour reserves to counter the economic downturn. Post-colonial India saw an increase in all types of labour reserves, and it would be inexpedient to be unable to use this as an advantage. The Contract Labour Act that the Indian State brought in1970 tried to address the crisis posed by the judiciary. It sought “to regulate the employment of contract labour in certain establishments and to provide for its abolition in certain circumstances.” But instead of any provision clearly directed towards the abolition of contract labour, the Act provided time filters for post-performance determination of the nature of work. It provided for specific welfare measures too. But the essential purpose was to alienate the conflict over contract labour from regular industrial relations, and empower the state and its bureaucracy to decide upon the characterisation of a particular work, whether it is of perennial or intermittent/casual nature.

This act was of course a recognition of the system of contract labour, but not so much to abolish it, which it couldn’t, given the changes in the regime of accumulation globally. It definitely had provisions for the regularisation of the workforce, but the same provisions in effect secured the system, which could not be trespassed but could be extended unlimitedly. The provisions of the Act did not apply to establishments employing less than twenty workmen, and those establishments “in which work only of an intermittent or casual nature is performed.” If in an establishment some work “was performed for [less than] one hundred and twenty days in the preceding twelve months” and in case of a seasonal work if it was “performed for [less than] sixty days in a year” then they were unambiguously considered to be of an intermittent nature. But most importantly, the Act clearly said, “if a question arises whether work performed in an establishment is of an intermittent or casual nature, the appropriate Government shall decide that question after consultation with the Central Board or, as the case may be, a State Board, and its decision shall be final.” Period. It codified and institutionalised a caste like division among labourers.

4

The Contract Labour Act definitely recognised the rights of the permanent employees as undisputed privileges and thus garnered the support of the trade unions. These trade unions remained and kept their members under the grip of the myth of teleology and state fetishism. They thought themselves to be the future of the insecure youthful mass worker, when in reality they were being “implicated in the garbage of the past.” The telos has long been reversed; nay, in fact, it has been demolished.

As labour reserves – unemployed and underemployed – surviving in the informal sector found fending for themselves in everyday politics and economics of work, they found the philanthropic patronising attitude of the shrinking mainstream useful sometimes to access privileged entries. The funded NGOs and social organisations mushroomed to take care of the volatile nature of this section. They dignified these workers by organising them as positive identities, as self-employed and in self help groups – a world of the third: neither capitalists, nor workers.

As the sense of permanence and stability was diminished, anxieties increased, leading to an open struggle – to defend privileges. Of course, side by side the issue of “organising the unorganised” was definitely posed. They have to be organised separately was the view of the new unions, who saw the specificities of the new “industrial” workforce in contradiction to the old stable workforce. On the other hand, old unionism stressed on the unity, and considered any new attempt to be divisive. In its opinion, the new unionist attempts displayed the immaturity of the informal workforce (perhaps due to its incomplete proletarianisation). It wanted these “new” workers to be subsumed in the established organisational setups. Overall the two sides stood united in taking the segmentation within the working class for granted.

They are unable to comprehend the process of informalisation that brings various segments together and binds them in hyper competition for redistributive claims. But it is thus that the caste boundaries too become porous. Capitalism has brought labour reserves in the centre of working class politics by generalising precariousness which today all segments of the society face. All segments within the working class have their one foot in the surplus population. In other words, with the informalisation of labour and associated precarisation becoming the general tendency of the economy, the intensity and seamlessness of the production and circulation networks trans-personalises the confrontation among labour and with capital. Even though we find precarisation and instability intensifying identity conflicts, leading to rampant violence over competitive redistributive claims, the trans-personalised cooperation against capital once achieved to a degree, which essentially politically recomposes the technical composition that capital has mobilised, becomes relatively immune to such conflicts.

When Marx says that every combination of employed and unemployed disturbs the harmony of capitalism, he is clearly referring to trade unions as self-organisations, where they were not agencies to accumulate claims, but to organise day to day cooperation against capital. At the time when these forms have been legally incorporated, they acquire defining legal roles which can only straightjacket or police these cooperations – so that they are systemically “productive” cooperation, not destructive. Organising the unemployed has to be an anathema for the system and its apparatuses, except to mitigate their plight in such a manner that the unemployed are reproduced and the system is perpetuated. Let us end this note with a quote from Ana Dinerstein (2001:223) who has worked extensively on Argentina’s unemployed workers movement,

“Rather than a lack, unemployment is an intensified form of capitalist work where the dematerialisation of labour becomes apparent. Although invisible, this dimension of dematerialisation is a dimension of struggle which is problematic for capital not because it separates subject from object, but because… it asserts itself in the form of the unrealised, the ‘unborn’. The subjectivity of labour emerges not as the means to unifying what has been separated, but as a disruption of the arrangement between the abstract and the concrete aspects of labour. Subjectivity recomposes and redefines the forms of the concrete and the abstract and thus opens the possibility for the unborn to be born, for the unrealised to be realised. The struggle over subjectivity is as much a struggle over the concrete and visible forms of domination-resistance as it is a struggle over the invisible aspects of that relation. In the condition of unemployment, the struggle over subjectivity appears to be a struggle over a non-relationship, therefore, it asserts itself mainly as a refusal to be made invisible.”

(DRAFT)

References:

Ana C Dinerstein (2001) Regaining Materiality: Unemployment and the Invisible Subjectivity of Labour. In The Labour Debate: An Investigation into the Theory and Reality of Capitalist Work, Ana C Dinerstein & Michael Neary (eds). Ashgate.

David Harvey (2006 [1982]) Limits to Capital. London: Verso.

Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Collected Works. Vols. 34, 35 & 42.Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Affirming poverty, or, how to radically break with fascistic underconsumptionism


“To deny poverty is to deny the absence of the Kingdom in the present system. It is to affirm the existing system as the Kingdom of this world. To affirm the poor, on the other hand, and to serve their eventual liberation, in the structures and in history, is to witness the presence of the Kingdom in the satisfying of the poor and to the absence of the Kingdom in the imperfection of society. The poor are the epiphany of the Kingdom or the infinite exteriority of God.
“It remains to distinguish between the inorganic multitude and the people as the emerging subject of history (Gen. 41:40), and the People of God as Church (Acts 15:14) called to a special role in history:
Come out of her (Babylon), my people, lest you take part in her sins (Revelation 18:4)”
–Enrique Dussel, ‘The Kingdom of God and the Poor’ (Beyond Philosophy: Ethics, History, Marxism, and Liberation Theology)

It must be stated quite explicitly here that the bleeding-heart, underconsumptionist politics of poverty alleviation — something that is preponderant among South Asian radicals, Marxists included — is precisely what we ought to, pace Dussel, characterise as denial of poverty. Such ‘Marxian’ underconsumptionism, and its concomitant ideology and politics of philanthropy and reformism respectively, is no more than the obverse of neoliberalism, which denies poverty in as many words. From a position that is rigorously Marxian, and is thus conceptually premised on overproduction/overaccumulation, poverty must be affirmed; neither denied, nor, for that matter, alleviated. Affirmation of poverty would be constitutive of politics proper — politics as the excess of all that which exists and which will come to exist — because such affirmation would amount to the affirmation of the condition of being unmeasured.

For, what else is poverty other than the condition of being unmeasured in the face of a system of quasi-objective measure (or value). This condition of being unmeasured, thanks to it being the condition of the absence of measure, and thus the condition of the limit of measure, makes measure possible. Hence, it is the limit of measure that is nevertheless constitutive of it. In that context, affirmation of poverty as politics would amount to affirmation of the limit of this system of quasi-objective measure or valorisation so that the latter is destroyed even as the former abolishes itself as the constitutive limit of that system of measure to emerge on its own terms as the immeasurable. In more clear strategic terms, such unsentimental affirmation of poverty would be, in Pasolini’s immortal words, unrelenting antagonism, without a shred of dialectical respite or reconciliation, towards the subsumptive value-relational system of quasi-objective measure in its concrete appearances.

Underconsumptionist ‘radicalism’, on the other hand, seeks to alleviate and thus deny poverty. The denial of poverty and suffering implicit in the apparent radicalism of struggling precisely for the alleviation of poverty and suffering stems from its underconsumptionist theoretical presupposition, wherein poverty and suffering are made sense of not as a crisis of the system of measure, which is precisely produced by this system in order to keep itself going, but as a curse of not being measured; or, not being fully subsumed by the system of measure. Such politics of alleviating poverty and suffering, needless to say, reinforces the system of quasi-objective measure (or valorisation) that produces poverty and suffering — which is the condition of being unmeasured — precisely in mobilising this limit of measure to found and (re)found itself as that system. It is not surprising that Pasolini, who was unflinching and unsentimental in affirming poverty as a revolutionary virtue, would see such underconsumptionist ‘radicalism’ as an unforgiveable handmaiden and ally of “neo-capitalism”.

Pasolini, in his characteristically counter-intuitive manner, repeatedly criticised such politics for undermining the revolutionary project. Here is an excerpt from his Lutheran Letters:
“The sin of the fathers is not only the violence of power, Fascism. It is also this: the dismissal from our consciousness by us anti-Fascists of the old Fascism, the fact that we comfortably freed ourselves from our deep intimacy with it (the fact that we considered the Fascists ‘our idiot brothers’; secondly and above all, the acceptance (all the more guilty because unconscious) of the degrading violence, of the real, immense genocides of the new Fascism.
“Why is there such complicity with the old Fascism and why such an acceptance of the new Fascism? Because there is — and this is the point — a guiding principle common to both, sincerely or insincerely: that is the idea that the greatest ill in the world is poverty and that therefore the culture of the poorer classes must be replaced by the culture of the ruling class.
“In other words, our guilt as fathers could be said to consist in this: that we believe that history is not and cannot be other than bourgeois history.”

Clearly, such politics, if we follow the train of Pasolini’s reasoning and analysis, effects the subjective embourgeoisement of the proletariat even as it not only leaves intact, but also actually reinforces, the proletarian condition in its sheer objectivity. This is arguably what Pasolini sought to argue when he insisted that “neo-capitalism” was a form of fascism more pernicious than political fascism that Europe had already experienced. And that, according to Pasolini, was because the latter was (is) characterised by, among other things, the continuance of “economic class struggle” even as the antagonistic class struggle between bourgeois and proletarian cultures had lapsed and disappeared. Pasolini’s “neo-capitalist” fascism — which he acutely demonstrated as being more insidious and more dangerous than the political fascism of yore — is nothing but our conjuncture of neoliberalism. This conjuncture is characterised by the state of exception having become generalised. So much so that struggles claiming to be anti-fascist are, precisely in asserting those claims, rendered fascistic in their own right. Thanks to ineluctable objective conditions, fascistic politics today is easily – and, as a matter of fact, invariably– operationalised precisely in the very moment of liberal-democratic juridicality, and in its political register.

It is in this context that the following contention of Dussel’s becomes extremely pertinent from the point of view of thinking an effective revolutionary strategy by way of articulating a thorough critique of underconsumptionism:
“It remains to distinguish between the inorganic multitude and the people as the emerging subject of history (Gen. 41:40), and the People of God as Church (Acts 15:14) called to a special role in history:

Come out of her (Babylon), my people, lest you take part in her sins (Revelation 18:4)”