The Historic Agreement in Nepal and the Immediate Challenge

Pratyush Chandra

Nepal continues to create history. Within a few weeks from now there will be an interim government with the Maoists’ participation to pre-empt any further betrayal to the basic immediate demands of the Nepali people for a constituent assembly and for exercising their right to decide the fate of the moribund monarchy and its institutional shields. Definitely, the political developments in Nepal after the April mobilization have approximated to what the parliamentary parties agreed upon in their understanding with the Maoists.

But as Reuters put (June 19), “The pace of change has been as breathtaking as the Himalayan scenery…This week Nepalis are asking themselves if it is all too good to be true”. Given the tremendous hostility that the global and regional hegemonies display, to the degree that they still label the Maoists terrorists, and opportunism of the parliamentary leadership, which was till recently struggling within itself to gain royal proximity and to become trusted agency for the external powers’ interests, has the situation really arrived for the revolutionaries to put their trust in the vestiges of the ancien régime? However, it is the level of popular vigilance and radicalism that have affected even the grassroots of the parliamentary parties, complementing the revolutionaries’ faith in the Nepali downtrodden, that makes them confident to take such unprecedented risk.

Popular Vigilance

After the restoration of their parliamentary privileges, the Nepali democrats have re-baptized the established institutions with new names and cut the wings of the royalty. Of course, all these do help in building the atmosphere amenable for taking the first step towards the resolution of the “Nepali crisis”, which is the formation of the Constituent Assembly as the body that will have the capacity to establish the basic rules, norms and ‘institutions’ necessary for, what Chairman Prachanda calls, “political competition”.

The local elites and their global sponsors had thought that the April radicalism on the urban streets of Nepal would die down after the restoration of the old parliament. But they were time and again rebuffed when the vigilant Nepali people took to the streets to check and decry every compromise and regression in the air. The Maoist rejection of the April compromise did not allow this radicalism to sleep. Deuba, Koirala and others known for their moderate royalism and elitist anti-Maoist stance in the past are constantly watched, and any statement and action from them that reek of the design to give space to decadent institutions and their representatives are duly criticized by spontaneous showdowns on the streets.

Not a single day has passed since the April agitation without meetings and gatherings where diverse sections of the Nepali people discussed the future regime and contents of the future constitution. Various sections of the marginalized majority of the Nepali society have been coming and demonstrating in Kathmandu for ensuring their representation and the inclusion of their demands and rights in the future political system. This remarkable spirit of self-determination rejects any compromise that is short of what the Nepali people have promised themselves. It is this spirit that destroyed the “Royal Regression” and continues to eliminate any possibility of the Parliamentary Regression, of making the old parliament an end in itself. And the June 16 agreement between the Maoists and the government is the definite result of this Popular defiance.

The Elitist Game Plan

But the Nepali crisis was never just related to the accommodation of the Maoists and establishing institutions for such accommodation. It is most importantly linked with the political economic empowerment of the Nepali downtrodden. Until and unless the radical needs of the Nepali laboring classes – workers and peasantry – that have found expression in the Maoist movement are not dealt with, the crisis is not going to be resolved. And here lies the tension that is clearly visible in the political developments in Nepal.

Just before the recent June agreement the Prime Minister arrived from a very “successful” trip to India. And as expected the parameter of this success in Nepal is how much monetary aid the leader is able to raise. And India as the new recruit in the Imperial Project struggling to obtain a definite share in the continuous re-division of the world has recently been too ready to fulfill such requests. Hence, the success was unprecedented.

In return, Finance Minister Ram S. Mahat sold the newfound peace and sovereignty, for which the Nepali people have been fighting, to “captains of Indian industry” at a function organized by the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII): “This is a new era after the establishment of the people’s sovereignty in Nepal. Peace has now been restored after the end of a decade long conflict that had held back the country’s socio-economic advancement… It is in this context that our attention is now focused on increased investment, public and private, domestic and foreign.” An Indian newspaper, The Hindu (June 10) reports, “Referring to the fact that India faced higher labour and operating costs of production, Mr. Mahat said cheap and abundant labour, educated technical workforce and other less expensive inputs provide investors incentives for producing intermediate products for Indian companies in Nepal.”

This economic hyper-activism just before the installation of the interim government is meant to pre-empt any future attempt to radically transform the economic path that the Nepali state and ruling classes have pursued for the last five decades – of economic clientilism and dependency. It seeks to depoliticize the arena of economic policy by overburdening the future political regime with all sorts of economic arrangements that would maintain status quo in the basic political economic structure. The Koirala government has effectively utilized its time to ensure that the basic economic framework is in place which would be difficult to change drastically under any future political transformation. Only after this did it become comfortable with the idea of the dissolution of the parliament and the formation of the interim government with the Maoists.

All this is very aptly complemented by the recent attempt to reduce the “Nepali crisis” and the Democracy Movement to the question of the position of the Nepali royalty and the accommodation of the Maoist “rebels” in the mainstream political system. Clearly, the most formidable way to dilute any radical resolution of this crisis is to simply ignore what it is all about. The recent political discourse of “People’s Movement” and “People’s Power” which sought to de-“classify” the movement, ignore its class constituents and their diverse aspirations, homogenize it under an amorphous category of the “people” was the first attempt in this regard. Moderate royalists, corporate media (foreign and national) and foreign funded NGOs and “civil society” groups led this santization campaign. Foreign interests too found this discourse worthwhile, as it minimizes the damage, by eliminating the clarity of the demands. It effectively evades the Maoist element and puts the Nepali movement in line with the “color revolutions” of Eastern Europe, coloring the corrupt elements of the old regime to provide a “stable”, yet “experienced”, leadership to the new.

Obviously on every front, the Nepali ruling classes are trying hard to de-link the question of democracy from the issue of building the essential institutions for fulfilling the popular needs, giving “land to the tillers”, political and economic self-determination of the diverse downtrodden sections of the Nepali society. They seek to sweep aside the whole question of endogenous development – of accounting the endogenous resources, putting them under democratic control for fulfilling the popular needs.

The Revolutionary Resolution

On the other hand, the popular classes of Nepal – Nepali workers and peasantry – were for the first time mobilized independently during the People’s War, undiluted by the opportunism of the disgruntled sections of the landlord-merchant-moneylending classes and the clientele petty bourgeoisie nurtured as local “nodes” for implementing the social agenda of imperialism. It was in the Maoist movement that for the first time the Nepali landless and near landless, involved in circular national and international migration to meet their ends, found an organized political expression. The rural roots of the Nepali laboring classes even in the secondary and tertiary sectors allowed the popular democratic aspirations unleashed by the Maoist movement to integrate virtually the whole Nepali society behind the New Democracy Movement, despite the claims by other political forces to have achieved democracy in 1990.

Obviously, Prachanda’s concept of “political competition”, which the Maoists in Nepal have developed in one or the other way right from the time they put forward their 40-point demand in 1996, has to be interpreted in this background. They seek an open competition between the “democracy from above” that the 1990 arrangement established and the aspirations for the “democracy from below” that they have inculcated in the daily lives and struggles of the Nepali downtrodden. In standard terms, at the level of economic policy, it is a competition between the growth-oriented and need-oriented frameworks. With the June 16 agreement, the possibility of such competition as the new level of class struggle has become almost certain. But it will be interesting to see how the revolutionaries in the interim government, when established, are able to undo what the Nepali ruling classes have already achieved to make this competition inherently lopsided in their own favor by imposing the basic framework for pre-empting any conclusive assault from below.

(Modified version of the article written for ML International Newsletter (July-August))

Indian Politics in the context of the Iranian Crisis

Pratyush Chandra

The postponement of the decision to refer Iran to the UN Security Council has given the Indian rulers temporary relief. A few days back, India’s Foreign Secretary denied giving away any inkling about India’s stand if voting on Iran issue took place on November 24. (1) But did he or his superiors themselves have any hint of what they were going to do?

1 India and the Iranian crisis

Ever since India joined the Western powers led by the US in backing an IAEA resolution calling on the agency to consider reporting Iran to the UN Security Council if it does not meet its nuclear obligations, the Indian government has been going out of its way to explain its vote being in accordance with not only national but also Iranian interests. Its leftist allies are doing everything to make it apologetic for what it did on September 24, and to ensure that they do not repeat it again whether on November 24 or after. When the rightist opposition was in government it did not miss any opportunity to run behind the US wagging its tail. In fact, the consistency that we see today in the Indo-US relationship and its general acceptability are their gift to Manmohan Singh. However, the parliamentary logic forces even this spineless opposition to talk about non-alignment and anti-“imperialism” in its efforts to mobilise the alienated forces under its fold, and regain its spirit after last year’s electoral shock.

The government had always expected some international political development to take place that would help it avoid the voting. Increasing its pain was the Iranian endeavour to mix up the issue with the pipeline deal, which is still halfway. During the project’s Joint Working Group’s meeting in Tehran, Iran’s Deputy Petroleum Minister for International Affairs M H Nejad Hosseinian told the Indian delegation on October 24 “Iran expects that the esteemed government of India would compensate the past default by supporting Iran in the next meeting of the IAEA board of governors in November.” (2) Petroleum Secretary “had then replied that Iran’s demand was political in nature and it was difficult for him to comment on a political issue.” (3) Since then the desperate Indian government has been trying hard to convince Iran of its neoliberal lessons on the depoliticisation of economy learnt under the guidance of an Economist who happens to be the present Prime Minister, too, “to keep nuclear politics out of the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project and consider the latter as a purely commercial deal.” (4)

Finally, the US agreed to the Russian proposal allowing Iran to refine uranium at a key nuclear facility as long as more advanced work on the material was completed in Russia. Iran too promised to consider it. It is a face saving exercise for every party in the discussion. The Bush administration recognises “that its Iran policy, both tactically and strategically, was failing to resolve” the crisis and that it has been unable to persuade other Western powers, not even its otherwise faithful allies to refer the case to the Security Council. (5) Any unilateralism in these circumstances will be dangerous for the US. Militarily irresolute EU powers too wanted a resolution that did not force them to take a stand. However, the only negative aspect of such resolution for the US and other Western interests seems to be the strategic boost to Russia and China that this resolution entails – their ability to negotiate.

A similar face saving exercise was on in India – the possible resolution of the nuclear crisis or even delay in any decision in the IAEA in sight was a great respite. The international political exercise apparently seemed to second the government’s main argument in its efforts to convince its partners and others that what it did on September 24 was in national interest and in the interest of Iran too – giving time to Iran and others for negotiations. On the other hand, the official Left which has been trying hard to balance between saving its own independent political image and its desperate need to keep rightists out of power by supporting the government too will be able to continue balancing them consistently for some more time. When everything seemed safe, the government informed the Left what everybody already knew by then:

“At the eighth meeting of the United Progressive Alliance and the Left parties here, two days ahead of the crucial IAEA meeting in Vienna, the Government apprised the Left leaders of the progress made. The indication is that there is a possibility that there will be no voting and till now there has been no draft resolution suggesting that the matter be taken to the United Nations Security Council.”

As expected the government sought to convince its critiques that the postponement was the success of the diplomatic efforts to which it became a party by voting affirmatively on September 24. Finance Minister told the media, “The Government informed the Left parties of the progress made through diplomatic efforts. It was noted that the Government’s intention was to ensure that the matter remains within the jurisdiction of the IAEA”. (6)

2 Neo-liberal consensus and the foreign ministry

Ambiguity and opportunism have always constituted the bedrock of Indian foreign policy. Even during the Cold War, India’s choice for “non-alignment” was opportunistic rather than a matter of principle. Non-alignment allowed it a space to manoeuvre and bargain in the bipolar atmosphere. On the one hand, the already established strong capitalist interests in the country motivated the Indian state to establish channels that could facilitate their integration in the world market dominated by the West under the US. But, on the other hand, the lateness of capitalism in India kept it devoid of a systematic infrastructure for domestic capitalist expansion on the basis of which its capitalist interests could integrate and compete in the world market. The required support for this could come only from the Soviet camp, which envisaged a similar model for “national capitalist development” in third world countries. This dualism on the part of the Indian State made it opportunistic par excellence.

This opportunism has acquired new dimension in the post-Cold War liberalisation phase. The uneasiness that India feels today when it has to take a clear stand on international issues derives from the multi-layered, often contradictory, nature of its integration in international political economy. Its apparent opportunism is starkly reflected throughout its international dealings. Ever since it did nuclear tests in 1998, India seems to be caught in a schizophrenic existence, unceasingly oscillating between over-confidence and desperation. Events in the year 2005 evidence this eccentricity at least twice, earlier on the issue of Nepal and now on Iran.

Political analysts generally take this political behaviour at their face value. They fail to grasp the underlying stress and strain. Since Rajiv Gandhi’s open avowal to ‘neo-liberalise” the Indian economy with his New Economic Policy, there have been opportunities to test the words and deeds of almost all the major political fronts in the country. Since Rajiv Gandhi’s defeat in 1989, we have seen 8 Prime Ministers taking over (if we include the 13 days rule by Vajpayee in 1996). All these leaders despite their diverse political and ideological allegiances have been consistently wed to the basics of neo-liberalism. Finance Ministry has been remarkably consistent in its attitude throughout the two decades since 1985. Ideologies and ‘politics” have served to divert their social fallouts rather than to guide the overall policy designs.

The interior or home ministry along with the external affairs or foreign ministry takes on the tasks of making the ground fertile for the practice of neoliberalism. The Home Ministry has always been important for smoothening the track for capital accumulation by securing property relations and bringing material and “cultural” commons into the fold of these relations. However, less recognised is the fact that since the neo-liberalist economic policy is fundamentally designed to facilitate the entry and exit of capital and to administer the process of international capitalist integration, the External Affairs or Foreign Ministry eventually becomes the most active in this phase. Synchronising the global market dynamics and political reality is the major task undertaken through this ministerial coordination. The motivational glue is provided by keywords like pragmatism and the trans-political (de-politicised) notion of national interest. This pragmatism is nothing but a sanctified discourse to justify the “realpolitick” of making best of opportunities, or opportunism.

3. The crisis of mainstream left nationalism in India

The so-called experts on international relations and security issues have divided India’s international activism in two phases – the idealist phase and pragmatist phase, Rajiv Gandhi’s reign being generally considered the turning point. Despite being superficial and meaningless, this division sufficiently indicates at its purpose, which is simply to disparage the principle of non-alignment as utopian and to justify the pro-US tilt. Similarly these self-acclaimed ‘security intellectuals’ have redefined the all-accommodative notion of “national interest” in “Social Darwinian” terms. They have succeeded sufficiently in derailing the task of a serious inspection of the real context in which the Indian foreign policy is taking shape, of understanding it in terms of the continuity and change in Indian capitalist development.

Even the Left in India has been mesmerised by this ‘realpolitick’ definition of national interests, not trying to reinterpret them in terms of class and class interests. Eventually they too become prisoners of the supra-class nationalist ideology. This has been starkly evident in the ongoing debate on India’s “interest” in the Iranian nuclear crisis. The Leftists tried to assess India’s “national interest” in terms of ‘national’ material gains, the same basis on which the ruling elites are grounding their defence. Asking for an independent foreign policy in general, on this particular issue Prakash Karat, the general secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), said, “If the Centre decides to vote against Iran, it should be viewed seriously as the focus should be on Indian interests, without succumbing to outside pressures”. And, hence, “India, which imports 70 percent of its oil, should maintain good relations with Iran and be alert of the designs of the ‘imperialists’”.(7) So the “focuses” are national sovereignty, “national interests” and pragmatism. Does any mainstream political formation differ on the primacy of these “focuses”? Does the Indian state deny them? In fact, by retelling all the known facts leading to India’s September 24 vote, the Indian government has been repeatedly showing that whatever it did was its own sovereign decision. Further, on the question of national material interests too, Indian policies pro-US tilt can be explained on the basis of India’s dependence on the Western (especially the US’) market and investment.

The mainstream presentation of ‘national interest” allows the hegemonic political economic interests to homogenise the ‘nation’ behind their designs. In a class divided and stratified society any such homogenisation ultimately harnesses the ‘people’ for the royal ride of the state and the ruling classes in pursuit of a “national” political economic expansion. Instead of recognising and sharpening the class conflict underlying the neo-liberal polity, while fighting its ideological transcendence in the discourse of nation and “national interests”, the Indian Left in its eagerness to become part of the ‘national mainstream’ is helping in conserving the national pomposity that characterises the Indian foreign policy, which politically sustains the Indian capital’s global pursuit. It seeks a nationalist compromise that can synchronise its “interests” with the State’s “national interests”. In the event of this uncritical acceptance of the political philosophy that underlies the Indian state policies, even anti-Americanism in the Indian leftist discourse is well utilised in supplying versatility and strength to the Indian state’s manoeuvrings and bargaining.

Notes

(1) Stand at Vienna will be in national interest, says Saran, The Hindu, November 17, 2005

(2) Iran’s armtwisting begins: fix Vienna mistake or else, The Indian Express, November 13, 2005

(3) Delhi will tell Iran: Keep N-politics out of pipeline, The Indian Express, November 16, 2005

(4) Ibid

(5) US backs Russian Plan to resolve Iran Crisis, The Washington Post, November 19, 2005

(6) Left apprised of stand on Iran issue, The Hindu, November 22, 2005

(7) PTI, India must have independent foreign policy: Karat, posted on November 20, 2005

Defining "National Interests" in Indian Foreign Policy

Pratyush Chandra

There has been a tremendous growth in politico-intellectual interest in interpreting Indian foreign policy. On the one hand, journals and newspapers are overflowing with analyses of India’s international activism, and on the other, we find a rise in institutions or ‘think-tanks’ specializing in it, both within India and abroad. However, it can be effectively contended that there is rarely any novelty in the approaches taken by these intellectuals, institutions and politicians on the issue. Most of them are restricted to producing permutation and combination of preconceived and ill-defined notions of “national interests”, “security interests”, “terrorism”, “pre-emptive measures” etc. Even progressive and ‘counter-hegemonic’ discourses are unable to go beyond conceiving the Indian policies as those of a ‘comprador’ third world ruling class, submitting to external pressures. This leads to analyses limiting themselves to mere tautological descriptions of the policies, different only in tone and of course in humanist tenor, but rarely disputing on the basic foundations of policy-making, that inform even the rightist jingoism and centrist pragmatism.

1. Indian “National Interests” – the Left-Right-Center Combined

The domestic opposition to Indian rulers’ intervention in international politics today is broadly confined on the following lines:
(1) They are compromising on the “national interests”,
(2) They are coming under the “American pressure”,
(3) As the consequence of (1) and (2), they are betraying their erstwhile “Non-Aligned Movement” (NAM) comrades.

Such tenor of opposition itself provides the Indian state a viable framework to rationalize its position. It can restrict itself to demonstrating how “national interests” are being served and sovereignty is not compromised, that it is taking its own decision and is being treated as an equal partner in the international strategic forums; further, that it is “leading” its erstwhile NAM comrades by actively representing them and supporting their political and economic sovereignty. This is effortless defense since there exists no need to defend the basic premises of the Indian foreign policy. There is unanimity across-the-board over the sanctity of “national interests”, sovereignty, the principle of “not coming under any external pressure” and India as a leader of the “third world” or “NAM” countries. The opposition counts on the evidences on which these sanctified principles are being violated, while the government in power provides counter-evidence on the same lines.

Recent debates “on the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), the July 18 Agreement with the United States, the September vote in the IAEA and the recent deliberations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)” are typically confined to this mode of discourse – whether led by the leftists, rightists or centrists.

Seemingly, there is no disagreement on India’s right to be a “Nuclear Weapon State” while remaining “committed to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons”. Not long ago, when with the rightist Vajpayee government’s nuclear tests in 1998, political forces of all hues and colors not only refrained from criticizing the act, but on the contrary they fought to take the credit for promoting researches which led to India’s nuclear capability. Nobody apparently denies the ideal “that the best and most effective nuclear non-proliferation measure would be a credible and time-bound commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons from existing arsenals, including India’s own nuclear weapons” and that we should “have no desire to perpetuate the division between nuclear-haves and have-nots”. However still, the left, right and center all are guilty of aspiring to see India as “a permanent member of the Security Council”. They all want India to demonstrate “a growing capability to shoulder regional and global responsibilities”, and “focus … increasingly on trans-national issues that today constitute the priority challenges – whether it is terrorism or proliferation, pandemics or disaster relief”. Further, “we cannot sit out the debates on the big issues of our times. Our interests demand a vigorous and articulate diplomatic effort that explains our positions and advances our interests.”

The quotes above are taken from a single lecture by the Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran on “Nuclear Non-Proliferation and International Security” (1), wherein, despite its usual diplomatic nature, he eloquently presents the unanimous aspirations of the Indian political elites. Everybody (left, right and center) will agree with him that India’s approach to nuclear non-proliferation [or on everything] should be “a consistent one, a principled one and one grounded as much in our national security interests as in our commitment to a rule-based international system.”

While defending the recent decisions by the Indian government and its agreements with the US, he says,

“There is a continuity and consistency in our approach that may sometimes be masked by the particularities of a specific decision…. What appears to some observers as inordinate external influence over our decision-making in sensitive areas is, in fact, rooted in our own well-considered and independent judgment of where our best interests lie. This is in keeping with our tradition of non-alignment… We must adjust to change, change inherent in our emergence as a Nuclear Weapon State, change inherent in the sustained dynamism and technological sophistication of the Indian economy, and, as a consequence, change in global expectations of India as an increasingly influential actor on the international stage.”(2)

As a bureaucrat who is supposed to be “above politics”, Shyam Saran is not wary of making it a point to stress on the continuity and consistency in the policies of the Indian state, always reminding of the consonance of the present left-supported ‘centrist’ government’s policies with those of the erstwhile rightist Vajpayee government. In his defense of the Indian vote on the IAEA resolution on Iran, he stressed in his press briefings:

“I do not think that you should interpret India’s position as being aligned on the Left or on the Right or aligned with this group of countries or that group of countries. I think India has all along taken decisions on issues of concern to itself on the basis of its own assessment, and on the basis of its own national interest. So, the question of this representing a shift in India’s policy does not arise.”(3)

And he is obviously not wrong. All depends on how you define the “national interests”. And on their definition there is hardly any difference between various parties involved in the debate. One side says the government serves them, other side denies it; but nobody seeks to describe what those interests are and which sections of the society determine them.

2. “Uses of Domestic Dissent”

This fact of unanimity makes all mainstream approaches on the Indian foreign policy merely repetitive. They rarely question the basic foundation of the policy decisions. One says “compromises”, other notes “cooperation”; one notes “subjugation”, other says “equal partnership” etc. But this discursive exercise has a definite ideological role. Howsoever, this exercise seems futile, it significantly emasculates any decisive domestic opposition to the Indian state as they combine in unity on making it evermore “stronger” in the name of challenging ‘external pressure’, giving ‘international leadership’, and serving ‘national interests’ etc. It is this unanimous ‘nationalist’ tone in the Indian politics that has left the Indian hegemonic [militarist] exercises complementing and supporting the expansion of ‘national capitalist’ interests internationally unchecked.

The Indian interventions in the politics and economy of its neighboring countries and elsewhere are universally termed self-conceited and ‘big-brotherly’, but not imperialist. Hence what is seen as required is simply correcting this ‘aberration’, making the Indian policy towards these small and weak neighboring countries more ‘responsible’. The preconceived notion of a ‘third-world’ country imposed on the late capitalist countries does not allow the analysts to perceive their leadership as serving ‘national’ political economic interests by maneuvering internationally.

Further, any gesture of confrontation with the First World is termed ‘anti-imperialist’. This ‘anti-imperialism’ stresses the importance of the reconstruction of a ‘non-aligned movement’ and ‘south-south’ cooperation. But it does not take into account the material basis of a state-to-state cooperation between the “third world” countries. It does not consider the contradiction inherent in the ‘nationalist anti-imperialism’ in countries like India. At the juncture when India owns 35 percent of the FDI in Nepal, when it is the biggest investor in Sri Lanka since 2002 and has Bhutan and Maldives as perfect clienteles, do we expect India to lead another NAM? And if it does, what will be its role? Will it not be similar to that of Germany’s in EU, howsoever subservient to the US or any other global hegemonic power? Backwardness or lopsidedness of the Indian capitalism and society does not stop it from becoming expansionist and imperialist.

The indigenous corporate capitalist interests (immaterial of the adjectives we might choose to characterize them) today frame the agenda for the Indian state in the international scenario, whether pro-US or otherwise. These interests are formidably conscious and mature, as can be seen from the way the Indian state and capital combines their various strategies – a militarist combination with the US-Israel nexus, supposedly “progressive” alliance with various “third world” powers in WTO, independent oil dealings with varied forces, investments in oil fields, offer of lines of credit to developing countries in Africa and Tsunami affected countries, pipeline diplomacy and readiness to militarily-politically support all these. We cannot simply isolate one aspect of the Indian capitalist interests and generalize it to grasp their hydra-like nature. Competition and collaboration are inherent in the capitalist political economy. Will it not be just and appropriate to use this same principle to assess the “Indian designs”? Or else, we will only support them asking the Indian state to be “stronger” and will convert the opposing voices to mere instrument in its international bargaining. (4)

References:

(1) Lecture on “Nuclear Non-Proliferation and International Security” by Foreign Secretary Shri Shyam Saran at India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, October 24, 2005, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.
(2) Ibid.
(3) “Press Briefing by the Foreign Secretary on the events in UN and IAEA”, September 26, 2005, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.
(4) In fact in a recent article by Harish Khare such use of dissent has been proudly advocated. See Harish Khare, “Uses of Domestic Dissent in Foreign Policy”, The Hindu, October 26, 2005.

For a different interpretation of Shyam Saran’s lecture, see Siddhartha Varadarajan’s India submits to the Bush doctrine?

India’s “Persian Puzzle” – A Possible Solution

Pratyush Chandra

[The recent Indian vote on the IAEA resolution is being generally interpreted as a sign of the Indian state’s subservience to the US. However, the reality belies this simplistic analysis. At the risk of being labelled economic determinist, this article brings out some facts that indicate towards the growing expansionist interest of the Indian capital. It is this expansionism that drives the Indian state to defy its ‘non-alignment’ past and design its own game-plan, which at least for now coheres with the US global strategies.]

India has finally voted in favor of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution on Iran. Everybody was speculating that at last an issue has come up that will break the pace and uniformity of the growing Indo-US relations. But India has made its choice clear in the world market of strategies and alignments. There are various lines of explanation that dominate the discussion on the rationale of India’s choice on the issue. The most prevalent one is of course based on the belief that the “third world” states are congenitally incapable of taking such decisions except under the pressure from the West. This view generally presumes these states to be ‘soft’ and their ‘national’ hegemonic interests to be weak, which can easily be swayed by the external pressures. Further, any gesture of confrontation between these states and the Western states especially the US is generally taken as potentially anti-imperialist. However, this view cannot explain the Indian case as it does not capture the basic political economic processes that are increasingly integrating the Indian hegemonic interests within the global strategic alignments and realignments.

The Official Justification

Even before voting for the resolution, the Indian government had been categorically stressing that there was “no difference in objectives between India and the United States vis-à-vis Iran even if the two sides differ on tactics”.(1) Further, even when India stressed on “diplomatic consultations to evolve an international consensus on how to deal with Teheran’s decision to continue its uranium enrichment programme”, it never wanted “another nuclear weapon state in its neighbourhood”.(2) Under these circumstances India’s vote must not be taken as a surprise.

The Indian foreign ministry is not wrong when it says that India’s vote on the resolution was actually in line with whatever had already been happening. This continuity is what constitutes the “evolutionary” foreign policy of India, as envisaged by its present Foreign Minister. The Indian leadership has consistently expressed all its international dealings in terms of “national interests”, “security interests”, etc. Once again, with regard to its vote on the IAEA resolution, the justification given by the Indian state is based on an ideological depoliticization of the so-called “national interests”. In the words of the Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran:

However, it all depends on the way you define the “national interest” which under neoliberalism (the professed ideology of the Indian state at least since 1991) means nothing but what provides leverage to the Indian businessmen and their businesses.

The Context

While analyzing India’s strategic maneuverings internationally, the analysts very rarely note their economic dimensions. It is scarcely admitted that India’s relationship with other developing countries after 1991 has been increasingly based on the export of capital and the Indian investment abroad. And in most of the cases, such economic relationship has been simultaneously equipped with militaristic aid to those states. India has been offering credit lines to many Afro-Asian countries that they can utilize for infrastructure building and other business purposes with a condition that they will employ Indian companies. India’s ‘non-aligned’ past has allowed it to have a major share in the capitalist subordination of the backward economies in Africa and Asia. In fact, the rhetoric of non-alignment (“South-South cooperation”) plays an efficient ideological role in rationalizing the expansionist drive of the Indian capital. Recently after India refused the foreign aid for its own Tsunami victims, the Indian External Affairs Minister, Natwar Singh, while offering Indonesians “concessional credit for reconstructing roads, buildings, harbours, ten units of fully equipped hospitals”, rattled proudly that “they were lumping us with the others but now we are seen separate offering our help and assistance”. (4)

Definitely, since 1991 India has been consistently endeavoring to be recognized as a faithful ally of the US. Its nuclear graduation and global politico-economic interests have shown the US leadership that it is a force to be reckoned with, and its subordination provides one of the most reliable allies to oversee the Indian Ocean and meet up with China. In recent years the growing energy needs of the Indian capital has forced the Indian State to invest in the oilfields abroad – India has operating assets in Sudan, Vietnam, Iraq, Iran, Myanmar, Libya, Syria, Sakhalin Islands, etc. It has been acquiring competitive amounts of shares in foreign oil companies. All these make India a player in the global oil politics too both as an investor and a consumer.

The Indo-US relationship is thriving in this context, and has a clear-cut ‘material’ semantics. India requires not having a confrontation with the “global police” state when its capital is struggling to stabilize its share in the global pool of surplus value, of which a major portion comes from the American market and the Indian investment in the US. Further, by providing dual citizenship to the Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) recently, the Indian state has further increased its own responsibility of protecting NRI capital in exchange of ‘rent’ and the assurance of repatriation of profit.

In this scenario, apparently one may interpret the Indian vote on the IAEA resolution as an appeasement of the US-led ‘coalition’. But here too there is a vital interest of the Indian capital that is playing an important role. The recent pipline diplomacy between Iran, India and Pakistan is quite well known. It is impossible to interpret the Indian vote, which is unequivocally affirmative (not even abstention!) on a resolution that is meant to isolate Iran, without connecting it to the facts of the Indian ‘oil politics’ in general and its pipeline diplomacy with Iran in particular.

The Nature of India’s Oil Interests and the Global Coalition

Recently, while rationalizing the Indian nuclearization, the Indian Defense Minister noted:

“India is a heavily energy deficient country. Of all the variables that could hinder India’s economic progress, energy scarcity and dependence are probably the most serious. Seventy percent of our crude oil is imported. Per capita energy consumption presently is only 1/5th of the world average. Considering a high growth rate of around 8 percent of GDP per year in the coming years, growth of oil demand is projected to be 6 percent per annum. If so, dependence on oil imports could rise from 70 percent to 80 (percent), to 85 percent over the next two decades. It is therefore imperative for us to look for cost-effective and long-term alternatives to meet our energy requirements. Indian oil companies are currently actively involved in a search for energy in the form of oil and gas fields, pipelines, LNG, and other new and non-conventional sources. But most hydrocarbon resources underline our dependence on limited reserves and others for this critical requirement. They also carry scope for avoidable strategic energy rivalries.” (5)

The clue to India’s alignment with the US hegemony in the Middle East lies here. Its energy deficiency, yet the desire and ability to proactively make up for it, makes the Indian rulers a player in the Middle East conflicts. Major, yet low productive oil producing industrialized countries, including the United States (6) and oil deficient industrialized economies can influence the global oil price only by appeasing or isolating OPEC countries. Since a major determinant of the oil price today is the differential oil rent appropriated by the highly productive oil economies like those of the Middle East, “cost effective” energy appropriation requires reducing this rent. The bully tactics (“either with us or against us”) of the US and other Western powers in the Middle East has been mainly geared towards this purpose.

The increasing Indian investment in the oilfields abroad was definitely triggered by the need to satisfy the domestic energy requirements, but ultimately as it happens with all capitalist ventures, these investments eventually develop their own logic of earning profit. With increasing divestment in the state owned oil companies of India and intrusion of private capital, this becomes furthermore true. Hence, the need to minimize the differential oil rent, which the oil companies have to pay to the oil producing countries, becomes an important aspect of India’s international political intervention, too. So this unity of ‘economic’ interest serves as the background for the increasing Indian intervention in the Gulf politics and that too in consonance with the US hegemony and other non-OPEC powers. India’s readiness to refuel the American warships during the First Gulf War and later during the Afghan War all point out that there exists an Indian consciousness of possible material gains from its subservience to the US led coalition. However, because of a formidable domestic anti-imperialist opposition, until now the capitalist preference in India could not come out as openly as it has in the vote on the IAEA resolution.

It is worthwhile to note that that a major hitch in the Indo-Iranian negotiations on the proposed pipeline was also related to pricing. “India has taken the position that any price above the US$3 per million British thermal units (BTUs) currently being paid by its power and fertilizer sectors for gas on the international market is unacceptable. Iran, in contrast, appears to be seeking more than US$4 per million BTUs, a rate that will only go higher if Pakistani transit fees are added.” (7) This might have been one of the major reasons in persuading the Indian state to go with the scheme of the West, since the isolation of the Iranian regime and its consequent desperation to earn revenues in the midst of enveloping sanctions can make the Iranians more compliant to the Indian demands and increase the weight on the side of the Indians in the negotiations for the pipeline.

References

(1) The Times of India, September 16, 2005
(2) The Hindu, September 21, 2005
(3) “Press Briefing by the Foreign Secretary on the events in UN and IAEA”, September 26, 2005
(4) Indian Express, January 8, 2005
(5) Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s Talk on “India’s Strategic Perspective”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, June 27, 2005
(6) Cyrus Bina, “The Economics of the Oil Crisis: Theories of Oil Crisis, Oil Rent & Internationalization of Capital in the Oil Industry”, Merlin Press, London, 1985.
(7) A.J. Tellis, “India As a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2005

Advani’s Jinnah Drama

Advani’s Jinnah Drama – An exercise in Goebbelsian parliamentarism

Advani’s recent visit to Pakistan was quite meaningful. Perhaps the most apparent reason was to assuage his aggressive communalist image, which is seen as a hindrance in posing him as a ‘national’ leader of a ‘secular’ India. Vajpayee’s image of a moderate rightist made him more acceptable, despite Advani’s unique popularity among the ranks and files of all the rightist forces in the country, due to the latter’s leadership in the movement that led to the demolition of the Babri Mosque and communal riots across the country (although he denies his own participation in the actual demolition). If we understand this purpose, the total game plan behind the just finished Jinnah ‘controversy’ seems deliberate and well designed. It shows the strength of the fascist forces in India and their ability to manipulate opinions and coordinate their own organs skilfully. How does it matter, at least, to BJP, VHP and RSS whether Jinnah was secular or not? Taking into consideration their perception regarding the state and the role of religion in defining it, it is highly suspicious that they are reacting against Jinnah being called secular. They could have made it an occasion to tell people that Pakistan is the result of what they call ‘pseudo-secularism’, as they are always ready to reinterpret their leaders’ meaningless utterances. But they did not choose to do that, or rather they wanted to take time in doing so. It was only after the drama that BJP started convincing its bewildered cadres that Advani was actually suggesting that despite Jinnah’s secular speech at the time of independence, he created a theocratic state. However, the collaboration between the different organs of the ten-headed (dashanan) RSS was perfect as always, and it corroborates the Italian anti-fascist leader Togliatti’s characterisation of fascism as a chameleon –
1. Advani calls Jinnah secular,
2. VHP’s Togadia croaks immediately in his regular spirit of mindless denunciations,
3. RSS too does some chastising,
4. Advani is defiant; he resigns and calls for an open debate,
5. BJP is in temporary crisis,
6. “Secular” toadies in NDA, like Nitish Kumar, come in support of Advani, and threatens to pull out of the coalition,
7. Vajpayee and the BJP leadership soothe Advani and,
8. Advani withdraws his resignation.

Logical Conclusion: Within a few days of drama, Advani has become fit for leading a ‘secular’ India. Togadia’s abuses, RSS’ chastising and Nitish’s mediation all are necessary for such qualifications.

Bush’s Re-Election and the ‘Indian Dream’

Pratyush Chandra

ML INTERNATIONAL NEWSLETTER JAN-FEB 2005

Interesting reactions over the US elections came from two sections of the Indian society – those vocalised by different associations of the Indian capitalist class, and those coming from the right reactionary forces of the country. More interesting is their open concurrence not only with regard to their assessment of the economic impact of Bush’s victory, but also with regard to their politico-militarist tenor. In my opinion this concurrence speaks a lot about the character of the so-called “national” bourgeoisie and their immediate interests.

Generally, it is assumed that the Indian ruling interests in the foreign political developments are rent-oriented, i.e., gathering favours for offering Indian markets. This judgement is too simplistic and does not match up to the complexity of capitalist international relations. Further, it fails to grasp the nature of capitalist development in India. Marxists enriched the concept of “imperialism” in the second decade of the 20th century to grasp this very complexity of relationships in capitalism. They saw in imperialism a “dense and widespread network of relationships and connections” causing “the propertied classes to go over entirely to the side of imperialism”. (Lenin: 133) They recognised the crisscross nature of international associations and treaties between “national” ruling classes. With the later development of “shareholder” capitalism and MNCs/TNCs, inter-national relationships have become more complicated, which cannot be explained by strict geographical conceptualisation of core/periphery divide. The Indian ruling interests have to be explained as embedded in the global logic of capitalist accumulation, their aim, like their competitors’, being to siphon away as much profit from the global pool of surplus value as they can, by collaborative or aggressive tactics.

This complex relationship between the Indian capitalist class, their political representatives and global politico-economic developments is evident in reactions to Bush’s victory. Strategic and militaristic concerns are predominant in them. They perceive Bush’s victory as an opportunity to ensure the implementation of “Next Steps in Strategic Partnership” (NSSP) with India, which was elaborated in his first tenure. NSSP outlined collaborations in high technology, civil and nuclear space programs and trade. Bush’s commitment to the partnership was taken to be evident in the setting up of the U.S. India High Technology Cooperation Group, U.S. India Cyber Security Forum and the Joint Working Group on Terrorism.

The Indian political and economic elites rely strictly on the “strategic calculus” that would garner Bush’s attractions for India. Since the collapse of Soviet Union, the Indian ruling class has been trying hard to sell themselves as a regional force that can act as a reliable watchdog for global imperialism. The decision to refuel the Anglo-American warplanes in 1991 during Chandrashekhar’s regime, India’s desperate graduation as a nuclear power and bargaining favours on its basis, and sycophant persuasion to get employment during the Afghan War – all amount to the same goal of selling themselves as a power to be reckoned with for any strategic building up in Asia. And they feel now the time has come to realise the “Indian Dream”.

Just after the elections the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) hoped for President Bush’s visit to India early in his second term to provide a new thrust to U.S.-India relations. Rumsfield has already arrived to pave the way for the mission. The CII finds, “Bilateral defense relations are at record highs with the two countries organizing joint military exercises and patrols and are now looking at cooperating in newer areas such as missile defense”, and “a second term now provides an opportunity to build on these initiatives.” The CII being a prime association of the Indian corporates finds the economic gains packaged in this aggressive military relation that puts the government-to-government agreement for cooperation in place. The Indian bourgeoisie seem to agree with the pop-intellectual of American imperialism, Thomas Friedman (1999) that “the hidden hand of the market will never work without the hidden fist – McDonald’s cannot flourish without McDonnel-Douglas, the designer of the F-15”, and that the hidden fist that keeps Silicon Valleys and their technologies safe is the army, navy and air-force. I think he forgot to add private armies and “Ku Klux Klan” rioters, who do what “legal” forces can’t do. Further, with the Indian stakes in McDonalds, why will not F-15s be refuelled in India?

A representative of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), Prasanta Biswal, voiced a similar hope and found that “the republican administration has been pro-India with people like the under secretary of Commerce, Ken Juster, and former ambassador to India Robert Blackwill. We just hope that the initiatives that have been taken will be carried forward and at the same time, they will take newer initiatives.”

A presentiment, definitely, existed that the Democrats would have faced difficulty in avoiding the nationalist pressure of the biggest labour union in the US, the AFL-CIO, which has been the most formidable support base for the Democratic Party. This could have resulted into the curtailment on outsourcing etc., which is an important source of tapping on low wage zones for global profit making which then is shared by the MNCs in the first world and their collaborators in the Third World. In India especially in the IT industry there was an uneasiness and apprehension. The Hindu (Nov 5, 2004) reported, “The re-election of George Bush as President of the U.S. has ended the brief period of uncertainty for the Indian IT industry. Mr. Bush’s rival John Kerry’s protectionist promises that included ending the outflow of call centre and software development business from the U.S. to other countries had made the Indian industry, one of the biggest beneficiaries of this relocation, apprehensive.”

However this fear was false because, on the one hand, any “mature” democracy and its parties are fully trained to dupe such support base while still maintaining it. On the other hand, both Republicans and Democrats have always been involved in propaganda competition on who fulfils the “American Dream”, hence both play on chauvinism to hoodwink the American masses, while remaining consistently married to the expansionist drive of the capitalist class. Even the “democratic” Clinton sagely commends the “conservatives” for drawing “lines that should not be crossed”. (Walsh, 2004)

In fact, the chauvinist tenor of the American Dream and American values herds together the masses behind expansionism as supposed “resolution” to their plight. It is true, the organised labour everywhere has been on defensive in the phase of globalisation, when capital flight works as the regimenting factor. In the face of non-availability of any immediate revolutionary option in the society, they revert to the ideology of desperation, of introversion, to slogans like “buy American, be American”. On the one hand, this forces them to convince the capitalists of their commitment to the industrial “peace”, to make “national” industries competitive in the global market! On the other hand, it consolidates the domestic market for the “national” bourgeoisie of the US. Hence, the “labour support” nowhere binds the hands of the US state or any capitalist state to do what it is meant to do as the governing body of the ruling class.

Particularly interesting is the response of Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS); though one never knows which part of its sounding zone will be claimed official – fascism is always cacophonous. A few months ago RSS Chief Sudarshan “discovered” about the US funded programme to christianise India completely by 2010 or so, and propounded the US to be India’s worst enemy. But now in the columns of RSS’ mouthpiece, Organiser (Nov 21, 2004), one finds Bush as the emancipator of the world from “oriental Talibanism and occidental anarchy” and by re-electing him the Americans have salvaged their civil society. In this column entitled “America, America … says the PM, Comrades want him to shut up” (a usual and unimpressive stuff of anti-communism), Rajendra Prabhu finds “the relationship between India and the United States has been transformed from the cold war suspicion to strategic partnership where the two have deepening mutual interests”. He praises Bush for bringing democracy and freedom to Afghanis and Iraqis. “Today our companies, our government, our experts are building roads, hospitals and schools in that country.” Afghan war was in “our national interest” (one of the Bushisms).

Prabhu, further, notes, “the Presidential election campaign in the US has thrown up the deep divide within that country over Bush’s action and strategy in Iraq.” But then “it was Iraq action that sent the shivers in Pakistan also that the American President could act if the Musharraf regime refused to tango with it in suppressing the Islamic fundamentalists”, thus the US action once again fulfilled “our national interest”.

In a sycophantic tone, peculiar to the “liberal” section of RSS, he lauds Bush’s messianic goals. “From Indonesia to Egypt, the historic Muslim Crescent did get a message in various intensities that the days of oppressive regimes are numbered. Regimes have changed no doubt through elections in Indonesia and Malaysia, and stirrings of a more liberal approach are buffeting the royal regimes and semi-autocracies. If finally an elected government takes office in Baghdad, the President would be vindicated. It looks doubtful at present given the rising level of violence. It looked impossible in Afghanistan also even six months back. But it has happened.” The cowboy spirit of Bush makes possible all Missions Impossible.

Finally, Prabhu concludes – “In this US election, besides Iraq and terrorism, the most divisive issue was the destruction of family values through such aberrations as gay marriages, legalization of lesbianism and such social viruses. For years it seemed the New England liberal establishment and California’s aberrant communities would hijack core values of the country. But suddenly the silent majority gave up its silence and spoke through the ballot to restore the social balance. American ultra liberals may be in mourning. And the Islamic fundamentalists are angry. Civil society needs to be saved both from oriental Talibanism and occidental anarchy. At least that is what the Americans accomplished in this election.”

Both the Indian capitalist class and the rightist forces find strategic and militaristic collaboration between India and the US as crucial for the Indian “national interests”. The only difference is that the latter provides the former with a voice that can draw the general masses behind these national interests with the help of the homogenising effect of aggressive chauvinism. It allows the ruling class interest to become a national interest. Sudarshan’s rabid anti-Christian rhetoric ghettoising masses on communal lines uniquely combines with the “secular” urge of profit-making that can be fulfilled only by joining forces with the US imperialism.

Sections of the Indian capitalists suffered a heavy shock a few months ago to see Vajpayee government voted out of power. It was the government that represented their interests while perfectly taming the masses with its rightist rhetoric. It is not that they were averse to the Congress, which has been their representative for the longest period of time. But the Congress could not sustain itself as such because of its inability to combine various sectional interests within the rural/urban ruling classes while simultaneously regimenting the general masses. In the neo-liberal phase of global capitalism it could not provide a stable government with an aggressive tenor required to support the domestic capital to collaborate and compete in the post-Cold War globalising market. After numerous ups and downs, Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) graduated as that political power. But its defeat and moreover the parliamentary left’s position in a crucial role of stabilising the new government made the capitalists desperate.

Now, the new Congress government has the dual task of competing with the rightist political gymnastics and moderating the damage on the state’s legitimacy by the earlier government by its naïve open communal preferences. Further, it has to continue with the act of settling in the evolving global polity. The biggest contribution of the earlier rightist regime was its determination to fashion its international surroundings in favour of the corporatist interests in the country. Its tactics ranged from the hype of nuclear blasts to the laughable sycophant persuasion of the Anglo-American masters to get employment in the Afghan war. The Indian oil interests and other corporates had their heyday during Vajpayee government. It was the first consistently “outward”- oriented (even if not expansionist in the normal sense of the word) regime, concentrating on building a place in the global polity as a junior partner in global imperialism. As a result, Manmohan’s government has the major task of internal re-legitimisation of the Indian state with a furtherance of the basic orientation of the earlier government, i.e., its economic and foreign policies. In fact, the left support gives his government the essential political legitimacy to pursue these tasks. The parliamentary left was quite easily tamed by the manipulated stock exchange turbulences just after the general elections. It is being time and again forced to reassure the “business” community of its moderated nature. Even when it says that its support must not be taken for granted, it is extremely afraid of the immediate fallout of any hard-line on its part. This situation has become another self-justification for not waging “class struggle” leading to their further reduction as a distinct force of the working class. This tamed radical has become the biggest asset of the capitalist state, which was struggling for its legitimacy right from the initial days of liberalisation in the country.

Frankly as regards to the American policies it hardly mattered who won the election – Bush or Kerry. But for the Indian politics Bush’s victory is significant in the sense, that it allows the rightist forces to once again pose themselves as the smarter representative of the capitalist class attuned to the global needs, which is evident in their respective reactions to Bush’s victory. Further, it pressurises Manmohan to be on the “right” track even with a left support, as he has already demonstrated recently. His initial efforts to start a dialogue with nationalist and left extremists were perhaps laudable, but he has not shown any sign of doing away with Vajpayee government’s belligerent rhetoric and apparatus to wage its own regional “war against terrorism” that includes fighting the left insurgency in Nepal. Bush’s re-election is definitely a gift to the Indian capitalist class and the rightist forces in India, as it would continue to build an atmosphere of aggressive globalism. And they have aptly interpreted the result of the American elections – a victory for militarism and rightism.

References:

Dutt, Rimin (2004) “Indian business groups welcome Bush’s re-election”, IndUS Business Journal Online Nov 15, http://www.indusbusinessjournal.com

Friedman, Thomas (1999) “What the World Needs Now”, New York Times, March 28

Lenin, V.I. (2000) Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Left Word Books, New Delhi

Prabhu, Rajendra (2004) “America, America … says the PM Comrades want him to shut up”, Organiser Nov 21, http://www.organiser.org

Special Correspondent (2004) “IT Sector greets Bush’s Re-elections”, The Hindu Nov 05, http://www.hindu.com/2004/11/05/stories/2004110503541500.htm

Walsh, David (2004) “Opening of Bill Clinton’s library: a sordid gathering of the “fat cats””, World Socialist Web Site (WSWS) Nov 20, http://www.wsws.org/